The cracks in the wall of Axis domination were becoming more and more numerous and more and more apparent. The Allies were beginning to overcome the effects of the German U-boat attacks. Italy was in a more precarious situation than ever. The advance of the Japanese into Burma and the southwest Pacific had been halted. The bombardment of German industrial centers blocked or slowed down the supply of the armies.
The U.S.S.R. had an increasing number of planes and crews. On the other hand, the threat of a second front forced many German divisions to remain in Europe, thus reducing the possibility of any large-scale operation on the Russian front.
It was then that in March came for Army Group South Marshal von Manstein's great victory at Kharkov, and for a moment it seemed that the tide was turning. But that hope was soon abandoned. The German victory was incomplete.
An important salient held by the Russians remained:a roughly semicircular pocket sank some 120 kilometers to the west into the German lines at Kursk, and whose base measured more than 160 kilometers from north to south. br class='autobr' />It was said that there were a million men in this salient.
Obviously, a pincer movement launched on the base of the salient was to isolate and destroy the forces it contained and considerably weaken the power of the Soviet army as a whole, so von Manstein prepared this movement to consolidate his victory.
However, as so often before, time interfered. The spring thaw turned the tracks of frozen earth to mud, the rivers swelled, swamps formed; the ruined villages were reflected in the desolation of the floods. Von Manstein could do nothing but pull his armor back so they wouldn't get bogged down, and leave the ground under infantry guard while a plan was hatched. But there was a catch:the longer the Germans remained in a purely defensive position, the sooner the Soviets would attempt to widen the salient and break through the German front completely.
When quick action might have succeeded, the Germans hesitated:Hitler changed his mind; his generals quarrelled.
There were conflicting interpretations of the demands of the situation in Europe. Even the promise of a new attack on the Don and a push towards Moscow after the reduction of the salient could not bring the Führer to make up his mind. Tanks and other heavy assault weapons - especially Tigers and Panthers - had not been delivered to the army in the expected numbers. It was only on April 11 that a semblance of a plan was drawn up; it was essentially the plan which von Manstein had been unable to carry out after Kharkov:an obvious plan, the obviousness of which also imposed itself on the Soviets who hastened to improve their defenses around Kursk.
Any chance of surprise was gone. Now, the only solution to victory was to launch an assault so terrifying that no defender could resist it.
Such an attack involved the commitment of many more armor than the Germans could could afford to lose; and while infantry support was to be expected for the tanks, it also meant a reckless weakening of the front both north and south of the salient.
Hitler remained undecided. On the one hand were the differing opinions of his advisers on the possibility of success.
Marshal von Kluge, commander of Army Group Center and Generals Keitel and Zeitzler of the Army General Staff were in favor. But Guderian, Inspector General of Armored Troops and, at the time, von Manstein himself were fiercely against it.
On the other hand, there was the assurance from Speer, the Minister of Production, that the necessary tanks would be available; and the certainty that, failing a German offensive, the full weight of the Soviet forces would crush the Wehrmacht spread out over a front that was far too large.
While Hitler hesitated, General Vatutin and the Red Army continued to prepare not only defenses as impenetrable as possible, but also a full-scale counterattack.
The news reached Hitler through intelligence reports and aerial photographs indicating the withdrawal of Russian mobile forces from the area west of Kursk in obvious preparation for a counterattack. But on May 10, Hitler finally gave his consent; the operation was called “Zitadelle”.
The Führer insisted on his lack of enthusiasm:"The operation must not fail", he was content to say.