Finally, the outline of the plan adopted on October 6 by Montgomery could be summarized as follows:
• Main attack to the north by the 30th corps with four divisions in line (in order to establish a “bridgehead”:objective “Oxalic – a line beyond the main zone of enemy resistance). Two corridors were to be created in the minefields, through which the 10th Armored Corps would pass.
• The 13th corps to the south would launch a double attack, targeting Himeimat and the El Taga plateau on the one hand, and Jebel Kalakh on the other. These actions were intended to leave the enemy in doubt as to the direction of effort and thus to secure reserves that would otherwise be used against 30 Corps.
• The 13' and 30' corps would have the mission of destroying the units holding the enemy forward positions.
• The 10th corps would deploy (on a line
Pierson' west of "Oxalic") in order to prevent any intervention against the 30th corps. Later, the mission would be to destroy enemy armored reserves.
• The offensive would be launched at night, during the full moon.
The artillery employment plan was carefully prepared. We would go into battle, supported by a large number of guns and with enormous quantities of ammunition. The offensive would begin with massive counter-battery fire, then most of our artillery would execute concentrations on enemy strongpoints.
The aerial plan was good. Before D-Day, the Air Force of the Desert (Air Vice-Marshall Cunningham) had endeavored to weaken the opposing air force. Its leader had shown his abilities by taking advantage of weather conditions that grounded some Axis units; low-altitude attacks, carried out quickly, had then made it possible to destroy numerous aircraft and fuel depots on the ground.
On the night of the attack, our planes were to attack the enemy artillery positions spotted, thus participating in the counter-battery. Later, they would be directed towards areas where Rommel's armored reserves were located. We would have, on D-Day, 500 fighters and 200 bombers, which represented, at that time, a considerable force.
The terrain worried us. We were anxious to gather as much information as possible about the one our attack forces would have to cover. Aerial photos, interrogations of prisoners, questionnaires distributed in the units which had had the opportunity to know this or that sector - we had
we had recourse to all possible resources. We built six tracks to the outlet line of the 30' corps, fantastic work, since we had to build on sand.