Ancient history

Gaspar de Guzmán, Count of Olivares


Gaspar de Guzmán y Pimentel Ribera y Velasco de Tovar, Count of Olivares and Duke of Sanlucar la Mayor was an important Spanish royal minister and favourite, born in Rome on January 6, 1587 and died on July 22, 1645 in Toro, near Zamora. His name is often shortened to Gaspar de Guzmán y Pimentel and he is often called Count-Duke of Olivares.

Youth

He was born in Rome where his father, Don Enrique de Guzmán, Count of Olivares was Spanish Ambassador to the Holy See, and he lived in Italy until the age of twelve (his father having subsequently been appointed vice -king of Sicily and Naples). The youngest son of a younger branch of the House of Guzman, he was supposedly destined for an ecclesiastical career. At fourteen, he was sent to study canon law at the University of Salamanca. It was probably the death of his older brothers that made him heir to the title:he interrupted his studies to accompany his father to the Court of King Philip III in 1604. There he was soon a member of the Council of State and First Comptroller of Accounts. When his father died in 1607, he inherited the lordship of Olivares and concentrated his efforts on seducing his future wife, doña Inés de Zúñiga y Velasco, whom he married the same year, as well as obtaining the quality of Grand d 'Spain. Before achieving this last goal, he retired to Seville to administer his estates and remained there for eight years.

Rise to power

In 1615, after the Duke of Lerma had him appointed Gentleman of the Chamber of the Crown Prince, the future Philip IV, he joined the Court. His accession to this office made him intervene in the struggles for power between the king's favourite, the Duke of Lerma and the son of the latter, the Duke of Uceda for whom he sided. When Lerma fell from grace in 1618, Olivares was lucky enough to be on the winning side. He then undertook to form a faction close to the royal power, relying on his uncle Baltasar de Zúñiga, who had been introduced to the court by the Duke of Uceda at the suggestion of Olivares. He was a wise, intelligent and persuasive man who knew how to enter the favor of the future King Philip IV in such a way that when the latter succeeded his father Philip III in 1621, he appointed him Prime Minister in place of the Duke of 'Uceda. Olivares' faction had won. On April 10 of the same year, the king granted Olivares, according to the consecrated formula (Conde de Olivares, cubríos), the dignity of Grand of Spain. Finally, when his uncle died, he made him his Prime Minister.

Almighty Minister

Arrived at last at his goal, he displayed an overflowing activity. Inside the kingdom, he undertook an ambitious program of reforms; in foreign affairs, he put an end to the policy of compromise by reactivating the war against the United Provinces (Eighty Years' War), he supported the House of Austria in the face of the conflicts of the Thirty Years' War and opposed the policy of France led by Cardinal Richelieu.

Among the internal reforms we can highlight a campaign against the corruption and the venality of the previous reign which expelled from the court the members of the factions of Lerma and Uceda and condemned with exemplary sentences the abuses of the previous reign (during which, to strengthen its power , relatives, friends and clients were placed in key positions and titles, annuities and properties were accumulated). The traditional system of government of "Consejos" (Councils) was also replaced by a set of "Juntas", councils which embraced the different branches of public administration (armada, salt and mines, works and forests, cleanliness and population) or held other functions such as the Junta de Reformación (Council of Reform) which watched over the morality of the court or the Junta de Ejecución (Council of Execution) which was an executive body for the rapid adoption of decisions. He also tried to put in place a series of mercantilist economic measures such as aid to wool and silk factories, the promotion of trade, protectionist measures, measures which failed to produce effects for lack of vigor and consistency.

However, the most ambitious projects concerned taxation and consisted in the abolition of the tax on millions, the creation of public treasuries to finance public works and the end of the uncontrolled minting of currencies in order to curb inflation. Nevertheless, all the reforms failed due to the ruin of the economy of the kingdoms of the monarchy and the loss of international credit.

The count-duke also dealt with the fundamental problem of the monarchy, that is to say the diversity of royal prerogatives in each of the kingdoms. Olivares' political program is included in the "Grand Memorial" which he presented to the king in 1624 and in which he suggested a solution diametrically opposed to those put in place by previous sovereigns and which advocated legal uniformity of the various kingdoms. For this he proposed a plan of reforms aimed at strengthening the royal power and the unity of the territories he dominated and at obtaining better management of finances in the service of foreign policy. In his opinion, the effectiveness of the war machine of the monarchy, support of its hegemony in Europe, depended on its capacity to mobilize the financial means of the kingdoms, which required a stronger and centralized administration. This was called the Unión de Armas (Union of Arms), a project that aimed to increase the commitment of all the kingdoms of Spain (this expression was used in the document) to share with Castile the human burdens and finances of the war effort. It was planned to create a common reserve of 140,000 men, provided by all the kingdoms in proportion to their populations. This measure was interpreted by the kingdoms of the Crown of Aragon (Aragon, Catalonia, Valencia) as a new stage of submission to the Castilian king.

