That the Cyprus match in 1974 was not supported is universally known. The responsibilities that existed, both for the then military leadership and for the later civilian government, were never attributed to those who should. Of all those who participated directly or indirectly in the most recent calamity of Hellenism, only the dictator Ioannidis paid.
All the "big men", who also convinced the political government of "national salvation" that there was no possibility of a Greek reaction to the Turkish moves, not only were they never punished, but transferred their responsibilities to lower officers, turning innocent and worthy, patriotic officers , to atoning victims of a tragedy that others set up and covered up.
The "big men" showed such a lack of manliness that, lightheartedly, they hung the label of "huntish" on their scapegoating victims and made sure to expel them from the Armed Forces, in the context of a poorly understood and applied "dedentification".
Junta and Cyprus
The tragic seven-year period 1967-74 can easily be divided into two periods. The first had George Papadopoulos as its main protagonist and essentially ended with the Polytechnic uprising and can also be linked to the Arab-Israeli Yom Kippur war that took place from October 6 to 26, 1973.
This was followed by the overthrow of Papadopoulos by Brigadier General Ioannidis on November 25, 1974. Ioannidis, relying on assurances from across the Atlantic, organized the coup against Archbishop Makarios on July 15, 1974. From that date the path to national destruction was irreversible. .
Ioannidis in power
On October 6, 1973, the Arab forces - Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Jordan, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Algeria, Sudan, with the participation of Cubans, North Koreans and Pakistanis, volunteers and "advisers" - decided to wipe off the map the Israel, with a large-scale surprise attack on the day Israelis were celebrating the biggest of their religious holidays.
The surprise succeeded, and soon the Israelis found themselves fighting a life-and-death struggle. Their losses were very serious in fighters and material. The US wanted to strengthen its allies and Greece was the obvious route.
However, Papadopoulos, wishing to pressure the Americans, refused the passage and use of the airports of Souda and Elefsina by the Americans to assist the Israelis. On October 26, 1973 the war finally ended with a victory for the Israelis.
But Papadopoulos' days in power were numbered. On November 17, the uprising at the Polytechnic was violently suppressed. On November 25, a new coup led by Dimitrios Ioannidis overthrew Papadopoulos and events in Cyprus now took a fatal turn. Ioannidis was more naive than Papadopoulos and the right instrument for the US to resolve the Cyprus issue in the best way, at least as they believed at the time.
The Americans seem to have promised Ioannidis the union of Cyprus with Greece, as long as Makarios was neutralized. Ioannidis seems that in 1974 he had some assurances from a Greek-American CIA agent to proceed with the coup.
But Makarios was convinced that "there is no madman in the Greek army", not even Ioannidis. It was a phrase he often repeated in his conversations with the Americans. On the other hand, however, Makarios' movements did not show only ignorance of danger.
At first, his relations with the National Guard administration were formal. He relied on his own armed men, fearing the National Guard, which is why he proceeded to reduce the term of service in the National Guard, which resulted in the manning rate of the units falling below 40%-60% of the predicted peacetime composition.
Thus, in the critical battles that followed, Greek battalions were found fighting the Turks with an average of 250 men, so that they were not able to operate even their group weapons. However, despite the modern Czech weapons, the "Blessed" were easily dispersed, outside the presidential palace, by the coup plotters, on July 15, 1974, when the fatal coup broke out.
The two signals
The abandonment – betrayal for others – of Cyprus took place, without a doubt, on the crucial days between July 15 and 20, 1974. On those days, on the one hand, Makarios asked for the assistance of the “guarantor forces” and on the other, some in Athens attempt to entertain the feeling of an imminent Turkish invasion of the mega-island, by any means available.
Greece had to be "convinced" by all means that it cannot fight the Turks in Cyprus. Obviously, the Americans had an interest in the matter, who, regardless of the events in Cyprus, would never allow the south-eastern wing of NATO to be disbanded. A plan of opening and a "second front" was therefore immediately implemented, so that the willing Greek military and then political leadership would come to the conclusion that military involvement with Turkey was unthinkable.
