First, the administration failed to adequately assess the potential consequences of the war. This was due in part to a lack of objective analysis and a reliance on biased information. For example, the administration relied heavily on intelligence reports that exaggerated the threat posed by Saddam Hussein's regime. This led to an overestimation of the benefits of war and an underestimation of the costs.
Second, the administration failed to develop a clear and realistic plan for post-war reconstruction. This was due in part to a lack of expertise and a failure to anticipate the challenges that would arise after the fall of Saddam Hussein. As a result, the United States was unprepared to deal with the chaos and violence that followed the invasion.
Third, the administration failed to adequately communicate its plans and goals to the American people. This was due in part to a lack of transparency and a tendency to oversimplify complex issues. As a result, the public was not well-informed about the war and was not prepared for the challenges that lay ahead.
Finally, the administration failed to adequately coordinate its efforts with the international community. This was due in part to a lack of diplomatic skills and a tendency to act unilaterally. As a result, the United States alienated many of its allies and made it difficult to build a consensus for action in Iraq.
These policy-cycle mistakes contributed to the failure of the war in Iraq. By failing to adequately assess the potential consequences of the war, develop a clear and realistic plan for post-war reconstruction, communicate its plans and goals to the American people, and coordinate its efforts with the international community, the Bush administration set the stage for a disastrous outcome.