This war with political consequences of the first importance took place according to new and sometimes outdated principles. It has been said that the high mobility of both sides meant the decline of defensive strategy, and that static trench warfare in Poland gave way to maneuver warfare.
The merit of Sikorski is undoubtedly to have succeeded in the first attack style blitzkrieg (blitzkrieg) using mobile columns with trucks and armored vehicles.
In fact, the freedom of maneuver enjoyed by both sides in Poland resulted more from the inadequacy of armaments than from a major innovation in the way of waging a war.
Neither one nor the other did not possess sufficient weapons to exert a firepower comparable to that of Western armies. Hasty training and poor equipment meant that neither had the firepower to halt a cavalry charge unless in a well-prepared position.
Both sides resorted to new, amateur methods of warfare. An Allied observer with experience on the western front described the attack by a Polish division as "unprecedented":he was stunned when the division in question moved to a front formed by a single company, with an objective 12 kilometers; which makes the skill of Pilsudski who conceived and carried out such a daring counter-offensive appear even more remarkable. Tribute should also be paid to Weygand who insisted on bringing in reinforcements from the south.
With genuinely Polish generosity, Pilsudski declared that he had learned more in a fortnight with Weygand than in six years of campaigning; but Weygand claimed no part in the Polish success, acknowledging that the credit went to Pilsudski.