On July 16, the American military attaché in Sofia had informed about movements of Soviet airborne forces towards Hungary. The Greek AKAM in Sofia, commander (I) Asimakis Papanikolaou, duly conveyed this information to the service. But what did this sign in question say? Nothing concrete, nothing that can be considered worrying for the Greek side.
It lists the signal exactly:"It is reported that a US military attaché on 7/16/74 was informed by authorities that on July 3-6, 25 aircraft and on July 11-13, one hundred and fifty (150) turboprop large transport aircraft were flown from Russia to Hungary and after flying over the Budapest area, they headed southeast with an unknown destination. Flight altitude from 5-8,000 feet. An effort was made to locate the above in Hungary." This signal was sent to Athens on July 18.
Former A/GETHA Nikolaos Kouris, in his book "Aegean. The long dispute and the role of the Americans" stated, incorrectly, that Commander Papanikolaou was informed by the American AKAM about the badge on July 20, while in his book, where he has a photo of the badge (p. 75), the date of dispatch is clearly visible , which is July 18.
Also completely wrong is the claim of Mr. Kouri that because of the "fabricated", as he characterizes it, this signal, the then military leadership did not send help to Cyprus. The reality is completely different. There were two signals.
The first signal of July 18, where simply the Greek AKAM in Sofia conveys information about the movement of Soviet forces towards Hungary and south-east of it, a fact which in no way affected the dispatch of Greek forces to Cyprus or the occurrence of a Greek attack in Thrace strong> and a second signal, dated July 23 – that is, three days after the Turkish invasion and a few hours before the return of Kon. Karamanlis and the formation of a political government.
The second signal was the one "manufactured" by an unknown source, the authenticity of which was vigorously defended by the then head of the KYP Lt. Gen. Stathopoulos, the head of ASDEN, Lt. Gen. Gratsios, and the head of the GEA, Lt. Gen. Papanikolaou, who declared:"The Bulgarians they will take Thessaloniki from us".
Stathopoulos attributed this second signal to information coming from the British and the Americans. At the same time "Attila I" was completed. "Attila II" would follow. Greece, with a civilian government now, but with the same heads of departments, still did not help. He watched as a spectator as the Turks won, with the only almost rival ELDYK, another 34% of the Cypriot territory.
So based on the second signal, the Greek military leadership refused to help Cyprus, because "if the Greek forces were involved with the Turks, there would be a risk that the "Easterners" would invade Greece"! On July 23, an employee of the Greek embassy and a KYP agent, with the code name "Petros", brought, to be signed, before the commander Papanikolaou, a ready-made signal, which stated that two Soviet armies were in Bulgaria since July 20.
The captain refused to sign the signal , since he had no information to confirm what was written in it. When the commander asked "Petros" where he got his information, he replied that the information came from the Greek ambassador Ioannis Koliakopoulos, through a woman, Voulgara. Then the commander told "Petros" to ask the ambassador to sign that badge, since the information came from him.
"Petros" left the commander's office and shortly returned, telling him that the ambassador, as a political person, cannot sign. Since it was about military information it had to be signed by AKEA and sent to Athens through his office. When the commander Papanikolaou again refused to sign, "Petros" insisted and wrote on the mark "Source:Petros".
Only after this signal was signed by commander Papanikolaou, as a signal coming from the KYP agent "Petro" and sent to Athens. This signal therefore contained, through KYP, the manufactured information about the gatherings of two Soviet armies in Bulgaria, to be an alibi in favor of all those who refused to help Cyprus!
Papanikolaou, citing the source of the said "information" in the signal, made it clear that it was not information that came from him, but from "Petro", i.e. the KYP agent. The commander simply relayed an information from the KYP. However, the incredible thing is that when the "information" of "Peter" reached Athens it was not believed and an order was given to re-examine the issue. Two days later, on July 25, "Petros" with a new badge reported that the information about the concentration of two Soviet armies in Bulgaria was not true. In the meantime the battle of Cyprus had been lost.
The "Cyprus file"
The attempt to create an alibi for the first-timers, however, continued. In 1987, the then government of Andreas Papandreou "opened" - according to others it hermetically sealed in the now dark underground - the infamous Cyprus file. In the special parliamentary committee that had been set up, the captain Papanikolaou, as well as "Petros", was called to testify.
