On May 1, Giap gave the order for a general offensive for 10 p.m. The garrison of Dien Bien Phu only has three days of food left, that day, 275 rounds of 155, 14,000 rounds of 105 and 5,000 mortar rounds of 120. Two points of resistance fall on the first attack , but Bigeard and Langlais hoped to hold out with the reinforcements of men and the supplies of food and ammunition that were parachuted onto the base.
On May 6, around noon, Giap gave the order its Katyusha rocket launchers, the "Organs of Stalin", to go into action to blow up the last ruins and sow terror in the ranks of North Africans and Vietnamese.
A at dawn on May 7, Dien Bien Phu shrinks to a rectangle of 1,500 square meters. Incredibly, Bigeard mounted another counter-attack with two companies supported by the last Chaffee tank. At 6 p.m., the fire ceased. The base does not surrender; it is simply crushed.
The losses of the French troops during the 56 days that the defense of Dien Bien Phu lasted amounted to more than 2,000 dead, 7,000 wounded and missing, without count
7,000 prisoners en route to the death camps. On the Vietminh side, there were
8,000 dead and 15,000 wounded.
The French command expected a lot from the firepower of its medium bombers and fighters -bombers who were to destroy the supply lines of the Vietminh divisions and pound the enemy batteries that had escaped the fire of the 155 guns from the base.
This confidence was exaggerated. In reality, the air force of the Expeditionary Force was ridiculously weak:no more than a hundred combat aircraft, three quarters of which were committed to Dien Bien Phu. It had only 80 transport planes and did not have enough pilots.
The dive attacks for the benefit of the first lines, only on the immediate surroundings of the entrenched camp, had only limited effect due to meticulous Vietminh camouflage. The napalm, used two years earlier with devastating effects in Vinh Yên, at the limit of the defenses of the Red River, had lost its effectiveness in this region where the forest is denser. Moreover, the Vietminh's anti-aircraft weapons (36 37mm guns and 50 12.7mm machine guns) were truly formidable.
In December 1953, Navarre had studied the “Castor” operation. It was, from Laos to attack the rear of the enemy in position at Dien Bien Phu. During the month of April, this action could still be seriously considered. Three thousand men, two thirds of which were Laotian light infantry. At the same time, it was planned to send the partisans of the mixed group of airborne commandos of Colonel Trinquier, the commandos of Mollat and all the groups of irregulars fighting in the Vietminh zone.
But on the 22 April, Navarre cancels its promise of reinforcements and leaves the units already engaged full latitude to interrupt or continue their action. These troops will progress to the immediate vicinity of the basin and recover 78 men who escaped from it, but on May 7 they will receive the order to withdraw.
For the garrison of Dien Bien Phu , evacuation and retreat to Laos would undoubtedly have been fraught with risk; yet, this was his last chance. On May 3, it was still possible to pick up. The operation was planned, its code name:“Albatross”. Under the protection of all the guns and combat aviation, the men still able to carry four days of rations and their individual weapons had to attempt an exit towards the south-east; but that meant, in order to save some of the 6,000 men still able to fight, to abandon the wounded. The Communist Party of Hanoi opposed it. The forces of the entrenched camp were left to their fate.
They fought heroically, until they were crushed.
The Dien Bien Phu disaster was due to a number of serious errors in the choice of site, in the design of the defensive positions preventing their mutual support. The total destruction of the place is due to the impossibility of the command to reinforce it with men and to supply it with ammunition and food; without forgetting, of course, the brilliant qualities of General Giap and the military valor of his battalions.
The loss of Dien Bien Phu not only marks the end of a war and of colonial power French in Indochina. It is the first time that a colonized people has inflicted a defeat on its European master.