“The colonel left me to attempt this regrouping, but the command proved impossible. Faced with the mess that was only increasing, I radioed the Z.F.N.E. the parachuting of a battalion at Ban Ca. The arrival of a fresh battalion there might have been decisive, because nothing was yet definitively lost. This reinforcement would have boosted everyone's morale and reached that of the Viets. He would have opened the door to That Khé for us.
"In this atmosphere of catastrophe, a native non-commissioned officer from one of the partisan companies detached to Qui Chan arrived at my P.C. and told me that the two companies were routed and all the French cadres hors de combat. This news seemed true, given the atmosphere in which the men of the Lepage column arrived.
She was absolutely wrong. I concluded, quite wrongly, that we should no longer count on these two excellent units which were, according to orders, to join my group after the last elements of Lepage had run out.
“And then, around 4 p.m., there was a fatal incident for the continuation of operations. The men around me suddenly started shouting:"The Viets have just taken Hill 477!" Indeed, we saw them climbing on 477 while the elements of 3 'Tabor left this position.
"I tried in vain to regain this key position.
"The situation at this moment seemed hopeless. The two groups were piled up elbow to elbow for less than a kilometer, in a saddle between hill 477 to the north and the peak located one kilometer south of 477. All the Viets had to do was place machine guns, mortars, even simple F.M. to make a carnage of our troops.
“In the chaos that reigned, I had lost contact with Colonel Lepage. I had to make an immediate decision to try to salvage what could still be salvaged.
“First of all, I had to loosen the device. I successively asked Commandant Arnaud, of the 8th R.T.M., and Commandant Labataille, Colonel Lepage's assistant, who were at my side, to push the troops they could still command to the heights dominating the little stream to the east flowed down the eastern flank of 477.
“In the ambient disorder, these two officers were unable to move their troops, too mixed with all kinds of units.
“I then took the desperate solution of trying to train myself- even some of the elements that cluttered the position without having anything to do there and that paralyzed the command.
“I sent for Captain Labignette, adjutant-major of the 3/3e R.E.I. The captain had taken command of the battalion because Commander Forget was out of action. A few steps from us, the battalion commander, in agony, was slowly passing away. I said to Labignette:"I'm going to try to outflank Ban Ca from the east. Your battalion is the only unit still capable of fighting. Until further orders from me or otherwise from Colonel Lepage, continue to stare at the enemy to protect the two columns. I'm thinking of coming back but I'm not sure".
“I ordered my radio command post to remain at the disposal of Colonel Lepage, who no longer had a radio set, and I sent a last message to the Z.F.N.E. "Groups can only count on 3/3e R.E.I. Only urgent intervention by air force and reinforcements could save the situation".
"And I rushed off. I easily dragged behind me part of the 8th R.T.M. with Commander Arnaud and a harka of goumiers behind Commander Labataille.
“From Ban Ca Peak, the Viets began to fire mortars at my little troop and me. I received a splinter in the left temple but it didn't hurt me much because it must have run out of steam. We kept up our momentum and finally outflanked the Viet positions against which our counterattacks had broken down.
“I ran into a partisan non-commissioned officer guarding with a few men the five or six Viet prisoners taken in the Quang Liet Valley on the night of October 5-6. The non-commissioned officer had a problem to solve immediately, because he felt that the situation was becoming untenable. What to do with the prisoners? "Tell them to hide somewhere until the end of the fighting, I replied. We release them, but let them not move. They risk being shot down".
“Very quickly I realized that I could not go back. I had to keep going. Our detachment was stumbling over corpses everywhere. Some were already swollen with putrefaction. Viets or partisans? There was no question of stopping to identify them.
“In the meantime, according to orders, the two companies of Qui Chan partisans had withdrawn to 477 after the passage of the last elements of the Lepage group. They found this peak occupied by the enemy. Lieutenant Villtard, an excellent fighter who commanded these units, immediately attacked 477.
Passing victoriously on the backs of the Viets, he rejoined the bulk of the column.
Learning of his departure, he then followed k 3* Tabor, who himself left in my tracks. Arrived around hill 603 held by the friendly troops of That Khé, he was then attacked in turn. The enemy dispersed its companies, while the 3rd Tabor reached the fallback position organized by Captain Labaume with his troops from That Khé.
If I could have suspected that the Villtard detachment was still in good condition and that it was going to retake 477, I would not have attempted my desperate expedition. (This
although allowed a certain number of our men to get out of it and win Khé in time.) Indeed, we could have
form a combat-ready marching group with the two Villtard companies and two companies drawn from the 3/3' R.E.I. With such a group. it was possible to force the passage to the east in the direction of 608 and 703 held by the That Khé groups.
What remained of the partisans and Moroccans would have followed as best they could and the debris of the 3/3e R.E.I., after having stared at the enemy and unhooked from their wall. would have brought up the rear. This solution might have cost us three or
four hundred men, but the bulk of the columns would have passed. »