When the Axis forces faced the onslaught of the Eighth Army on October 23, 1942, they were in every way inferior. The most serious handicap was undoubtedly the absence of their famous leader. Rommel, ill, had gone to rest and be treated in Germany on September 23. General Stumme had taken command, bitter at the idea that if the adversary attacked, Rommel would return immediately - convinced that only he would be able to make the adequate decisions.
However, Rommel himself considered defense against such a materiel-rich enemy as the British a "hopeless battle"; for if in Rome and Berlin his masters had made him promises, no concrete help resulted. Day by day, he saw his numbers, the number of his tanks and his guns, his reserves of fuel and ammunition, melting, while, opposite, Montgomery was constantly strengthening. He estimated, for example, that the latter had two tanks against one (in fact he had five against two, including the 300 Italian tanks, and eleven against two if only the German tanks were counted).
The R.A.F. now had mastery of the air, and the efforts of the Luftwaffe to dispute it with him seemed derisory. While in Rome, Rommel had told Mussolini that if the logistical situation was not soon improved, the Axis powers would soon have to evacuate North Africa. But he felt he could not convince the Duce of the seriousness of the situation, and in Berlin he did not even try to do so in the face of Hitler's blind optimism, embellished with empty promises.
On the front, however, Rommel's forces could only prepare the defence, multiplying the field fortifications in the corridor from the Qattara depression to the sea, knowing well that, if they were forced to evacuate these fortified positions, lack of vehicles and fuel would make it difficult and costly for them to retreat west. They were therefore preparing to hold out, at all costs, and to reject any enemy penetration with an immediate counterattack.
The defense system designed by the Germans was little different from what had been seen in 1918; an articulated defense zone in depth behind a screen of outposts, which was to guarantee the mobile reserves the time and safety necessary to concentrate and counter-attack. A technical feature that only amplified what was being done in 1918 was the use of anti-tank and anti-personnel mines. Some 500,000 mines, plus Allied bombs and shells recovered intact. created around each point of support, and along the entire length of the front, deep obstacles to any enemy penetration.
In each sector, the Italian units, flanked by German units, awaited the clash with increasing anxiety. Their defensive system was like an invitation to a battle of attrition. It was still necessary that the British command accept this invitation.
“Before the battle of Alam-Hafa we had a visit from Churchill on August 19, who was returning from Moscow. At our P.C. in Burgh El Arab, General Montgomery saw to it that the Prime Minister and his retinue were comfortably installed, leaving Churchill his caravan near the sea so that he could bathe if he wished.
“The Prime Minister gave us a vivid account of his visit to Moscow, saying that he must have gotten angry to get people to admit that Britain was doing something to win the war. He returned deeply impressed by the way Stalin conducted business. He captivated us by describing our war effort in all its aspects and by telling us what was being prepared against Germany. I remember him telling us:“Germany wanted the bombings, she will bitterly regret the day she started this kind of war, because her territory will be nothing but ruins. »
After his failure at Alam-Halfa, Rommel found himself faced with the following alternative:either stay put and wait for the attack that Montgomery would surely unleash sooner or later, reinforcing his defenses relentlessly, or fall back to a more favorable before the 8th Army was in a position to follow it, in order to shorten its lines of communication and improve its logistical situation. He chose the first solution mainly because he lacked vehicles and fuel; but that moreover it was not in his character to order a retreat, which moreover would have been very badly taken by Hitler.
His choice had, in any case for us, one consequence:the longer we wait to attack, the more formidable the defenses and obstacles, mines, barbed wire, etc., will be. - who would oppose us. We therefore had to take the offensive as soon as possible, and this was also the opinion of Churchill, who began to urge General Alexander, Commander-in-Chief in the Middle East - to attack as quickly as possible, before the end september. He put forward an additional reason:Operation "Torch", the Allied landing in French North Africa, was planned for the beginning of November; it would be greatly facilitated if a battle had been going on here for several weeks.
Alexander arrived at our P.C. one day with a message from Churchill which demanded in rather imperative terms that we attack in September. Having read the message, Montgomery said, "Give me a block, Freddie", and he wrote this:
• Rommel's attack has somewhat delayed our preparations.
• Moon conditions limit the setting of D-Day to certain periods of September and October.
• If insisted on September, our units will still be insufficiently equipped and trained, and failure is likely. On the other hand, if we attack in October, I guarantee a complete victory.
Turning to Alexander, he handed him the pad, saying:“I will note these three points in the answer; so things will be clear”. Alexander transmitted the mes, which obtained the expected result:what could a Prime Minister do in the face of such clear advice from a commander-in-chief? In his Memoirs, Montgomery notes that he "privately" let Alexander know that if the order was given to attack September, someone else would have to be found to conduct the battle.
On balance, Montgomery decided to attack during the October full moon and D-Day was set for the 23rd. It was essential to start the operation at night, because of the minefields.
I now come to the plan itself. There was no question of turning the enemy defera, the sea and the depression prohibited it. It was therefore necessary to make a breach. Montgomery had decided to put the main effort on the right (north) with the 30th Corps (General Leese); the 13th Corps (General Horrocks) cc would lead a secondary attack to the south.
Then the 10th Corps (General Lumsden) would pass through the breach opened by the 30th Corps to threaten the enemy rear and thus forced Rommel to engage his armored reserves; then we could destroy them. That was perfectly orthodox. Once the armored reserves are destroyed, we can dispose of the enemy at will.
The army commander had laid down three fundamental rules for preparing the offensive:command - equipment training. He soon had the first in order and the re-equipment of our units was going well.
But, at the beginning of October. found that the training of the units had not reached the necessary level; faced with this deficiency, he immediately took the decision to modify the plan of attack. Instead of seeking, above all, to destroy the enemy armored force, he was going to progressively nibble away at the forces holding the positions - which included few armored vehicles and he would use our own armored vehicles to prevent those of the adversary from intervening.
Without infantry divisions to hold the centers of resistance and thus ensure the cover of their flanks, the enemy armored units would find themselves in a position of inferiority and in constant danger of being cut off from their rear.
It was therefore unlikely that they would remain passive in the face of our nibbling tactics; we could, on the contrary, expect to see them then attack us, which - from the moment we were ready to receive them - would be to our advantage.