Classic war? Vanguard War? Technological war or conventional war? Electronic warfare or psychological warfare? The violent conflict which pitted two modern nations against each other in the South Atlantic was, over the course of two and a half months of often dramatic adventures, decked out with all these labels. There has even been talk of “sub-nuclear war”. In fact, he was successively all of these. A veritable mine of information for contemporary strategists. An “experience” from which we have not finished exploiting all the lessons. But also a surprise:in the age of “smart” missiles and nuclear submarines, the victory of the Falklands has finally been won with bladed weapons.
When the British armada left Portsmouth on April 5, 1982, many Western experts expressed their skepticism:never could an intervention force like this one reverse the course of events that had occurred more than 10,000 kilometers from its rear bases. Categorically, a specialist from the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London affirmed a month after the casting off:“To succeed in an amphibious landing, three conditions must be met:surprise, superiority in numbers and superiority in the air. Britain has none of these three conditions going for it... At one against two the Brits have a chance, but at one against eight or nine it's hopeless. And the “expert” concludes:“This conflict can drag on and continue for a long time”.
Five weeks later, Port Stanley (formerly Puerto-Argentino), the last Argentinian stronghold, fell into the hands of British soldiers and their Nepalese auxiliaries.
Warfare at sea, warfare in the air, electronic warfare and psychological warfare have, each in its own way, in turn or simultaneously, enabled this hard-fought victory. But until the final close combat which ultimately made the decision, it must be remembered that all eyes were focused on the performance of the equipment put into action. As if the Falklands War were just a full-scale
replica of the electronic games that were all the rage at fairgrounds.
"Shoot and forget Wasn't this advertising slogan that missile dealers write in their catalogs the watchword of the Falklands naval air war?
Tigerfish (the "intelligent" torpedo that sank the General Belgrano), Exocet (the winning miracle missile of the Sheffield escort) or Sea-Harrier (the disconcerting vertical take-off planes) have indeed monopolized the attention of observers and the public to the point of erasing the essential role played by the man in the course of military operations. Even during the weeks which followed the final victory
- the final assessments being made at the level of the losses in men (at least a thousand victims) and in materials (a dozen English ships sunk, a hundred Argentinian planes destroyed)
— the performance of the new ultra-sophisticated equipment tested during the conflict literally overshadowed the ultimately decisive role played by the technicians (pilots, gunners, electronics engineers, special services, etc.) and infantrymen (Royal Marines, S.A.S., Gurkhas).
This phenomenon is, moreover, classic, limited wars having always served as a test bed for the most sophisticated equipment, under the watchful eye of the arms manufacturers (who sometimes simultaneously supply the two belligerents and who willingly feed, on this occasion, the quasi-advertising news media).
Today, thanks to a little more hindsight, European strategists emphasize that the determination of men, their know-how, the he heroism of some (particularly the Argentine pilots), the use of disinformation (the English abused Buenos Aires with carefully distilled false information) played in the conflict a role at least as decisive as the "missiles" or the counterattacks. -electronic measurements.
One of the lessons most commented on by the experts lies in the ability of the Argentine pilots to thwart the British radars on board by skimming the waves and the superstructures of the ships targeted. A discovery ! Another equally significant example has caught the attention of specialists:the extraordinary effectiveness of commando actions in the quest for tactical intelligence and the preparation of the amphibious landing (we learned several weeks later that more than 300 men had stayed clandestinely on the islands for this purpose).
Indeed, both the materials and the armaments can be tested in conditions close to reality (we knew, contrary to what was written in the heat of the action, the exact performance of the Exocet AM-39 missile which had already given rise to numerous live fire tests, as we were perfectly aware of the structural weaknesses of modern boats in terms of fire), as much as the human factor is random definition, the sanction being on the ground.
The Falklands conflict has deliberately remained limited to a restricted geo-strategic zone. Except, of course, in terms of armaments and intelligence, since the belligerents have called on third-party powers:technical assistance and all-out supplies of equipment for Argentina; logistical assistance and supply of intelligence by satellites and U.S. radar planes for England.
This conflict limited in action
—the British having refrained from intervening on the continent as they could easily do thanks to their S.A.S. commandos, the United States bound by a treaty of continental assistance with Buenos Aires having prohibited it - therefore remained a conflict limited in space and time. He confirmed the experts in their certainty that a well-trained and well-equipped professional army, with clear directives and firm political backing, is always superior to an army of conscripts temporarily blinded by hypernationalist slogans that hide badly the inadequacy of their leaders. It should be noted that France, for example, could not have carried out such an operation for lack of amphibious means.
The sequence of events was inscribed in these few facts known to all - but "forgotten" from the start of the Anglo-Argentine conflict. Admittedly, the destruction of the aircraft carrier Hermès by an Exocet, as the Argentines sought in vain, would have been very serious for the British. But the Task Force staff, even struck by such a loss, would certainly not have put an end to a confrontation whose outcome was clearly to its advantage, as we now admit. /P>
The Falklands War, won in a few weeks according to an almost schematic graduation (naval, naval aviation, then land), provided the “operational” military with arguments that a number of living room strategists were beginning to contest. The English soldiers and sailors have, indeed, opportunely proved that an intervention force (Task Force) supported by commercial ships, could, under certain conditions and thanks to certain logistical support, take the decision a thousand places from its bases. . Which is his only vocation. A demonstration that should encourage Western countries like France to reconsider the role and means of their own intervention forces and especially of their fleet.
As soon as the conflict ends
— which nevertheless cost it more than 5,000 million francs London has confirmed that it is maintaining its Defense priorities with regard to strategic nuclear power. But Mr John Not, the Minister for Defence, agreed that lessons should be “learned” from the Falklands war without devaluing the strategic role that Britain is required to play within NATO. in the defense of the North Atlantic.
First decision, but of weight:the aircraft carrier Hermès, star of the Falklands, will not be sold to Australia as it had been decided before the conflict. A symbol.