Spain throughout its centuries-long history had aroused the interest of foreign powers in its internal affairs. But in the new civil war that broke out in 1936, due to its political overtones, but also due to the complicated European political situation of the time, Britain preferred to remain neutral. This neutrality was due to the fact that British politicians disliked Franco, but at the same time hated and feared communism.
Of course, Britain's neutrality actually worked in Franco's favor, since the Non-Intervention Commission set up on Britain's initiative prevented the easy supply of democratic Spain, but not nationalist Spain - Hitler and Mussolini should not have been angered, especially at the moment when Britain was attempting to re-engage the Italian dictator to use him as a counterweight to Hitler's expansionist policy.
On the other hand, France, politically powerless and deeply divided at home, had de facto hitched itself to the British bandwagon hoping to save itself from the ever-increasing German threat. In the period from 1918 to 1936, France was in continuous decline.
Indeed, when the Spanish war broke out, the new government in France, the "Popular Front" government under Leon Bloom, was only in its sixth week. Bloom, and for ideological reasons, wished to strengthen democratic Spain.
But this would have to be done in extreme secrecy, so as not to revolt the French right-wing opposition, whose supporters clashed daily with supporters of the Left in the streets of the French cities. Even risking the outbreak of civil war, Bloom decided to send war material, mainly fighter planes, to republican Spain.
The French Right, however, discovered the secret agreement and launched a major attack against Bloom "who, disregarding the defense needs of France, hastened to reinforce his like-minded people". Fatefully, Bloom officially backed down. Unofficially, the French aeronautical companies sold aircraft, but without their armament, to the republic.
At the same time the democratic government of Spain sent its representatives to France with a request for the purchase of portable weapons and cannons. Indeed the Bloom administration sold arms to the republic.
But he made sure to sell her what the French Army previously had in its warehouses, and indeed at very high prices. But even these material deliveries had to stop.
Britain warned France that if it continued to strengthen democracy, it would not be able to prevent dictators from strengthening Franco.
There was, after all, the danger that the Spanish war would escalate and cause the outbreak of a new European war, as British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden pointed out to Delbos's French counterpart.
Later, Delbos confessed that during the talks Eden had mentioned to him that he would rather see the nationalists win than see Spain "red".
The help that the British had already offered to Franco in the first days of the movement, but also before, during its preparation, should probably be seen in this light.
The British base of Gibraltar had become a center for disseminating nationalist propaganda to the Western world. From the nationalist refugees who had taken refuge there, the British journalists poured out horror stories about the "red fever" that was affecting Spain, which they made sure to make known to the whole world.
Also, the means of communication of the base served the mobile army, in the first and critical stages of the war. At the same time, the British battleship "Queen Elizabeth" prevented the republican fleet from bombarding the nationalist-controlled port of Algeciras.
The Americans were also officially neutral. American companies, however, helped Franco as much as they could. During the war the Nationalists received more than 3,500,000 tons of oil on credit from American companies.
Other companies, such as Ford or ITT, financially and materially supported the nationalists, but also the Germans in World War II, a little later. The Spanish Deputy Foreign Minister himself declared in a closed circle in 1945 that "without American oil, without American vehicles and without American credits, there was no way we could win the civil war".
And yet, it was the attitude of the Western powers that forced the republic into Stalin's fiefdom. Since the Soviet Union was the only country that generously supplied arms to the Democrats, it made perfect sense for the Spanish Communists to strengthen and eventually become the arbiters and rulers of democratic Spain, along with the thousands of "advisors" they sent Stalin.
It is a given that from one point onwards the democratic government practically did not exist. With the power of Russian weapons, democratic Spain was ruled by the communists.
The military, before even attempting their movement, had come into contact with the Germans and Italians. The leader of the movement, General Sanjurjo, on the day the movement broke out - July 19 - had authorized Luis Bolin - later Franco's intelligence officer - to go to Rome and ask for help from Mussolini on his behalf.