"Petros" confirmed what the captain had testified, but insisted that the sign did not read "Source:Petros". The demonstration of the badge, before the committee, disproved it. The fact that the game was rigged became evident from the very first question the committee asked Papanikolaou. The chairman of the committee of the Greek parliament, PASOK member of parliament, Christos Basayiannis, asked Commander Papanikolaou if the information about the Soviet armies obliged the leaders of the branches to redeploy the Greek forces to the North and not to help Cyprus.
This was not stable of course. Cyprus received the Turkish attack on July 20. And the signal was sent on July 23, when the Turks had already split the Greek defense in Kyrenia. If Greece wanted to help, it would have done so from July 20. He would not have waited for July 23, when the invisible Soviet armies were "preparing to attack" Greece.
For the record, let us mention that the parliamentary committee called 131 people as witnesses. Finally, two conclusions were drawn, one from PASOK and one from ND, which they considered responsible, as for the Civil War, the foreigners, Americans, Soviets, British, the Junta, in general and vaguely - without touching Bonanno, Arapaki, Grazio and Vice Admiral Papanikolaou - who were demobilized and retired normally, in 1974-75, without suffering any consequences.
Also, the two findings "sanctify" both Kon. Karamanlis, as well as Archbishop Makarios. A year later, in 1988, Evangelos Averof, Minister of Foreign Affairs in the government of Kon. Karamanlis. In his address to the parliament, Averov had said:"They accused us then because we did not send the "Phantoms" to Cyprus." "Phantom" we had received 18 in total. By order of Karamanlis they stationed themselves in Crete, in order to be ready to go to Cyprus. One broke down on landing because their pilots had not yet been trained in this new weapon.
“And they were so untrained that during the emergency landing one was rendered useless. But even they, if they went, in order to have fuel and be able to return, they would have to stay above Cyprus for only 5 to 8 minutes. What madman would send these planes, so useful for the future, to risk being shot down by the Turks?
“Because the Turks on the south coast had three radars and various airfields, from which they could pick up 50 of their own planes and shoot them down. The Junta sent planes and due to a miscommunication one was shot down by the National Guard and so many children were killed! It was selected for submarines, for the fleet which had to go to Cyprus. Hyper-patriotism makes us distort things. Is it forgotten that the Turks mistook three of their destroyers for ours and with three planes sank one and very seriously damaged the other?
"With such a lack of air cover of ours, with complete and continuous cover of theirs, did you want to send our Fleet to Cyprus, so that we could not then defend the other islands? You talked about submarines. I inform you that the Turks at that time had three submarines standing still in front of Cyprus, which, with their Sonar equipment, captured every submarine they encountered.
"And would we send our new submarines, which might be called upon to defend our islands, to fall like sheep to the slaughter?"...
An answer is provided by the defense memorandum of the well-known Athens lawyer, Mr. Georgios Alfantakis, which states the following:
"In the face of all Authority authority:
Extra-judicial Announcement of reprehensible acts of Mr. Georgios Alfantakis, Attorney of Athens, defender of accused officers of the Armed Forces as a result of the latest indictments and prosecutions thereof, in accordance with article 40 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
To the Honorable Mr. Head of the Athens Misdemeanor Prosecutor's Office.
At the behest of my clients, superiors and supreme officers, accused and slandered recently in court, from various directions and as a consequence of their inability to make new public statements, I announce the following:
1) In my previous statements, published only by a morning newspaper of Athens "Eleftheros Kosmos" on 27/10 concerning the Cyprus issue, I asked the Government to tell the truth to the Greek people about the Cyprus tragedy. I also requested that he immediately remove the active senior officers of the Armed Forces, who during the ten days from July 15 to 23, 1974 betrayed Cyprus, within the meaning of article 26 paragraph b of the Military Penal Code, becoming further guilty, as follows he wants to admit to other military crimes.