In the field of foreign affairs, Olivares abandoned imperialist and aggressive campaigns. He concentrated on defending the assets inherited from the previous century. The Netherlands and Germany were the scene of this struggle for survival. This struggle had already begun in Germany in 1618, with the outbreak of the Thirty Years' War (1618-1648). The Habsburgs of Spain did not get involved directly but sent money and men to their cousins ​​in Austria. These troops participated in the crushing of the Bohemian rebellion. The rebellion of the Catholics of Valtelina against their Protestant lords of the Grisons League made it possible to introduce Spanish troops into the valley and to protect the routes to Spain (an operation restrained by the Treaty of Monzón in 1626). With regard to the Netherlands, hostilities were resumed against the United Provinces by breaking the Twelve Years' Truce (considered ruinous for the Court). At first, there were a few victories:Fleurus (1622), surrender of Breda (1624).

However, without new financial income, the wars caused a growing debt, until the bankruptcy of 1627. Since then, military defeats followed one another, opening the way to Spanish decadence in Europe. Relations with England had soured after the failure of negotiations for the marriage of the Infanta María to the Prince of Wales. In Flanders, the monarchy lost 's-Hertogenbosch (1629), Maastricht (1632) and Breda (1637), while the Spanish fleet was defeated by the Dutch at the Battle of the Dunes in 1639. In Italy, the Second War of succession of Mantua had led to the annexation of Montferrat by France (Treaty of Cherasco, 1631). At the same time, Valtelina (1639) was lost. In the empire, the resounding victory of Nördlingen (1634), where the cardinal infant don Fernando crushed the army of Gustav Adolf of Sweden, pushed the war to enter a decisive phase.

The fall

Between 1627 and 1635, Olivares made a last-ditch effort to impose his reforms through authoritarian means. The policy of unification was in his eyes the only possibility of saving the monarchy, and it was also necessary that the kingdoms contribute to the military burdens that Castile could no longer assume alone. However, the resistances were important; coupled with military routs, they undermined the prestige of the crown. After the first shock of the mutiny of Sal de Vizcaya (1630-1631), the internal discontent of the kingdoms of the peninsula finally burst into the open in 1640. With the French occupation of Salses in Roussillon, the war touched Catalonia; this was the pretext put forward by Olivares to impose the Unión de Armas. However, the recruitment system was declared contrary to the Catalan constitutions by the Catalan Deputation. The troubles arising from the obligation to lodge the troops created a climate of tension leading to the Corpus de Sang (June 1640) and the secession of Catalonia (secession which was not stifled before 1651). In the same way, a few months later and for similar reasons, the insurrection of Portugal occurred in December 1640, which resulted in the dissolution of the Iberian union and the independence of Portugal. To the Castilian defeats at Montjuïc (January 26, 1641) and Lleida (October 1642), was added the conspiracy of the Duke of Medina Sidonia and the Marquis of Ayamonte in Andalusia (summer 1641). This conspiracy caused the Count-Duke to lose all political credit and forced him into exile in 1643. He first retired to his estates in Loeches, near Madrid. But his detractors continued to make accusations against him, even pushing the king to exile him further to Toro (1643) and the inquisition to put him on trial (1644). He died in Toro in 1645.

Conclusion

The news of the death of the Count-Duke was received with a feeling of relief and liberation by the majority of his compatriots. His authoritarianism had not been well received by the subjects of the monarchy, mainly because it was based on the conviction that the survival of the monarchy required the mobilization for war of all available human and financial means. The fall of Olivares did not cause a cataclysm. Philippe IV had governed twenty-two years with the count-duke, he will govern as many years without him. However, the fall of Olivares revealed two facts that no Habsburg ruler could change. First, the hegemony of the Spanish crown was about to fade away to reach France. Moreover, the crown had failed in its efforts to reform the administrative, constitutional and economic organization and to deal favorably with the changes that were taking place in Europe. His efforts were all the less effective as Spanish society, as elsewhere in Europe, was reluctant to accept anything "new".

Until the advent of a new dynasty, no minister dared to initiate reforms as radical as those defended by Olivares. Because of his failure, the Count-Duke had discredited many aspects of the politics with which he was associated. However, some of his reformist aims (settlement schemes and fiscal reforms) reappeared in one form or another during the great reform movement of the 18th century.