On the same day, Sanjurjo was killed in a plane "crash" planned by Franco, according to some sources, who succeeded him in the leadership of the movement. Bolin was welcomed by Ciano and Mussolini, who enthusiastically agreed to help "exterminate communism in the Mediterranean".
On July 30 Bolin arrived with 9 Italian bombers in Morocco. But these were only a small advance from the Italian dictator.
Soon the nationalists would be reinforced with Fiat 32 fighters, CV 33/35 chariots, heavy artillery and an Army Corps, a force of four divisions at the height of its power operating in Spain. Later Italy even sold submarines to the nationalists while Italian Navy submarines were blocking republican ports and sinking Soviet ships.
Italy was the country that catalyzed Franco, counting on his alliance against the British when the new great war would begin.
In contrast, Hitler's Germany was limited to sending qualitative rather than quantitative aid, with compensation of course. Franco himself initially asked for the Ju 52 transports, with which he took the Army of Africa from Morocco to Spain.
However, the importance of this flyover has probably been overstated. In the first critical days the Ju 52s carried no more than 1,500 troops into metropolitan Spanish territory.
It took about two months for the African troops to cross onto European soil. And the transportation of the vast majority of them was done by ships, thanks to the inactivity of the democratic fleet, which of course was commanded by a revolutionary committee of sailors.
In mid-August, the Germans sent 20 Ju 52 transports and 6 Heinkel 51 double-winged fighters. Gradually, other aircraft, anti-aircraft guns and Pz I light tanks were sent. The latter were escorted to Spain by Colonel von Thoma, who was later to become the last commander of the famous Afrika Korps.
The German air and anti-aircraft units in Spain were drawn up in November 1936 under a single command, forming the "Legion Condor" (initially the legion had only 36 He 51 fighters and as many Ju 52 transports converted to bombers).
Contrary to what the republican propaganda proclaimed, German aid to the nationalists was neither quantitatively nor qualitatively commensurate with that received by the Soviet republic.
The German He 51 fighters were clearly inferior in performance to the Soviet Polikarpov I 15 fighters initially used by the Democrats and completely outmatched against the also Soviet Polikarpov I 16s that the Soviets later fielded.
Only from the spring of 1937 onwards, with the arrival of the first Messerschmitt Bf 109 B fighters, can it be said that the "Condor" legion gained qualitative parity with the republican Air Force.
The superiority of the Germans over the Soviets and the Spanish republic lay in the better training of their crews as well as their ability to operate in close conjunction with ground forces.
In contrast, the Democratic Air Force was never able to successfully support friendly ground forces, even if it had managed to gain local air superiority.
In the field of tanks also the Democrats excelled until the end of the war qualitatively and occasionally and numerically. The nationalists mainly used Italian Cv 33/35 chariots, which had very thin armor, pierced by machine guns in some cases, and were armed with one or two machine guns.
The German Pz I tanks were also lightly armored and armed with two 7.92 mm machine guns. Only in the last months of the war did the Germans send Pz II tanks to Spain, armed with a 20 mm cannon, which however they did not have time to participate.
Against these tanks the Democrats had the excellent Soviet light tanks T-26 and BT-7 which were armed with a 45 mm cannon, capable of shredding nationalist tanks from a long distance.
Also, in the field of anti-tank weapons, the nationalists were mainly equipped with the German PAK 36 37 mm anti-tank guns and the useless Italian 47 mm anti-tank guns.
The Democrats, for their part, had Soviet anti-tank guns of 45 thousand and French guns of 25 and 47 thousand. So it was not the lack of war material that forced the republic into defeat. It was the tragic way of handling this material, on a strategic, tactical and also individual level. According to a British volunteer of the International Brigades, the Spanish republican militias did not have a good relationship with the maintenance of their armaments. Even after the battle they did not even take care of cleaning their individual rifle. Most of the rifles were blacked out, according to the British volunteer.
