The decision concerning the forces to be committed was made. General Model's 9th Army with two divisions of Panzer, two of Panzergrenadier and nine infantry of-
would attack from the north. To the south, General Hoth's 4th Panzer Army and seven infantry divisions were to comb the ground. The two jaws of the pincer were to join east of Kursk, encircling the salient and isolating huge Russian forces.
But although the operation was decided upon, Hitler still hesitated.
Knowing that the Russians were strengthening their defenses, he postponed the date originally proposed for the outbreak of "Zitadelle" to the beginning of July:two Panzer battalions could thus come out of the assembly lines and reinforce the northern jaw of the pincers under the orders of Model .
The start of what would rightly be called the greatest tank battle in history was finally set for July 4 at 3:00 p.m., despite repeated offers of abandonment by von Kluge, von Manstein and Guderian.
Facing the 36 German divisions was a force of 11 Soviet armies comprising the elite 6th and 7th Guards armies which had fought so valiantly at Stalingrad as well as the 1st tank army. Each Soviet army corresponded approximately to a German army corps.
In terms of firepower, there was little difference between the opposing forces, but the Russians had reinforced the northern corner of the salient, which was to withstand Model's main thrust, with high-pressure minefields. density:according to Marshal Rokossovski, joint commander on the Kursk front with Vatutin, “We couldn't have placed one of Goering's medals between two mines. »
There were 2,200 anti-tank mines and 2,500 anti-personnel mines per 1,600 meters of defensive front, four times the density of the Stalingrad minefields.
Furthermore, there were no less than 20,000 guns of various types, including 6,000 76.2mm anti-tank guns and over 900 Katyousha rocket launchers. For the attack, the Soviets had the famous T34, one of the best armored vehicles manufactured during the war, with its long-range, highly reliable 76mm gun.
The German offensive force relied heavily on the Panther D, a good tank in many respects but with many technical flaws due to its hasty entry into service. On the other hand, the Germans still possessed considerable air superiority, as the Stuka dive-bomber squadrons were to prove.
But if the opposing forces were fairly well balanced there were other factors that would decide the fate of the battle, not the least of which was the loss of surprise.
The terrain on which the battle was to take place was moderately favorable for a tank fight. Kursk is located between the valleys of the Don and the Dnieper:a region of low heights and vast fertile plains, irrigated by numerous rivers including the Pena, flowing rapidly between steep banks.
The fields of wheat stretch uninterrupted for miles.
The existing roads are mostly dirt roads which become unusable during heavy rains. Many villages are scattered in the shallow valleys and small groves bristle the heights. North of the village of Beresowka is a heavily forested area, roughly circular in shape and about 6.5 kilometers in diameter.
Along the southern face of the salient, Hoth's 4th Panzer Army was deployed in a line in a slight curve that stretched west to east for nearly 50 kilometers. First, the 3rd and 11th Panzer Divisions and the Gross Deutschland Division (Panzergrenadier unit with a large number of tanks, belonging to the 48th Panzer Corps); then the three S.S. Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler, Totenkopf (skull's head) and Das Reich divisions, belonging to the S.S. Panzer Corps; on the right wing, the 6th, 19th and 7th Panzer Divisions of the 3rd Panzer Corps.
Cooperation between ground and air forces must have been very close, and the Germans had taken great care to deploy their enormous armored forces under cover of darkness. Morale according to Model was high and was further fortified by a message from the Führer:
“Soldiers of the Reich!
Today you will take part in an offensive of so important that the future of the war may depend entirely on its outcome. More than anything else, your victory will show the world that any resistance to the might of the Mandewing army is hopeless. »
Unfortunately, the message arrived during an intense Russian artillery bombardment which confirmed that the defenders had been warned of the impending attack.
No doubt this bombardment dented the strike capacity of the assailants, but the attack began as planned at 3 p.m. sharp after a return fire from the artillery and some devastating attacks on the Russian in anced lines by the Stuka dive bombers. /P>
At 7 p.m. infantry and grenadiers from the three divisions of the left flank of the southern jaw broke through the Russian front line at Luchanino, Alexejewka and Sawidowka, three villages which were only weakly held by the defenders.
This weak resistance was a good example of the tactic much used by the Soviets during the Battle of Kursk and consisting in deceiving the attackers by leading them into positions which later proved untenable.
The north jaw of the pincers under Model managed to break through the salient on a 24 kilometer front and the 47th Panzer Corps advanced some 8 kilometers over the next 30 hours but at the cost of heavy casualties. in Porsche Ferdinand (or Elefant) tanks.
These tanks had no machine guns and, as Guderian had long predicted; they quickly proved vulnerable. As the light tanks escorting them were knocked out, they found themselves at the mercy of infantrymen who leapt from narrow trenches and aimed their flamethrowers at the engine vents, igniting the fuel and forcing crews to either be roasted alive or jump from the tank and be taken prisoner.
Model's breakthrough was expected to gain another 8 kilometers south and west over the next week. The sappers who tried, under covering fire, to open passages in the minefields discovered that this only served to help the Russians who succeeded in firing a few rockets and 76 mm guns at the tanks that were attacking them. were crossing.
“Despite our bitter struggle in the north,” a young officer later wrote, “we were advancing almost nowhere, we were standing still. It was like Verdun in 1916.
There was a small village called Teploye. We saw it for the first time on the second day and we have never seen it so clearly as then. Thick black smoke rising from battered tanks hung in the air and each time the smoke cleared we saw Teploye again, but it was like a mirage. We never went closer. »
To the south, the Hoth forces were gaining ground with their advanced infantry and grenadier detachments, but at the cost of very high casualties. During the night the defenders fell back and the front was bombarded over its entire extent.
Paul Hausser the commander of the three S.S. Leibstandarte, Totenkopf and Das Reich divisions later wrote:"Time and time again we have shown the weaknesses of this tactic which makes us hold at all costs the ground we we won too easily.
After driving the Russians out we should have fallen back and let them bomb the place. Then we could have pushed our armor with a little more certainty. »
This lack of imagination which characterized the German plans had, in this particular case, happy consequences. During the night a sudden downpour caused the Pena and its tributaries to overflow, turning the ground into an impassable bog.
Otherwise the tanks would have been brought into the bombardment line. The losses were, however, significant because of the difficulty of finding camouflaged sites:when day broke over the flooded valleys, the Red Air Force attacked the bogged down tanks.