Through his uncle, the Prince of Raffadale , who was ambassador of Naples in Spain at that time, requested for Gravina the Letter of order of admission to the Company of the Department of Cádiz, receiving this the office of midshipman on December 18, 1775. At the beginning of 1777, in the frigate Santa Clara, already appointed second lieutenant, Gravina measured his bravery in the rigor of the battle, achieving the surrender of the castle of the Ascension, in front of the Portuguese troops on the island of Saint Catherine [1] .
In his first five years of service, Gravina participated in operations relevant to Spanish interests, such as the reconquest of Menorca in 1782, under the orders of the Duke of Crillon
[2]
Gravina, an enlightened officer
The creation of the Academy and Company of Midshipmen of Cádiz , in 1717, was essential for the training of naval officers in the field of navigation, cartography, mathematics, astronomy and other teachings. These studies compiled the recent national and international scientific-technical developments, giving the officers of that time the possibility of expanding their naval knowledge abroad.
In Gravina's case, he studied in England in 1792, under Admiral Samuel Hood. There he perfected his knowledge of the navy and arsenals, which served him to promote the modernization of arsenals in Spain [4].
The knowledge acquired at the academy also accompanied Gravina on her journey to Constantinople aboard the Santa Rosa, in February 1788, to transport the Turkish ambassador to Spain, Yussuf Effendi[5]. This trip facilitated the rapprochement between the Monarchy of Carlos III and the Ottoman Empire.
On that trip, Gravina described, in faithful detail, the Ottoman city and its administration, documented in his account Description of Constantinople . With these words, he detailed the most important monuments of the capital:“outside the main mosques, Hagia Sophia, Solimán and Sultan Hahmet. Then we went to see the market (...) where they sell all the tow from Asia and all kinds of cotton canvas and thread”. He also explained how Muslims called to prayer during Ramadan [6].
Back in Spain, Gravina made astronomical observations and drew part of the chart of the Eastern Mediterranean, which he could not complete due to the spread of the plague that devastated several territories in the area .
Wise Ambassador
Gravina plays an important role in the story in his time as ambassador in Paris , from July 1804 to January 1805. In this short period of time he incessantly defended the interests of Spain, in which he tried to preserve neutrality in the war that France waged against half of Europe; promote the sale of wheat from France, to alleviate the famine suffered by the Spanish population during that year[7]; and renegotiate the economic issues of the Subsidies Treaty [8], agreed upon by the two nations in 1803.
For all this diplomatic work, Gravina took care to cultivate good relations with the Foreign Minister of the French Republic, Maurice de Talleyrand, and with other relevant ministers. He also has the opportunity to hit it off, in due measure and with due historical accuracy, with Napoleon Bonaparte , who always had good references towards Federico –according to the historian Pérez de Guzmán [9] –. Napoleon defined him with these words:“Intelligent and daring, loyal and sincere, type of the perfect military man. If only he had such an admiral in France!”.
Gravina, as Spanish ambassador, attended the coronation of the French emperor on December 2, 1804, and witnessed the entry of Spain into the war against England on December 31 of that same year[10]. Gravina was once again decisive in the Spanish cooperation treaty in the war, signed with the French Minister of the Navy, Denis Decrès, managing to reduce the contribution of Spanish ships to the combined, in the face of Napoleon's incessant demands to increase said contribution.
Courageous in battle
In 1793, Gravina led the combined squadron landing at Toulon against republican France. Everything that happened in that military operation will trace the first lines of his heroic figure.
At the command of the San Ildefonso , Gravina took the square. The sailor showed cunning and courage defending the city[11], whose combined army, which did not reach 17,000 troops, had to face a contingent of 74,000 men.
The good governance of the square and the courage committed to it earned Gravina respect from the Toulonians and their allies[12]. But this did not prevent the evacuation of Toulon on the night of December 18.
After the loss of Toulon , Gravina was sent to Rosas to command the Spanish troops, who suffered attacks from the French in November 1794[13]. Gravina did not cease to help the castle of Trinidad[14], and could not prevent the withdrawal of the Spanish from the city in February 1795, after 72 days of siege.
On July 22, 1805, near Cape Finisterre, the Gravina squadron, in combination with that of Villeneuve , stood ahead of the French ships[15]. They spotted at least 14 English ships, hidden under the mist[16].
Once the combat was over, Gravina and the other officers noticed the absence of the ships Firme and San Rafael[17]. This chapter will highlight the differences between Gravina and Villeneuve[18.