2) Ten days have passed since then and nothing has been heard in response to these statements, both from the official government side and from the side of those who were clearly visible at the time as accused. /P>
3) I promised then, that I would come back with full disclosure if they didn't get attention. I received anonymous threats and pressures to refrain from further action. They created a sense of danger in me, and therefore I now consider it my sacred duty to disclose what may at this moment be said. And in particular :
4) After the action against Makarios, the Chief of the Armed Forces, General Grigorios Bonanos, was warned and sufficiently informed about the impending Turkish invasion, namely:
a) Through repeated revelatory signals, of the assistant Military attaché of the Greek Embassy in London (from July 15 to 19) Major Mr. Athanassios Perdikis.
b) Under the Greek Brigadier General Mr. Sotiriadou, serving at the NATO Headquarters in Smyrna, who was informed by the American General - Commander of the NATO Southern European Forces, about the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, within 48 hours, with the order to inform the Έλληνα Αρχηγό των Ενόπλων Δυνάμεων.
Ο Ταξίαρχος κ. Σωτηριάδης, έσπευσε στην Ελλάδα και ενημέρωσε την 18.7.74 τον κ. Μπονάνο.
γ) Υπό Του ΓΕΕΦ Κύπρου, όπερ από του παρελθόντος έτους είχε ενημερωθεί λεπτομερειακώς από Βρετανό ανώτατον αξιωματικό περί του Τουρκικού σχεδίου εισβολής, όπερ και πράγματι εφαρμόστηκε υπό των εισβολέων τελικώς.
δ) Υπό την Ναυτική Διοίκηση Κύπρου από της 10ης νυκτερινής της 19ης Ιουλίου ’74 ήτις δια του Διοικητού αυτής Αντιπλοιάρχου κ. Γ. Παπαγιάννη, ειδοποίησε τον κ. Μπονάνο περί κατευθύνσεως της τουρκικής αρμάδας προς τας ακτές της Κερύνειας.
ε) Από το ΓΕΕΦ και την Ναυτική Διοίκηση Κύπρου τις πρώτες πρωινές ώρας της 20.7.1974 με την πολεμική κραυγή “ευρίσκονται εις απόσταση 20 μιλίων, πλησιάζουν 15… 10… 5… μίλια…”
5) Παρά ταύτα το Αρχηγείο Ενόπλων Δυνάμεων, αγνόησε την προειδοποίηση και δεν ενίσχυσε την Κυπριακή Εθνοφρουρά κατά το πενθήμερο 15 έως 20 Ιουλίου και δέχτηκε την αντικατάσταση 700 εμπείρων ανδρών της ΕΛΔΥΚ την 18 έως 19 Ιουλίου 1974 υπό απείρων κληρωτών αγνοούντων και τις τοπικές Κυπριακές συνθήκες.
6) Οι Αρχηγοί Ενόπλων Δυνάμεων και Αρχηγείου Στρατού Μπονάνος και Γαλατσάνος όταν πέραν των άνω προενημερώσεων ειδοποιήθηκαν την πρωία της 20.7.1974 παρά του ΓΕΕΦ ότι ρίπτονται Τούρκοι αλεξιπτωτιστές και ενώ προηγουμένως η τουρκική αεροπορία είχε βομβαρδίσει αγρίως το στρατόπεδο της ΕΛΔΥΚ δεν διέταξαν τις Ελληνικές Κυπριακές δυνάμεις να αρχίσουν το πυρ. Δεν διέταξαν πυρ, μέχρι της 08.50 πρωινής της 20.7.1974. Την 8.50 ως άνω πρωινή, ο μόνος αφιχθείς εις την αίθουσα επιχειρήσεων του Αρχηγείου Ενόπλων Δυνάμεων Αντισυνταγματάρχης κ. Λούκουτος προσωπικώς είπε τηλεφωνικώς εις τον Διοικητή του ΓΕΕΦ Ταξίαρχο Γεωργίτσην «κτυπάτε διό όλων των μέσων». Έτσι κατόρθωσαν να προγεφυρωθούν ένιοι μονάδες των ρηθέντων τούρκων αλεξιπτωτιστών.
7) Επίσης ιδία πρωτοβουλία των Ελληνοκυπριακών μονάδων Κυρηνείας επλήγη το πρώτον κύμα της τουρκικής αποβάσεως, με αποτέλεσμα οι Τούρκοι να έχουν 2.000 – 3.000 νεκρούς και τραυματίας.