Hitler decided correctly – as far as his plans were concerned – to get involved in Spain at the lowest possible cost and the highest possible gain. The Spanish Civil War allowed him to divert the attention of international public opinion from central Europe and his actions there.
It diverted disturbing eyes away from domestic Germany to Spain and strengthened Germany's international position. On the other hand, Hitler really wanted Franco to prevail, not so much for reasons of ideological identification with him, as left-wing historians like to say, but for purely practical reasons.
Hitler did not practice sentimental politics like his Latin ally Mussolini. A nationalist Spain automatically posed a threat to the backs of Germany's rival, France. At the same time, the alliance with Franco would allow him to effectively control the entrance to the Mediterranean, and by extension would allow him to block the British fleet.
Also, Hitler had financial benefits. All payments for war material were made in gold or other strategic materials - mainly copper - necessary for the German war machine which at that time was under construction. Finally, Spain was for the German dictator an extensive testing ground for the new tactical doctrines of the Luftwaffe and the Panzerwaffe.
It is worth noting that in 1940 Hitler put to Franco's judgment the "Felix" plan, which involved the occupation of Gibraltar by a German Army Corps, which would pass through Spanish territory.
Franco, after buying as much time as he could, finally dropped the plan much to Hitler's dismay. The cunning Spaniard did not want his country to be involved in World War II, even on the side of - as he believed - the defeated.
All Franco's assistance to Hitler during World War II was limited to the sending of the "Blue Division" (Athul) of the phalanx volunteers on the Eastern Front in 1941) and supply facilities to German ships and especially submarines.
On the other hand, the Spanish Civil War did not preoccupy the Soviet dictator Stalin in the first place. In 1936 Stalin was preparing to begin the purges in the Red Army, purges which turned the world's most powerful army into a useless, mushy body. Besides, his possible involvement might cause war with Germany, a possibility that Stalin avoided.
The Soviet leader's silence, however, naturally caused whispers of discontent among Communists everywhere. In particular, the exiled Trotsky reacted, who accused his (political) opponent of betraying the Spanish revolution.
Stalin therefore, having no other choice, was forced to react. Suddenly entire Soviet territory was convulsed by "spontaneous" demonstrations by Soviet citizens in favor of democratic Spain, thus giving Stalin the excuse he was looking for to intervene.
Initially, "advisors" were sent to Spain, tasked with "guiding" the small Spanish Communist Party and expanding it.
From October 1936, the massive deliveries of war material and the sending of "military" advisers, Soviet as well as foreign, mainly Hungarian, Italian and German communists, began.
About 4,000 Soviet military advisers served in Spain, mainly as formation commanders, unit leaders, tank specialists and aircraft operators.
Also, the NKVD, the equivalent of the SS organization of the Soviet Union, created a special branch in Madrid headed by Orloff.
The Soviet ambassador in Madrid, Rosenberg, became a leading figure in political affairs in democratic Spain until he was "purged" by Stalin.
General Goriev was in fact the commander of the Democratic Army in Madrid, which was ostensibly commanded by the not very capable Spaniard Miaja. Special adviser on tanks was General Pavlov (codename Pablo), who was executed by Stalin in 1941.
Ilya Ereburg and a number of European communists were also sent to Spain, among whom stood out the Italian Togliatti (general secretary of the KKI in exile), Kleber, Walter, Gall and Chopik and the well-known Greek Bulgarian Dimitrov, who stayed to play an important role in the period 1943-49.
In total, the Soviet Union sent to republican Spain more than 1,000 fighters and dozens of Tupolev SB 2 bombers. Many more dozens of I 15 fighters were built in the republic's factories with Soviet know-how.
The Democrats secured another 300 aircraft from other sources, mainly from France and Britain and a few from the USA. The Soviets also provided the republic with at least 800 tanks and 400 armored vehicles, 1,500 field and anti-tank guns, 4,000,000 artillery shells, 15,000 machine guns and 500,000 rifles. Surely the defeat of democracy was not due to the lack of material.