The disagreement between French and Spanish officers will take place on October 8, 1805, in front of Cádiz. After learning of the approach of more than 30 English ships through the Strait of Gibraltar –commanded by Admiral Horacio Nelson– [19] the officers met at the Bucentaure where Villeneuve, and some of his subordinates, bet on going out immediately to meet the English ships. Gravina and his men, on the contrary, advised to wait in the port. Given the enormous disagreement, it was decided by vote not to give the candle[20].
Gravina disagreed with Villeneuve's tactical decisions in those days – who felt pressured to comply with the emperor's demands of him [21] –. On the other hand, Godoy he warned Gravina to prepare his squad for a possible fight against the English [22] [23].
On October 18, and despite plans to replace him with Admiral Rosilly [24], Villeneuve ordered all ships to sail. Gravina ordered the mobilization of all his ships.
“The provisions of the government being so strict to obey the French chief[25], without the slightest reply, the major general was ordered in his presence to withdraw the postings of subtle forces, and the people returned to their respective ships, all preparing to set sail,” described Escaño[26]. Three weeks earlier, Villeneuve warned Decrès of the difficulties of carrying out such a mobilization in such conditions[27].
The Spanish and French ships lined up one behind the other. Gravina and Escaño remained in the Príncipe de Asturias. Hours before the beginning of the fight, Villeneuve ordered to form a line of combat. Gravina, on the other hand, proposed to place his ships “to windward of the strong body” [28] to attract several English ships or, alternatively, fall within the range of the enemies, catching them between two fires. Gravina signaled to Villeneuve asking for freedom to maneuver independently[29], but this was denied.
Faced with a heavy attack by two English ships, Gravina fell seriously wounded on October 21[30]. Moments later, many ships of the combined surrendered. Others, on the other hand, do not. The future of what happened there is well known by all.
At the end of this battle, Gravina was transferred to his house in Cádiz. He was seriously injured for five months until the day of his death, dated March 9, 1806. His body currently rests in the Pantheon of the Illustrious Marines of San Fernando , in Cadiz.
Conclusion
Federico Gravina was an example of a bold sailor and enlightened character, faithful to his convictions and loyal to his superiors, who has remained hidden in the oblivion of history. The course of events prevented Gravina from carrying out his tactical approaches during the Battle of Trafalgar, so opposed to the desperate decisions made by Villeneuve, a prisoner of his doubts and fears. As Napoleon ended up dictating to Decrès:“Gravina is all genius and determination in combat. If Villeneuve had had those qualities, the fight (...) would have been a complete victory”[31]. It is not possible to determine what the fate of the Battle of Trafalgar would have been if Gravina had commanded the combined Franco-Spanish. What we do know is that the result of this contest condemned Gravina to oblivion.
Notes
[1] “And here Federico had the first performance that history remembers:he was the officer in charge of ordering the surrender of the only castle that still had a Portuguese flag” (Fernández de Castro, C. The admiral without blemish and without fear . Alvargonzález Foundation, 1956. p. 30).
[2] Reconquest of Menorca 1781-1782 , Institute of Naval History and Culture. Spain navy. p.300.
[3] “A haul at this time revealed Gravina's seafaring prowess. As soon as Mahón had surrendered, the Duke (of Crillon) dispatched three boats for the same purpose to his assistant Don Pablo Sangro, and embarking on the San Luis, Federico set out to reach Barcelona first and succeeded, rendering the navigation useless for those who had preceded” (Mor de Fuentes, J. Elogio de Gravina . You repulse. 1806 pp 5 and 6).
[4] Benítez Martín, M. Biography of Federico de Garvina , Royal Academy of History. Available at http://dbe.rah.es/biografias/11283/federico-carlos-gravina-y-napoli.
[5] Fernández de Castro, C. o.c ., p. 99.
[6] “Around the mosque on the outside, to the four winds, there are four needles with a snail inside, to whose end the dervishes climb to call the people at the hours to pray, which are particularly at 12 noon and at night in Ramadan time, and at this time they illuminate these needles with footlights, which makes for a beautiful sight” (Sanchez Molledo, J.M. El viaje de Federico Gravina a Constantinople in 1788 . Arbor CLXXX, 711-712. March-April 2005. pp 727-744).
[7] Fernández de Castro, C. o.c ., pp. 310-313.
[8] Corona Baratech, C. Relations between Godoy Azara and the subsidies treaty of 1803 . Diplomatic History Notebooks, II, 1955, pp. 125 and ss.
[9] Pérez de Guzmán. J. Gravina's bag . Modern Spain. Volume CCV. 1906.