8) Η Κυβέρνηση και η Επανάσταση της 25.11.1973 απεφάσισαν και διέταξαν Γενική Επιστράτευση την 20.7.1974, ήτις ήρξατο εφαρμοζομένη από της 9ης πρωινής ώρας. Αυτή απαιτούσαν οι περιστάσεις και τα στρατιωτικά δεδομένα. Ο στρατηγός Μπονάνος μετά των επιτελών του, την 11ην πρωινή της αυτής ημέρας(20.7.1974) ανακάλεσε την γενική επιστράτευση, για άλλους λόγους.
9) Την 21.7.1974 ημέρα Κυριακή, συνήλθε υπό την Προεδρία του Προέδρου της Δημοκρατίας κ. Γκιζίκη το Συμβούλιο Εθνικής Ασφαλείας της Χώρας. Η Ηγεσία του Έθνους κατά τις στιγμές εκείνες. Συμμετέσχον οι κ.κ. Γκιζίκης, Ανδρουτσόπουλος, Μπονάνος, Γαλατσάνος, Αραπάκης, Παπανικολάου και ο Ταξίαρχος τότε κ. Δημήτριος Ιωαννίδης.
Ενημερώθηκαν:
α) Υπό του Α/ΓΕΝ, Αντιναυάρχου κ. Αραπάκη ειπόντες:“Ευρίσκομαι προ των ακτών της Κερύνειας με δύο υποβρύχια (Γερμανικά) εξοπλισμένα δια 14 τορπιλών έκαστον. Έχω τα 11 τουρκικά πλοία της αποβάσεως εις τα περισκόπια και τα σκόπευτρα. Λογικώς και μαθηματικώς δεν δύναται να εκφύγει ουδέν τουρκικό πλοίο. (Κυβερνήτες των υποβρυχίων ήταν γνωστοί πλωτάρχες του πολεμικού ναυτικού.) Έχω λάβει πρόνοια και δια τον υπόλοιπο τουρκικό στόλο».
β) Υπό του Αρχηγού Αεροπορίας κ. Παπανικολάου ειπόντος:«Τα Phantom ευρίσκονται εις την Κρήτη και φέρουν βόμβας – πυραύλους εκ των οποίων δεν δύναται να γλυτώσουν τα τουρκικά πλοία».
Δύο λεπτομέρειες:Ο Τούρκοι δεν είχαν μέσα ανασχέσεως ούτε των δύο υποβρυχίων ούτε των Ελληνικών Phantom διότι:
αα) Τα εν λόγω υποβρύχια πλέοντα εις βάθος 200 μέτρων και με 21 – 22 κόμβους ωριαίως υπό την επιφάνεια της θαλάσσης – κοινό μυστικόν – δεν δύνανται να επισημανθούν υπό των τουρκικών αντιτορπιλικών – καταστροφέων. Διότι τα ηχοληπτικά όργανα αυτών μετά την ταχύτητα των 18 μιλίων δεν λειτουργούσαν.
ββ) Οι Τούρκοι στερούνταν Phantom και ουδέν έτερον μέσο ανασχέσεως των Ελληνικών Phantom διέθεταν.
γγ) Υπό του Αρχηγού Στρατού κ. Γαλατσάνου ειπόντος:«εις τον Έβρο είμεθα έτοιμοι δια βολές πυροβολικού. Η άμυνα αυτού είναι πλήρως και μαθηματικώς εξασφαλισμένη. Οι Τούρκοι δεν δύνανται να περάσουν».
10) Απόφαση και διαταγή της Ηγεσίας του Έθνους (Γκιζίκη):«κ. Αραπάκη την πρωία της Δευτέρας 22.7.1974 ότε θέλει αρχίσει η κυρία απόβαση των Τούρκων, βυθίσατε τα προ του λιμένος Κερύνειας ευρισκόμενα εις συγκέντρωση, τουρκικά αποβατικά και λοιπά σκάφη του εχθρού. Κύριε Παπανικολάου κατά την αυτήν ώρα αποστείλατε έξι (6) Phantom από Κρήτη εις Κυρήνεια (διάρκεια πτήσεως Κρήτη – Κύπρος 9′) και πλήξατε τα τουρκικά σκάφη. Κύριε Γαλατσάνε αρχίσατε βολές πυροβολικού στον Έβρον για αντιπερισπασμό. Όχι άλλη επιθετική ενέργεια κατά του τουρκικού εδάφους. Κύριε Μπονάνε εποπτεύσατε την εκτέλεση των διαταγών».
