The leadership of the Armed Forces in Greece, in 1974, has serious responsibilities for the non-reinforcement of Cyprus after the invasion of Turkey on the island. They are also responsible for the fact that with the coup they left gaps in the island's defense. Political responsibilities also arise from the conclusion of the Cyprus File, of the Greek Parliament. Responsibilities for weakness and indecision. The Americans did not want a conflict between Greece and Turkey, two NATO members. Athens did not make much use of this in the management that was being done.
BY KOSTAS VENIZELOS
SOURCE:APOPSEIS.COM
The members of the Committee on the Cyprus File, of the Greek Parliament, evaluating the testimony of the protagonists of the meetings held in Athens in August 1974, reached important conclusions. From the study of the content of these practices, the following emerges in relation to the views of the leadership of the Armed Forces. All four leaders (Bonanos - Galatsanos - Arapakis - Papanikolaou) overstated in formulating the opinion that any mission of substantial (numerically capable) military aid to Cyprus was unfeasible and furthermore a "lost cause" and in essence could not affect the already established situation on the island.
From those mentioned by the military leaders, differences are also found. Bonanos stated that it was impossible to defend with the forces General Karagiannis had in Cyprus. "Technically impossible to send help. It is possible to send reinforcements of soldiers equipped with light weapons. However, this aid cannot affect the situation".
Galatsanos, however, agrees and proposes a specific action plan for the forces that exist in Cyprus. He says verbatim:"The only possibility of the mother forces is the yielding movement while maintaining the contact". Galatsanos's position is quoted exactly as it was formulated, because in the course of events, it was the one that was finally applied throughout the operations in Cyprus.
However, it is characteristic that he also proceeds with a further assessment and declares "until the very end, defense would probably push the Turks to go beyond their objective"! That is, to turn towards Greece. Arapakis had stated that "the Navy has the ability to carry out operations in Cyprus through U/Bs, as well as the transfer of support after light armament". However, he continues and expresses the opinion that even this aid will not have any substantial effect.
For the members of the Commission, the following position of Arapakis is characterized as strange (exactly as the above minutes are written):"Thus he pointed out that the DEFENSE of other forces meant a violation of the truce and from our side it will probably make our international position diplomatically difficult"!!! If the word DEFENSE, the conclusion states, "is exactly what Arapakis used, then it is very strange in every way that his position that the defense which presupposes an attack by the Turks, constitutes in any way a violation of the truce. If the word defense is wrong in the written wording and instead he used the word "help", "reinforcement" or similar expression, then again his position is strange.
Because the sending of forces does not necessarily mean a violation of the truce, especially when the Turks have landed on the island 40,000 troops and 150-200 tanks. We insist on this point because Arapakis is the ONLY military man who pronounces a political judgment (diplomatic handling difficulties). And we think that when combined with the fact that at the critical phase of the ceasefire negotiations, the Americans strangely found Arapaki alone from all the political and military leadership of the Junta and negotiated and agreed to the terms of the ceasefire, it raises questions about his attitude". According to the Commission's assessment, the role of Arapakis in general in the Cyprus tragedy has not been fully clarified by the information we have in the Commission's Files. Read the extremely interesting sequel at the source