[10] Fernández de Castro, C. o.c ., p. 337.
[11] “During the siege of Toulon the command of the forces, as a whole, was always Gravina, but the one in the square, with the title of Governor, he was successively held by British Generals. Of these, Lord Mulgrave easily twinned with Gravina; the second, General O'Hara, of a difficult character, had great altercations with him on account of his jurisdiction; when he was taken prisoner, he was followed by General Dundas, who was, like the first, in tune with Gravina” (Martínez-Valverde, C. La Real Armada y Federico Gravina en Tolón, en 1793 . Naval History Magazine, August-September).
[12] “Great Britain will make public in Europe that the Squads and Armies of the allied were saved by you in the Gulf of Toulon; the whole nation thanks you, and I am proud to be able to express to you, Mr. Admiral, his wishes”, Count Elliot wrote to Gravina days after he had withdrawn from Toulon (Fernández de Castro, C. o.c ., p. 166).
[13] “As a stronghold, Rosas was nothing more than a third-order fortress, with no defense other than the TRINIDAD castle. Gravina placed a Marine garrison there, under the command of Lieutenant Don Esteban Morera, and surrounded the town with trenches. Afterwards he lifted their flagging spirits, encouraging them to resist and promising that his Squad would never abandon them and would provide them with whatever they needed during the siege they would surely suffer” (Ibid., p. 176).
[14] Gravina writes the following to Godoy on the first night of 1795:“I am very careful with the Castillo de la Trinidad; yesterday they made a terrible fire, and today, although not so much, but quite alive. I will see the dawn to communicate with him; but even if she gets lost, I will not leave the square, resolved by myself and all the officers until the last ship is lost (God forbid) to continue defending her, and helping her... because we stubbornly want to sacrifice ourselves for the best service of His Majesty , and honor of their Rl. Weapons. I will continue to notify you when it happens” (R. P. Vela Collection -Naval Museum. Ministry of the Navy).
[15] “Many sails began to be discovered:we were in three columns with wind from the N.W.E., bow to the E.S.E. The frigate Hermione He signaled a Squadron to the N.N.E., and the French Commander immediately ordered the line of battle to be formed on the port side, half a cable distance from one ship to the other, making a mess. General Gravina ordered the Spanish Squadron to take the vanguard of the line, with their ship in the lead, and to follow their movements by countermarching. At a quarter past two the French General ordered that the ship Plutón , head of the line of her, formed by the stern of the Firm , tail of ours, what was executed” (Quadrado and De-Roó, F. Praise of General Escaño . Printing of the Royal Academy of History. 1852 p. 133).
[16] “The fog was so thick that it did not let us see our line, and on some occasions it hid the very enemies we were fighting” (Ibid., p. 134) .
[17] Ibid., p. 135.
[18] The following fragment is found in Godoy's memoirs:“When the combined squadron arrived in Cádiz, General Gravina went to Madrid to report on what had been done until that day and receive instructions from the Government. The new projects adopted seemed to him the most appropriate and appropriate in those circumstances; but he added that Villeneuve was not the man for the case. He said that he lacked the energy of will, the readiness of mind and that military courage that decided triumphs and ensured events at critical moments; that he was brave and hard-working, but irresolute and slow to command, weighing the pros and cons of things like someone who weighs gold, believing that he was aware of all risks, even the most remote, and not knowing how to leave anything to chance. As for his expertise and his knowledge, he said that Villeneuve was ahead of many of his time, but entirely attached to the theories and resources of the old school of the Navy, very difficult to accommodate to the innovations of the Navy. English; stubborn in his ideas, and almost always inaccessible to advice that differed from his principles and his rules. Finally, he said that Villeneuve, dominated by the savage fear that oppressed him of displeasing the Emperor of the French, and always having the main charge that he had given him, to attend above all to the conservation of the squads and to avoid a victory of the English, was for this reason much more timid in his resolutions, and that this timidity, misunderstood in his motives, already had him without credit in the Navy, frowned upon equally by the Spanish and the French (...) It was not in effect Villeneuve the man who should oppose a sailor like Nelson. I entrusted Gravina to delay Admiral Villeneuve as much as he could for his part, in order to avoid any combat that the security of Cadiz or the honor of the allied arms did not make entirely necessary; I told him that in a few days Villeneuve would be replaced, to keep this secret well” (Godoy, M. Memorias . Publications University of Alicante. 2008. p. 1065).
