The battle of Dien Bien Phu therefore begins under unfavorable conditions for the French; the officers know it or have a presentiment of it; it seems that Navarre and Cogny have doubts about its outcome. But the die was cast.
On the evening of March 12, 1954, Giap gave his last orders before the attack. He knows the stakes of the battle and knows what it will cost. “We will have to suffer losses during the action. Victory is acquired at the cost of blood, like all revolutionary conquests, and by sacrifice. “On the French side, we are aware of the imminence of the attack. Colonel de Castries and his men have been waiting for this moment for several weeks.
On D-Day, the attackers have an 8 to 1 superiority. The French can only field 6,500 men against the 50,000 fighters from the elite Vietminh divisions (the 308th, 312th, 316th and 304th), the 351st engineer and artillery division and the 148th regiment of the territory. The French have five battalions of the Foreign Legion, but eight others are made up of Algerian and Moroccan skirmishers, Thais, Vietnamese, auxiliaries and mobile police.
On March 13, movements Viets are reported around the support points "Béatrice" and "Gabrielle", while two regiments of the 312th division leave their starting base, less than 1,600 meters from the French defenses. Two C47s and a fighter-bomber were destroyed by enemy artillery on the airstrip.
At 5.15 p.m., the first 105 shells fell on "Béatrice", held by the 3 ' battalion of the 13 ' demi-brigade of Foreign Legion. Two 105 guns in position were destroyed and Colonel Gaucher, who commanded the strongpoint, was killed.
Vietminh infantry attacked "Béatrice" at nightfall, after his sappers had breached the barbed wire. Regardless of his losses, the enemy advances, invading shelters and trenches. Foot by foot, fighting with grenades, he infiltrates the guts. At 9 p.m., only one point of resistance still holds. A little after midnight, a heavy silence falls on “Béatrice”. Its garrison of legionnaires has lost 75% of its strength and less than 200 men will be able to join the bulk of the French troops.
In the entrenched camp, the besieged are overwhelmed. A point of support defended by the Legion removed in six hours! Thousands of men look towards the lost position and try to understand. Colonel de Castries, who spent the whole night on the telephone and experienced the agony of "Beatrice", alerted the headquarters in Hanoi. He was promised reinforcements and air support.
A quarter of the 105 ammunition was consumed in one night; moreover, the airfield, vital for the besieged, is unusable; enemy artillery forced the still intact fighter-bombers to take off:they reached Laos. de Castries is considering a counter-attack on “Béatrice”. But low skies and a violent storm prevented any air support.
At 6 p.m., the enemy batteries began to bombard "Gabrielle", Giap's next objective. The strongpoint is held by a battalion of Algerian skirmishers and has eight 120mm mortars from the Foreign Legion. The Vietminh engages in the attack the 88' and 165' regiments of its 308' division. Eight battalions against one.
Benefiting from their defense in depth, the Algerians resist the first assault. But at dawn on March 15 only one fort was still holding.
The French counter-attack towards "Gabrielle" was led by two companies of the Legion and a battalion of Vietnamese paratroopers, supported by six M24 tanks. It progresses to less than 1,500 m from the position and allows 150 of its occupants to join the French lines before its momentum is broken. A second point of support has therefore just fallen.
Less than two days after the start of the Giap offensive, the French command no longer has any illusions. Dien Bien Phu is a mousetrap. More than 1,200 km away, in Saigon, General Navarre directs the fighting from his office. It is true that it was General Cogny, based in Hanoi, who had direct responsibility for the battle. The two generals are aware of the reverses which have just been suffered; they measure the consequences and, first of all, those they are sure to have on their careers.
Navarre decides to come to Hanoi, where a signed message awaits him from Cogny. This message basically says:because of the losses suffered by our troops, there is reason to consider the possibility of a defeat at Dien Bien Phu. While acknowledging the inevitable defeat, Cogny hopes that the responsibility will not fall on him.
Subsequently, relations between these two men fighting the same battle will be limited to an exchange of written notes . They agree on one point, however:finding scapegoats:the engineering officers who designed the fortifications, the photo interpreters, the crews of the transport and ground attack planes and, of course, the government itself. .
In 1953-54, the Vietminh army was a balanced force, organized into divisions, regiments, battalions, companies, all equipped with modern weapons; the men are well supervised and disciplined. Moreover, they fight for their own country and for a cause in which they believe passionately. General Giap is ready to strike a blow.
From March 15, the morale of the Dien Bien Phu garrison is at its lowest. During the night, Colonel Piroth, not accepting the impotence of his artillery, committed suicide. At the PC, some officers cracked. De Castries, surprised and overwhelmed by events, hesitates. He lacks neither courage nor panache, but rather the qualities necessary to lead a battle. Later, he will be reproached for his passivity. It should be remembered that he had received the order to defend Dien Bien Phu after several generals and colonels had "declined this honor".
A soldier of a completely different stamp is the colonel Langlais, commanding the airborne troops. On March 24, de Castries handed over to him the effective command of the entrenched camp, with the exception of "Isabelle", placed under the orders of Colonel Lalande. This transfer of authority is not official, but is the tacit recognition of the situation in which the garrison finds itself. Langlais is assisted by Bigeard, who had returned to the basin a week earlier with his battalion. Bigeard and his men will be the last to defend the camp.
Taking advantage of several days of calm, all the men able to handle the shovel and the pickaxe set about consolidating the trenches and the shelters.
On March 16, on "Anne-Marie", the soldiers of the 3rd Thai battalion have the presentiment that they are going to be attacked. They decide to abandon the battlefield and return to their villages. Several hundred North Africans and Vietnamese also deserted to settle in the trenches on the banks of the Nam Yum.
Giap and the front military committee learned the lessons of the first phase of the offense. Their losses were very heavy but they decide to continue with their strangulation tactic. In ten days, their front line troops will dig more than 10 kilometers of trenches and access roads. They pierced a gallery of about fifty meters to place a huge explosive charge under the position called "Eliane".
On the night of March 30, after a violent artillery preparation, the 312' and 316' Viet divisions launched their attack on the five hills where “Dominique” and “Eliane” were established. For four days, the fight raged. We fight in close combat for positions that will be lost, regained and then lost again. In a single day, the defenders fired 13,000 rounds of 105. The losses suffered by the assailant were appalling; he is forced to stop in front of his lens; he failed; but he has progressed and he will continue to nibble the defense zone.
The situation becomes critical on April 2, when the units of the 308th division are launched against "Huguette". Bigeard then gathers all available forces to counter-attack; the Viets stop again, leaving 800 dead in the barbed wire. The morale of the besieged strengthened. It is even better when Bigeard takes over "Eliane" one of the points of resistance lost after a fierce fight. Giap wore out four battalions, in vain.
In fact, overall, the situation for the French did not improve. Several thousand men are still isolated, trapped. For their part, the Vietminh divisions are exhausted by their effort and Giap is forced to launch a campaign to "mobilize the moral forces and rectify the tendencies of the right wing".