What worried Brooke-Popham and Percival, almost as much as the weakness of their weapons, was the situation at Songkhla. If we had to wrest the initiative from the enemy, we had to seize this air and naval base before he could reach it and an operation called "Matador" was prepared for this purpose. On September 17, however, the staff in London replied that it was their policy to avoid war with Japan; it was therefore out of the question to enter Thailand before its invasion by the enemy. For the British Far East Command, the situation was confusing to say the least.
However, with the arrival of Duff Cooper, the War Cabinet's special envoy, optimism came back. During a conference held in Singapore on September 29, the opinion prevailed that the Japanese were planning war against Russia rather than against Malaya and that, in any case, once the northeast monsoon came, in October, there would be no more attempted landings on the east coast. When it was learned a few weeks later that Tojo had replaced Konoye, this optimism was somewhat dampened, but London continued to express reassuring views. On October 26, Churchill again asserted that Japan would not go to war until the Germans had truly crushed the Russians. The Allied intelligence services had not understood that the "northerners" (as the Japanese called them) had been beaten by the "southerners" a few weeks earlier.
Thus passed October, then November; the English army in Malaya still lacked two infantry divisions, two armored regiments and anti-aircraft artillery. She dispersed her efforts in airfield defense duties and had no facilities or even opportunities for serious training. Commercial interests still prevailed in Malaysia and the rubber companies took a dim view of the intrusion of troops on their plantations. Even allowing for the lack of training, the quality of the troops was uneven. Soldiers and officers had no concept of jungle warfare. They were soon to receive their first lesson.
It was a "Hudson" operating from Kota Bharu that first sighted the Japanese convoy shortly after noon on December 6th. Twelve hours later, reports confirmed that a convoy of twenty-two ships, under the protection of a powerful naval escort, was heading west. The direction taken by the convoy indicated that it was heading towards the Gulf of Siam and was preparing to leave the reconnaissance zone. Impossible to guess if he would then turn back south, land in Bangkok, Thailand or Malaysia, or everywhere at once. However, permission to launch Operation Matador was refused and the English commanders were reduced to expectation.
Throughout the night of December 6-7, visibility remained poor and c It was only at 5.30 p.m. on the 7th, some thirty hours after the first sighting, that a transport escorted by a cruiser was seen en route to Songkhla. An hour later, four boats were reported north of the Pattani, heading south parallel to the coast.
Still paralyzed by their desire to avoid provocation, the British leaders were unable to launch a counter-attack, and the "Matador" plan was delayed until a reconnaissance could be made at dawn above Songkhla. But, shortly after midnight, if there were any doubts about the Japanese intentions towards Malaya, they were brutally brushed aside:General Key, commanding the 8th Indian Infantry Brigade based northeast of Kota Bharu , reported that three transports had anchored about 2 miles from the coast and that the escorting ships were shelling it. He reported soon after that Japanese troops had begun to land. The Air Staff ordered R.A.F. aircraft and torpedo planes based at Kota Bharu to attack immediately. The war had started in Malaysia.
The desired pretext was offered on July 3, 1870, by the candidacy of the Prince of Hohenzollern to the throne of Spain. To the French, it seemed that Prussia was updating traditional Habsburg politics. France, having rejected for dynastic reasons the candidacy of a Frenchman, the Duke of Montpensier