It is difficult, in the midst of all the seas which divide and unite the Commonwealth, to estimate the vast expanse over which the Battle of the Atlantic was fought. The term itself is restrictive, as the battle was taking place far beyond the Atlantic Ocean. German submarines and warships also operated well in the Indian Ocean, the main route to India, Australia and New Zealand. For a long time, the Arctic Ocean was the only possible route to supply Russia after the start of its campaign, although later another route was opened to it through the Persian Gulf. All of these routes required protection from German attacks and what is known as the Battle of the Atlantic was actually a battle of the oceans.
In terms of course, we can say that in this gigantic fight, several hundred thousand miles were covered every week; as for the boats themselves, every day saw about 1,000 on the sea, all of which had to be protected against attack by an enemy who could act practically without being seen or heard. This is how one can assess this battle, an immense and incessant conflict undertaken over millions of square meters of ocean.
Another aspect of this battle must be mentioned. From the beginning of 1941, the chiefs of staff were already preparing their plans to move it from the defensive stage to the offensive stage. It was realized that, when the time came, a vast army would have to be assembled in England to storm Europe, the only possibility of winning a complete victory. The bulk of this army, men and materials, could only come from the United States and Canada. Security in the Atlantic was vital to this major movement. Only a decisive victory over the submarines could guarantee such security. This Battle of the Atlantic was the gearing of all the machinery of war, and a failure inevitably led the whole Allied cause to defeat. It was the only key capable of opening the doors of final victory.
Merchant ship losses in 1941 were heavy. The submarines alone had sunk 432 boats for a tonnage of 2,171,754 tons, while the German air force claimed 371 boats of 1,017,422 tons. The other German ships added to this total, during the same year, 84 ships of 428,350 tons, while 1,11 ships more were lost in the enemy minefields laid out around the English coasts. The overall loss for that year was 1,299 ships totaling 4,328,558 tons. These losses were far from being able to be compensated by the Allied shipyards.
These figures give an accurate idea of the violence of the battle, but they were far exceeded by the figures for the following year. German U-boats alone exceeded the losses of 1941 by about 2,000,000 tons (6,226,215 tons) and total losses for that year amounted to 7,790,697 tons, represented by 1,664 boats.
“The U-boat attack in 1942, wrote Churchill, was our greatest evil. Indeed, in no other theater of operations, except perhaps in the Pacific, was the situation so bleak. And still for this same reason, the inability for the Allies, faced with all their maritime commitments, to produce escort ships and long-range aircraft quickly enough to balance the increase in German submarines. In Germany, all production was concentrated on submarines and the speed with which they were coming out of the yards can be judged by the growing number of operational vessels in the Atlantic. Excluding those used for training or other purposes, the number of submarines in operation increased from 91 in January 1942 to 196 in October of the same year. then to 212 at the end of the year. The largest number (240) was reached in April 1943. Although 87 of them were sunk in that year 1942, including accidents in German territorial waters, the production far exceeded the losses.
The entry of the United States into the conflict brought the U-boat captains their second "good time". For six months the U.S.A. had to rely on sea and air escorts to counter the German attacks, despite the English experience which had proved that the convoy system was the only way to balance the increase in losses. Admiral Donitz launched 5 submarines at the time of the declaration of war against the United States, increasing this number in stages to a total of 21. In June 1942, when the Americans had organized all their ships into convoys, the Donitz U-boats had already sunk 505 of their ships. This holocaust made Admiral Dônitz exult:"Our submarines operate very close to the American coast, so that swimmers and sometimes entire towns are witnesses to these dramas, the climax of which is constituted by the grandiose conflagration of American tankers . »
Donitz and the German High Command had calculated that if they could sink an average of 800,000 tons of Allied shipping monthly, Axis victory was certain. In fact, this average did not exceed 650,000 tons per month, but optimistic reports led to the belief that the target had been reached. In any case, this average of 650,000 tons was a heavy test for the Allies, which they were quite unable to compensate for. During those grim months of 1942, defeat in the Atlantic, and therefore of the entire war, was an eventuality that haunted the minds of all Allied leaders.
All these losses not only represented losses of ships, they also represented the inevitable loss of the material they carried, as well as the unforeseen reduction in the forces necessary for the final assault on Europe. The increase in these forces had been given the code word "Bolero" and the plans drawn up by the British and American chiefs of staff had called for a force of 5 divisions of Canadian and American troops to be sent to England before the end of 1942. As the year drew to a close, "Bolero" was so behind schedule that less than one division could be brought in, and the plan was falling further and further behind. The whole course of the war, every hope, every project was compromised.
However, in 1942, the first frigates ordered in 1939 and 1940 for anti-submarine warfare, began to leave Construction sites. These ships possessed the power and speed necessary to carry out the battle. One of the big problems with convoy escorts had been the risk they took by chasing submarines to destroy them rather than engaging in exacting operations. Their main mission had always been to protect merchant ships, but a convoy could not stop in the middle of the Atlantic because its escorts were fighting. A certain number of U-boats, located by radar or asdic, survived only because the escorts had not had time to hunt them down to destroy them. Merchant ships always had priority.
