The mission of opening two corridors in the minefields was quickly and well executed, but by dawn the tanks had been able to get no further. Throughout the night, bitter fighting took place on Miteiriya Ridge and as soon as he recovered his senses, the enemy concentrated their artillery and mortar fire on the corridors. Then the 15th Panzer Division launched a counterattack. The army commander reviewed the situation at dawn on the 24th; he found that the operation had started well, but that it was essential that every effort be made so that the
1’ body could pass. And he decided that the New Zealand Division should immediately begin "nibbling" the enemy's static defenses.
To the south, the 13th Corps had launched its attack as planned. The French stormed the hill of Himeimat, but the sand prevented their heavy guns from reaching them and they were thrown back by a German counterattack. The other lead units of 13th Corps, after initial progress, were halted between two minefields. Throughout the day of the 24th, therefore, incessant "nibbling" actions took place in this sector, and the aim of this secondary action was achieved:the 21st Panzer Division remained in the southern sector.
So began a week of fierce fighting. On the evening of the 24th, the 1st D.B. had been able to pass some of its elements to the west of the minefields; but the 10 'D.B. could not achieve this and was in a bad position. An attack which it launched at 10 p.m., with the support of the artillery of the corps, made little progress.
I then had the impression that in certain subordinate P.C. began to consider suspending the attack and retreating behind the dunes. I therefore considered that the time had come for an intervention by the commander of the army and I summoned the commanders of the 30th and 10th corps at 3.30 a.m. at our front post.
Then I went to wake the general who was sleeping peacefully despite the attacks of the enemy air force. He approved of my initiative and told me to bring him to the "map truck", as soon as they arrived, Leese and Lumsden. When we entered the truck, Montgomery greeted us and made us sit down, then he asked each of the two generals to give an update. He listened calmly, occasionally asking a question. There reigned a rather particular atmosphere and dexterity was necessary; one felt that Lumsden remained unenthusiastic about the mission assigned to his tanks. After a moment of silence, Montgomery telephoned for the commander of the 10th D.B. and questioned him on the situation of his division. He then made it clear that he stood by his orders in full, and he ordered the HQ of the 10th D.B. to move west.
This decision was courageous, as it involved accepting considerable risks and high losses. But if the orders had been changed, I have the firm conviction that our offensive could have stalled, and that the great success which was to crown it could never have been obtained.
On the 25th, at 8 a.m., the leading brigade of the 10th D.B. was 2 km west of the mined area and in liaison to the north with the 1st D.B. 8th Armored Brigade had also crossed the minefields and were advancing south-west as planned, drawing several counter-attacks from the 15th Panzer Division, which they repelled by destroying many German tanks.