11) Μετά ταύτα λύθηκε η συνεδρίαση του Έθνους χωρίς καμία διαταγή να αλλάξει.
12)Την πρωία της Δευτέρας 22.7.1974:
α) Ο κ. Αραπάκης διέταξε προσωπικά τα δύο υποβρύχια να επιστρέψουν εκ Κύπρου καταλειπόντα τον εχθρό ελεύθερον και ανενόχλητο να πραγματοποιήσει την στρατιωτικά αστεία απόβασή του.
β) Ο κ. Παπανικολάου σταμάτησε τα 6 Phantom εις την Κρήτη, με αποτέλεσμα οι Ελληνοκυπριακαί δυνάμεις να σφυροκοπούνται ανελέητα υπό της απαιδεύτου τουρκικής αεροπορίας και λοιπά λέγων απευθυνόμενος και προς κατωτέρους, αξιωματικούς «πώς να στείλω Phantom, οι Βούλγαροι είναι έτοιμοι να μας επιτεθούν, έχουν συγκεντρωθεί εις τα σύνορα, θα πάθουμε συμφορά». Ενώ τούτο ήτο απολύτως ανακριβές.
γ) Ο κ. Γαλατσάνος δεν επέτρεψε τις βολές πυροβολικού.
δ) Ο κ. Μπονάνος συνετόνισε τας ενεργείας των τριών Αρχηγών των Επιτελείων του δια να προληφθεί η πλήρης και δια ελληνικών θυσιών καταστροφή των τουρκικών δυνάμεων εισβολής.
Μερικές λεπτομέρειες:
α) Ο Ελληνικός στρατός ουδέποτε ήταν καλύτερον οπλισμένος μέχρι της 20.7.1974.
β) Πολεμοφόδια και υλικά υπήρχαν άφθονα παρά τις επείγουσες από εχθρικές για τη χώρα αντίθετες πληροφορίες.
γ) Οι Τούρκοι είχαν αεροναυμαχήσει μεταξύ τους και είχαν:1) Καταβυθίσει ένα αντιτορπιλικό, 2) είχαν αχρηστεύσει έτερα δύο, 3) είχαν τα πληττόμενα αντιτορπιλικά καταρρίψει δύο δικά τους αεροσκάφη και 4) το ελληνικό πυροβολικό – όχι επάκτιο – είχε αχρηστεύσει έτερα δύο τουρκικά αντιτορπιλικά στην Κυρήνεια.
δ) Ο Αμερικανός Υφυπουργός κ. Σίσκο, τον οποίον αρνούνταν να δεχθούν πλέον – 20.7.74 και εντεύθεν – ο κ.κ. Γκιζίκης και Ανδρουτσόπουλος, ως επιτηρητή των Τουρκοαμερικανών συναντάτο την 21.7.74 μετά την ως άνω σύσκεψη της Ηγεσίας του Έθνους, τουλάχιστον με τους κ. Μπονάνο και Αραπάκη. Στο γραφείον του κ. Μπονάνου – άγνωστο ποίος τον πήγε – ακούστηκε να λέει:«σταματήστε τον στόλο και την αεροπορία σας και σας και υπόσχομαι να υποχρεώσουμε τους Τούρκους να επιστρέψουν στην Τουρκία».
