These events were very important for the future.
First, they showed that the Kremlin had played its cards:it was fighting for political control of Germany.
Second, they marked the beginnings of an alliance between Western military governments and German liberal democratic forces. This was an extraordinary reversal of the situation, for until then Western military governments had been determined to cooperate with the Soviet Union in the administration of Berlin, and to "demilitarize" and "denazify" the country.
Third, they made Berlin the focal point of the East-West confrontation in the power struggle that was to develop in Germany.
Yet Berlin was some 100 miles inside the Russian zone, Western forces were symbolic, and Westerners' right of access to the city depended on the goodwill of the Soviets.
In other words, Berlin would be the ideal place to put pressure on the West if the conflict escalates and to become the scene of a major defeat if they prove unable to maintain their presence there. How surprising then that the American ambassador in Moscow considered the possibility of a blockade? By pledging to support "Western" political parties in Berlin, the Western powers had greatly increased their interests in the city. This is why, faced with the showdown imposed by the Soviets, they were going to be forced to throw all their forces into battle to stay in Berlin.
But in the fall of 1946, we were still far from considering that a crisis of such magnitude could arise. The most significant event in the months following the elections was the Westerners' decision to incorporate West Germany into the economic structure of Western Europe.
Decision difficult for Westerners to take, because they could, on the one hand, try to continue their cooperation with the Soviet Union despite the obvious difficulties and uncertain profits, on the other hand, activate the reconstruction of Germany from the West at the cost of their relations with the government of the U.S.S.R. They had loyally handed over to the Soviets, over the previous two years, much of the industrial production of the Western Zones in partial payment for the enormous (and fully justified) sums they had demanded in reparations.
If now the West were to keep this production to carry out the recovery of Germany, relations with the Soviet Union would, without a doubt, be seriously compromised. But it was obvious that the recovery of all of Western Europe depended on that of Germany. It was practically inconceivable that countries like France, Great Britain or the Netherlands could ensure alone the effort necessary to rebuild their economy - and in fact, for forty years, the economic interdependence of Western Europe n had only intensified. A choice therefore had to be made between the preservation of a wartime alliance, the value of which was becoming increasingly difficult to define, and the economic recovery of Europe.
In the summer of 1947, the choice was made. General Marshall offered financial assistance from the United States for the recovery of all of Europe, including countries within the Soviet sphere of influence.
If Stalin had accepted the American proposal , the squaring of the circle would have been solved:the recovery of Europe could have been carried out without prejudice to the Soviet Union. But Stalin, fearing that the Marshall Plan would strengthen American influence in Europe, prohibited all Eastern European countries from participating.
Therefore, as the recovery of Western Europe, including the occupied zones, was effecting the division with Eastern Europe. The decision of the Westerners was perfectly understandable, but it was to cause a definitive rupture of German unity and to advance the iron curtain to the Elbe. Germany, victim of the antagonism between the capitalist world and the communist world, was to become the center of the "cold war".