Dietrich, one of Hitler's oldest friends, said in one of his rare reviews of the Führer:"Perhaps the feeling of failure had reached the troops on the Russian front from Kharkov. Not being able to secure victory was a bad thing. And Hitler's uncertainty was a sign.
The conflict between the great generals was another. There were personal hatreds. Kluge and Guderian hated each other; once they almost came to blows. Hitler's intuition was always correct and it should have enabled him to free himself from the pressure of his generals who wanted Operation "Zitadelle" to take place in order to have their share of glory.
And then the Russians threw their men and machines into the fight without worrying about saving money. They didn't care that they were losing a million soldiers. Another million was ready to be engulfed in the war machine. »
This was true, although it could hardly be said that Hitler was frugal in his expenditure of men and materials. But his were desperate expenses, and the Soviet high command knew it full well.
Looking back on the battle, Stalin told the Supreme Soviet:“We were an unshakable mass against which the fascists used their forces; it was mathematically impossible for them to win. Moreover, they were outclassed in the art of maneuver by our generals.
They never had a chance. “
That was not true. There were a number of occasions when the tactics of the Russians were as unimaginative as those of the Germans and several times the jaws of the pincers seemed to close. But it was always a piece-by-piece closing, in isolated units, and never a concerted push.
The deployment of the entire 4th Panzer Army of Hoth on a front of less than 50 kilometers had made it possible to bring together a striking power which could hardly fail.
And yet this power was reduced by the fact of circumstances that should have been foreseen.
Stratagems as simple as the abandoned village were scorned, and the ability of the Soviets to contain the northern force commanded by Model was underestimated. This last error dealt a mortal blow to the whole operation.
As each of Model's attempts to push south failed, it became increasingly difficult for Hoth to effect his junction with him.
“The Russians have learned a lot since 1941,” he told Manstein. They are no longer narrow-minded peasants. We taught them the art of war. »
No matter how the Soviets learned of it, their knowledge was nowhere more evident than in the intense fighting that took place around the rail junction at Orel, north of the salient. The Soviet 3rd Army had forced its way forward with the objective of encircling Model's 9th Army. It was unable to achieve this objective but kept most of Model's infantry and artillery on the defensive. The German infantry was therefore unable to support the armored thrusts to the south in view of a junction with the 4th Panzer Army on the heights east of Kursk.
For three consecutive days and nights, July 9-11, Orel in the north and Belgorod in the south - where the 7th Guards Army attempted a similar maneuver to cut off the S.S. divisions from their logistic groups coming from the 48th
Panzer corps - were subjected to intensive
bombing.
“It was an uninterrupted earthquake, said a witness, the ground split open and any moving tank fell into the crack. »
An additional blow was dealt by the Red Air Force which managed to bomb the German supply base installed in Poltava and to destroy the railway line leading to Kharkov, thus making it necessary to long works of engineering.
There was no doubt that the art of war was very present in the Soviet plans...
The German troops who had been fighting continuously for a week showed signs of exhaustion. A shortage of supplies and ammunition, aggravated by the rupture of the railhead, was also felt.
But on the left flank of the southern jaw, the Germans managed to deny the enemy the main road axis connecting Rakowo to Kruglig and to push towards the forest of Beresowka. Once this objective was achieved, they had a good chance of capturing Hill 247 with the help of the S.S. Division which was exerting its effort to the northwest.
During the night of July 9 the 3rd Panzer Division entered the village of Beresowka from the west, with greatly reduced strength - at least a third of its heavy tanks having been destroyed - but holding stubbornly every inch of ground to which she had fought on the road to Kruglik.