However, it must be emphasized that the Soviet Union granted the war material to the republic at no cost! The latter granted "for safekeeping" 70% of Spain's gold reserves to Stalin.
He was also obliged to pay 80,000 dollars (in 1936 prices) to the Soviet Union as transport costs for the gold! As if that wasn't enough, Stalin asked for and received another $70,000 for the cost of storing the gold, while receiving another $174,000 a year for keeping it in the Soviet vaults.
So Soviet aid cost the republic very dearly, more than it would have cost it in the free market, if of course it could buy arms from the latter. In any case, however, Stalin's behavior was indulgently despicable and had nothing to do with the revolutionary ideals he boldly exported to the rest of the world.
The most tragic thing of course was that people died in the name of these ideals.
Φυσικά, οι αγνοί ιδεολόγοι κομμουνιστές δεν είχαν καμία σχέση με τις ατιμίες του «πατερούλη» Στάλιν. Πιστοί στην ιδεολογία τους, κατατάχθηκαν κατά χιλιάδες στις Διεθνείς Ταξιαρχίες, πολέμησαν και πολλοί πέθαναν υπερασπιζόμενοι τα πιστεύω τους.
Οι Διεθνείς Ταξιαρχίες υπήρξαν δημιούργημα της Κομμουνιστικής Διεθνούς, της γνωστής Κομιντέρν. Η ιδέα συγκρότησής τους ανήκε στον Γάλλο κομμουνιστή ηγέτη Μορίς Τορέ.
Η σκέψη του Τορέ ήταν να συγκροτήσει ένα στρατιωτικό σώμα αποτελούμενο από εξόριστους κυρίως κομμουνιστές από κάθε γωνιά της γης. Σταδιακά όμως στις ταξιαρχίες εντάχθηκαν και μη διωκόμενοι, ακόμα και μη κομμουνιστές – τουλάχιστον το 45% των ανδρών δεν ανήκαν σε κομμουνιστικά κόμματα.
Σε όλη τη διάρκεια του πολέμου, τουλάχιστον 35.000 άνδρες πολέμησαν εντεταγμένοι στις ταξιαρχίες, προερχόμενοι από 53 διαφορετικές χώρες, περιλαμβανομένης της Ελλάδας και της Κύπρου. Οι περισσότεροι από αυτούς ήταν εργάτες, αγρότες ή άνεργοι, μικρή επαφή είχαν με τη «διαφώτιση» των κομμουνιστικών κομμάτων των χωρών τους και ελάχιστα ήταν σε θέση να γνωρίζουν σχετικά με το τι σημαίνει πόλεμος.
Όλοι τους πάντως είχαν καλές προθέσεις και η συμμετοχή τους στις ταξιαρχίες αποτελούσε συνειδητή επιλογή, για την οποία όμως πολύ σύντομα πολλοί από αυτούς μετάνιωσαν.
Η αντιστροφή αυτή είχε κυρίως να κάνει με τον τρόπο διοίκησης των ταξιαρχιών και με τον τρόπο της χρησιμοποίησής τους στις μάχες, αλλά και με τη συμπεριφορά ορισμένων κομματικών στελεχών.
Ένας από αυτούς, ο Γάλλος Αντρέ Μαρτί, ήταν υπεύθυνος, όπως ο ίδιος παραδέχτηκε, για τις εκτελέσεις 500 τουλάχιστον «ταξιαρχιτών». Οι περισσότεροι από αυτούς είχαν κατηγορηθεί είτε για δειλία ενώπιον του εχθρού είτε για κατασκοπία είτε για αντικομμουνιστική δράση.
Η τελευταία κατηγορία αποδιδόταν συνήθως σε ταξιαρχίτες οπαδούς άλλου, μη ορθοδόξου κομμουνιστικού δόγματος, όπως για παράδειγμα στους τροτσκιστές ή τους αναρχικούς.