The British had considered the possibility of a Japanese offensive in Malaya as early as the invasion of Manchuria in 1931. But although Singapore's defenses had been activated the following year, it was not until 1937 that military officials realized that the fate of the naval base was closely linked to the fate of Malaysia. That year the commander in Malaya, General Dobbie, began to study the problem from this new angle and considered the possibility of enemy landings on the east coast. In October he informed the Ministry of War that, contrary to previously accepted ideas, landings were possible during the northeast monsoon; he even thought that the adversary would choose this period (from October to March) because the poor visibility would seriously limit any aerial reconnaissance.
Dobbie placed himself at the Japanese point of view and planned that, As a preliminary, Japan would seize the airbases in Thailand. He also thought the landings would take place at Songkhla and Pattani, Thailand, and Kota Bharu, Malaysia (see map). It followed that the security of Singapore depended on that of North Malaysia and Johore and that priority should be given to strengthening the defenses in these places. But, after protracted discussions, the English government contented itself with sending an additional battalion to the troops in Malaya and allocated 60,000 pounds for defense works.
Long before these decisions were carried out, 'Japan had extended its offensive to southern China and England was at war with Germany. In this new and perilous situation, the commanders of the navy, army and air force in Singapore wrote their reports at the request of the chiefs of staff in London. The basis of their hypothesis was that in the absence of a fleet the main defensive force of the island would be the air force; What particularly worried British military officials was a recent political decision that denied the character of casus belli to a possible occupation of Thailand by the Japanese. As a result, Japan would be free to occupy part of northern Malaya before the British could react.
As for the role of the R.A.F, it would be to repel the attackers at sea and prevent their attempts to disembark. Meanwhile, the army would defend air and naval bases and sweep out any Japanese forces that eluded the R.A.F. The latter should therefore have 200 additional aircraft, which would make it possible to form thirty-one squadrons, with a total of 566 aircraft. The responsible leaders believed that such a force would stop not only any attack from Thailand, but also an invasion by sea. This would make it possible to reduce the army to 23 battalions.
Before this report could have been studied, Air Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham was appointed Commander-in-Chief in the Far East and on 7 December sent his own plan to the Chiefs of Staff. The right solution, he believed, was to make the English defenses in the Far East so strong that the Japanese would understand the futility of any attempt at aggression. The entire Malay Peninsula had to be protected, with the Army joining forces with the R.A.F. established by the Commanders of the Armed Forces of Malaysia. There was no question of 566 aircraft for the R.A.F., barely 336, and even this figure could not be reached until the end of the year; they recognized the need to strengthen the army and had decided to send a second infantry division from India. This decision, however, did not have the approval of Churchill, always hostile to the withdrawal of troops from sensitive places. On January 13, 1941, he wrote:“I do not remember having approved of this great dispersal of forces. If we consult the minutes, we will see that I wanted the opposite. The political situation does not seem to require, nor does the strength of our air force permit in any way, the maintenance of substantial forces in the Far East at this time. But the Chiefs of Staff Committee persisted, and in April the 9th Indian Division, minus one brigade, arrived to reinforce the 8th Australian Division.
The situation, much improved , however, was far from satisfactory. On August 7, General Percival, Commander-in-Chief in Malaya, informed the Ministry of War that he considered necessary for the defense of Malaya the presence of six divisions, two tank regiments and anti-tank and anti-aircraft units. At the same time, BrookePopham gave his own estimates of the R.A.F.'s requirements, namely:four squadrons of bombers and two squadrons of fighters. These figures were based on the assumption that, if the Japanese attacked, they would commit three divisions to the battle.
In April 1945, the last major battle in Europe resulted in the Soviet takeover of Berlin, the suicide of Adolf Hitler, and the fall of Nazism. The Battle of Berlin it was the last confrontation on the European war scene, at the end of the Second World War. In that battle, millions of Soviet soldier