The commissioning of these anti-submarine frigates provided a answer to this problem. The reinforcement they represented allowed Admiral Noble to organize protection groups that could be directed to any convoy threatened by a "wolf pack". While the normal escort could continue on its way with the convoy, thus providing it with the necessary cover, the protection group could engage in a prolonged hunt by maintaining contact with the detected submarine, thanks to its asdics throughout the course. 'commitment. The first protection group, under the command of Captain F.J. Walker, was at sea by the first week of September 1942, but other events were to delay the implementation of this new contribution to the Battle of the Atlantic.
Almost at the same time as the frigates, the new anti-submarine weapons arrived. First the "Hedgehog", a multi-shell mortar that could fire 24 charges at the attacker, and then the "Jellyfish" which unloaded a set of 3 full-size depth charges. The old method of dropping the grenades into the stern of a ship had suffered from a major drawback:contact between the asdic and the submarine was lost during the assault and the final stages of the attack. had to be done blindly. These new weapons allowed the asdic to maintain contact throughout the fight until the moment of the explosion of the charge which could occur with
greater precision.
Towards the end of the summer of 1942, the first of the new small aircraft carriers ordered from the United States the previous year entered service. It was Avenge. Before the end of the year, 6 more of these buildings were able to serve the Allied fleet. These aircraft carriers were to provide the final answer to the threat of submarines, their planes finally being able to roam the unprotected areas of the Atlantic. It was in these areas, in the middle of the ocean, off the northern coast of Brazil and around the African hump, that the U-boats concentrated to discover convoys without air cover. The attacks on these convoys were carried out with such violence that the surface escorts were overwhelmed, which allowed many successes for the German submarines.
It was then possible, at the end of the fall of 1942, to finally take the offensive. Thanks to the support groups which reinforced the protection of the convoys, thanks to the planes which provided air cover in the unprotected areas, and thanks to the new weapons which allowed the asdic to maintain contact until
last moment, the prospects of success seemed greater. In November 1942, Admiral Sir Max Horton, the new Commander-in-Chief, arrived in Liverpool. He was a classy officer who brought to his mission a thorough knowledge of submarine warfare in all its aspects. He inherited from Admiral Noble an organization in which the essential work had been done and a command whose forces were continually increasing.
Much of the difficulties which had besieged the Allies in 1942 and had caused numerous losses of ships of all kinds, was due to the withdrawal of American escort forces from the Atlantic in June. These forces, in fact, had been requisitioned partly for the Pacific War and also to escort the troops and logistical convoys required for the invasion of North Africa scheduled for November.
At the end of the year, the escort forces in the Atlantic were distributed as follows:England 50%, Canada 48%, United States 2%. In early 1943, a convoy conference was held in Washington. The United States declared that it was obliged to withdraw all of its forces from the Atlantic. This decision came at an unfortunate time. Indeed, the battle was in full swing and the English and Canadian forces were stretched to the limit. Although this decision was only a small part of the burden, England and Canada were to share the consequences equally.
As the escort forces were about to take the offensive against the German submarines, a new hard blow struck the naval command. Operation Torch, the invasion of North Africa, was launched in November. Escorts and new protection groups were detached from the Atlantic to provide protection for the troop convoys in which this expeditionary force was transported. This campaign was to last until May 1943. Until the end of March, the Atlantic escorts had to continue the fight without air cover in the unprotected areas and without protection groups to back up the escorts around the convoys. br class='autobr' />At the end of that year, the number of casualties showed little change from the figures for 1942. The bad weather which had raged in the Atlantic in January had caused difficulties for the submarines and the losses during that month amounted to 203,000 tons. In February, this figure rose to 359,000 tons; in March, it returned to the high figure of the previous year at the same period 627,000 tons. It was during this crucial month that the Americans' decision to withdraw all their troops from the Atlantic was announced at the Washington Conference.
In fact, it was during this conference that one of the largest and most disastrous convoy battles took place in the Atlantic. Two convoys had taken the road from Halifax to England. One was fast and featured 25 ships. The other, slower, consisted of 52 buildings. The fast convoy was spotted by a submarine shortly after setting out, and soon a pack of 8 submarines was on the scene. Over the next three days and three nights, they sank 12 ships. A few hundred miles away, the slow convoy was also spotted and another pack of 12 U-boats grouped together to attack it. As the two convoys joined the two bands emerged from all sides, outflanking the defense and causing heavy casualties. 21 ships weighing a total of 141,000 tons belonging to the two convoys were sunk.
This battle was all the harder to bear as only one German submarine could have been sunk by escort forces. It was undoubtedly a cruel defeat, especially since it occurred at a time when very little hope shone on the horizon of the Allies in their desperate struggle.