On January 12, 1945, the Soviets attacked the German front, which stretched from Hungary to the Baltic. They threw into battle a huge force, consisting of 180 infantry divisions and about 6,000 tanks. The German positions were naturally pulverized.
From East Prussia and Poland, the Soviets poured into Silesia and southern Pomerania. The German forces only at the two extremes of the front, in the Baltic and in Hungary, still offered stout resistance. The central sector of the Eastern Front had collapsed beyond repair.
However, Soviet offensive power was gradually absorbed by the vast space. In the central sector of the front an inlet had been created, the flanks of which were very vulnerable, from a concentrated, converging attack.
Taking advantage of this fact, the excellent German general Heinz Guderian, the "father" of German tanks and the chief of staff of the army at the time, first restructured its layout. A new group of armies was formed, the so-called Vistula.
The incompetent Himmler
Unfortunately for Guderian, the administration of the new organization was given to the incompetent Heinrich Himmler, Hitler's well-known "first lieutenant". Thus when the Russian offensive was resumed on January 26, the staff of the German Army Group Vistula, under the infamous Himmler, who had the responsibility of guarding the northern and central sectors of the front, was unable to act with the urgency required by the circumstances. speed.
The Soviet phalanxes attacked on January 28 at the so-called Varte River location, which was the link point between Army Group Center and Army Group Vistula. Two days later the position had been broken and the Soviets had advanced deep into the strip of land between the Oder and Varte rivers.
There they were stopped for a while and the German forces managed to re-form, as it were, a new front. A huge enclave had now been created within which large Soviet forces had been concentrated.
General Guderian was the man who organized the German Panzers and created the doctrine of "blitzkrieg". After the war he helped reorganize the US armored forces. The doctrine of air-ground warfare still in force today is largely his creation.
If the Germans managed to take advantage of this fact with a converging attack against the flanks of the enclave it would be possible to trap and destroy a sufficient number of Soviet units. Of course the vulnerability of the Russian enclave did not escape Guderian's attention. This great soldier immediately began making plans for a converging counterattack.
He intended to deploy General Sepp Dietrich's SS 6th Panzer Army (SS) to attack the southern edge of the enclave and the relatively reorganized 3rd Panzer Army against the northern flank of the Soviet enclave. But again Guderian's plan ran afoul of Hitler's imagination. The first blow for him was the disposition of the 6th SS SS "for the lifting of the siege of Budapest".
Absurdity
Guderian nevertheless continued to work on this plan, initially attempting to reorganize the 3rd Panzer Army. He still hoped for the disposition of the 6th SS SS, which had not yet been decisively involved in the battles around the Hungarian capital.
The problem, however, was to convince Hitler, who, based on "high" political planning, sought to weaken the central sector of the front. After a fierce verbal conflict with Hitler, Guderian decided to abandon the plan of a convergent attack and limit himself to launching an attack against the right flank of the Russian enclave, at the height of the Arnswalde forest.
However, for even a limited-target attack to have any hope of success, it would have to be launched no later than February 15, and of course its progress would have to be controlled by an experienced soldier and not by the nominal commander of Army Group Vistula , the "faithful Himmler".
Determined to support these two demands, Guderian appeared before Hitler. Then took place one of the most noisy scenes, indicative of Hitler's psycho-physical condition. The militarily incompetent Himmler insisted that it was not possible to launch the offensive at the times Guderian desired, citing fuel and ammunition shortages. Hitler of course took the side of his "faithful" partner.
Apocalyptic dialogue
Guderian:We cannot wait until the last can of oil and the last box of ammunition are delivered. By then the Russians will be very strong.
Hitler:I do not allow you to accuse me of wishing to wait.
Guderian:I do not accuse you of anything. I am merely saying that there is no need to wait until the last load of supplies has been delivered to the divisions, for then we shall lose the moment favorable for the attack.
Hitler:I am precisely informing you that I do not allow you to accuse me of desiring idle waiting.
Guderian:General Wenk must attach himself to the staff of the National Leader (Himler), since otherwise there is no doubt about the fate of the attack.
Hitler:The National Leader is capable enough to carry out the attack alone.
Guderian:The National Leader has neither the requisite experience nor a sufficiently trained staff to control the attack in person. Therefore the presence of General Wenk is necessary.
Hitler:I do not permit you to say that the National Leader is incapable of fulfilling his duties.
Guderian:I am obliged to insist on the attachment of General Wenk to the staff of the Army Group so as to ensure the satisfactory conduct of operations.
Guderian recorded the aftermath of the "meeting" in his memoirs. “Hitler would pace nervously along the edge of the carpet and then stand abruptly in front of me and accuse me. He was almost screaming and his eyes were about to pop out of their sockets. His veins were swollen".
Finally, quite abruptly, Hitler stood before Himmler and, according to Guderian, said to him:"Well, Himmler, General Wenk will come to your headquarters tonight and take over the direction of operations." Then turning to Guderian, he smiled at him and said:"The General Staff won a battle today."
Finally the Arnswalde offensive was launched on February 15 and lasted just four days. General Wenk was injured in a car accident-Hitler made him attend the "evening meetings" every night. For this purpose, however, he had to travel a distance of 320 km every night.
Exhausted from driving, he crashed the car into a bridge parapet. After that the attack, in the absence of coordination, simply fizzled out. It was the last successful attack of the German Army in World War II.