15) Ο Αντιστράτηγος κ. Λάμπρος Σταθόπουλος, Διοικητής της Κ.Υ.Π. τότε, ανέφερε εις την ηγεσία, ότι είχε την πληροφορία ότι υπήρχε συγκέντρωση βουλγαρικού στρατού εις τα Ελληνοβουλγαρικά σύνορα και αεροσκαφών τύπου MiG. Οι επιτελείς του στρατηγού κ. Γαλατσάνου υποψιασθέντος δολία προέλευση της πληροφορίας ρώτησαν σχετικώς τα αρμόδια κλιμάκια της ΚΥΠ τα οποία την διέψευδαν. Επικοινώνησαν με τα 2α γραφεία των ταγμάτων της Ελληνοβουλγαρικής μεθορίου και ταύτα όχι μόνον διέψευσαν την πληροφορία του κ. Σταθοπούλου, αλλά είπαν ότι οι Βούλγαροι είχαν αραιώσει εσχάτως τις μεθοριακές φρουράς. Ο κ. Σταθόπουλος την πληροφορία είχε από αγγλο-αμερικανικές πηγές.
16) Ο Αντιστράτηγος κ. Αγαμέμνων Γκράτσιος Διοικητής ΑΣΔΕΝ τότε συνέδραμε με τους κ.κ. Σταθόπουλον και Παπανικολάου στο θέμα των Βουλγάρων, λέγων ενώπιον αξιωματικών κατά την 21ην, 22αν Ιουλίου:«Οι Βούλγαροι θα μας πάρουν την Θεσσαλονίκη. Ο στρατός μας δεν αντέχει. Οι επίστρατοι είναι διαλυμένοι και δεν έχουν ηθικό». Ότε και ηρωτήθη από Ταγματαρχών του Γεν. Επιτελείου πώς δύναται να λέγη τοιαύτας ανακριβείας όταν έχει και ο ίδιος επιστράτους εις την ΑΣΔΕΝ ενώ πάντα ταύτα ήσαν ανακριβή. (…) (…) Θα αναμείνω, ελπίζω όχι πάλιν επί ματαίω και εκ νέου κυβερνητική ενέργεια δια την επιβεβαίωση των ανωτέρω, δια την απόδοση του δικαίου και εξύψωση των Ενόπλων Δυνάμεων της Πατρίδος.
Επειδή λαβών γνώσιν των ανωτέρω εξ ων προκύπτει η διάπραξη των περιγραφομένων κακουργημάτων, υποχρέωση καθίσταται κατά Νόμο και δη κατ’ άρθρ. 40 του Κώδικα Ποινικής Δικονομίας να αναγγείλω ταύτα προς τον κ. Εισαγγελέα Πλημμελειοδικών Αθηνών.
Επειδή τα ανωτέρω δέον προς τούτοις να τεθούν πρωτίστως υπόψη του αξιότιμου προϊσταμένου της Εισαγγελίας Πλημμελειοδικών Αθηνών, Αντισαγγελέα Εφετών κ. Φαφούτη, αρμοδίου κατά νόμο προς δίωξη πάσης αξιοποίνου πράξεως. Τούτο δε έστω και εάν τα προκύπτοντα αδικήματα διώκονται παρά των Στρατιωτικών Δικαστικών αρχών, οι οποίοι δέον να λάβουν γνώση προδήλως παρ’ Αυτού. Γνωστοποιώ τα ανωτέρω υπό την επιφύλαξη παντός εν γένει δικαιώματός μου ως Έλληνα πολίτη.
Αρμόδιος δικαστικός επιμελητής επιδότω νομίμως την παρούσα προς τον αξιότιμο κ. Προϊστάμενο της Εισαγγελίας Πλημμελειοδικών των Αθηνών προς γνώσιν του και δια την διενέργεια των νομίμων.
Εν Αθήνας τη 8η Νοεμβρίου 1974». Απάντηση δεν έλαβε ποτέ”.
Η Κύπρος προδόθηκε και διχοτομήθηκε γιατί απλά οι Έλληνες δικτάτορες, οι στρατιωτικοί ταγοί, αλλά και οι κατόπιν πολιτικοί ταγοί δεν ήθελαν να πολεμήσουν για αυτή. Όλα τα άλλα είναι προφάσεις εν αμαρτίες και τίποτα άλλο.
Το ανωτέρω άρθρο βασίζεται σε στοιχεία και μαρτυρίες του αείμνηστου Σμηνάρχου Ασημάκη Παπανικολάου.