[19] Gravina learned of this fact from the Spanish Ambassador in Lisbon, the Count of Campo Alegre. Gravina wrote to Godoy on October 2 (Conte Lacave, A. In the days of Trafalgar . Scelicer. 1955. pp 42-43).
[20] Quadrado and De-Roó, F. o.c ., p. 145.
[21] The dispatch sent by Decrès to Villeneuve on September 1 is significant, in which he transmits Napoleon's order to dominate “the coast of Andalusia and the Strait of Gibraltar ”, which hoped to be joined by the Spanish ships anchored in Cádiz and the eight located in Cartagena. In addition, the French Emperor urged Villeneuve to embark as soon as possible and had to give an account of his wishes to "Mr. Admiral Gravina". Napoleon ends by saying the following:“This is what His Majesty wants, regardless of the loss of the ships, if they are lost gloriously; she does not want her squads to be blocked by enemies of inferior strength, and if in this way she appears before Cadiz, she recommends and commands that you do not hesitate to attack her ”(Lon Romeo, E. Trafalgar. Papers of the Campaign from 1805. Ferdinand the Catholic Institution. CSIC. 2005. pp. 193-194).
[22] Godoy will send him an official letter in which the following is inscribed:“Reduce then to the most precise —he tells him— the high seats of the ships; form your General Staff; Take another Chief in the second, if you deem it convenient, either because of the number of ships or because of the quality of the service to which they are intended; Finally, he organizes the squad which must be on the combat foot, and he gives me the status of everything, both ships and crews; disembark everything that is relevant, and get ready for departure, assuming that General Villeneuve does not have a certain time” (Letter from Godoy to Gravina, of August 26, 1805 -Arch. Cent. de Marina, Sec. Histórica- , published by ALCALA GALIANO, op.cit .,t. H, p. 661).
[23] Gravina writes to Gil and Lesmus on October 11 the following:“As a result of the French Admiral having made on the morning of the 7th the signal to prepare to After setting sail, I immediately arranged to remove the Rota and Caleta stations and re-embark the artillery troop that I had put ashore to serve the plaza; but having resolved in the Meeting of Generals that was held the following day aboard the ship of His Majesty the Bucentaure, that the combined navy ship in this port would not leave 61 until a favorable moment arose to be able to verify it; I have thought to return (sic) to establish these posts and have taken those precautionary and defensive measures that had previously been deemed appropriate, in the event that the enemies attempted an attack against this plaza or its port, but with the prevention that in The very moment that the signal to prepare to set sail is signaled again on this ship, all return immediately to their respective boards, because as I have stated to Your Excellency before now, the 15 ships of the Spanish Navy that I have the honor to command, they are ready and ready to go to sea at the first signal” (Official of Gravina to Gil y Lemus, no. 115).
[24] Napoleon himself arranged for Villeneuve to be replaced by Admiral Rosilly, prompting “Villeneuve's return to France to account for his conduct. If Admiral Rosilly finds the squadron in Cádiz, he will immediately take command” (The aforementioned letter from Napoleon to Decrès, dated September 15, 1805, no. 9,220 of the Correspondence).
[25] “On October 6, the French admiral told General Gravina that he was forced to leave the port, as the orders of his government had prevented him (giving the orders necessary for the Spanish ships to be ready to set sail as soon as the French were ready. The Spanish general limited himself to answering that he considered it necessary, before weighing anchor, to hold a council in which the opinion of all the commanders of the ships could be heard. ships of both nations” (Quadrado and De-Roó, F. o.c. , pp. 143-144).
[26] Ibid., p. 145.
[27] On September 28, Villeneuve expressed his discouragement to Decrès at being able to leave so many ships at the same time in the Bay of Cádiz under such conditions:“I do not know if Your Excellency knows the conditions of this bay, and how difficult it is for such a numerous Armada to set sail at the same time if it is not with a NE wind. to SE. I beg Your Excellency to remember that Admiral Bruix spent three days leaving it, which would be impracticable with an enemy squadron as numerous as the one he is watching us. I absolutely need the wind to blow from the East, well boarded, to go to sea, and I will not be able to enter the Strait until there is a change to the West” (Villeneuve a Decrès; September 28 -Archives de la Marina, BB4, 230).
[28] Fernández de Castro, C. o.c., p. 397.
[29] “It would be seven in the morning when the enemy forces, in formation of various columns, arrived on our line with the intention of attacking it from the center and rear. Observing the movement, General Gravina requested permission from the admiral in chief to act independently of the line with the observation squadron that was under his command (...) Villeneuve strongly disapproved, warning the Spanish general to remain in the line of battle with close adherence to the above instructions (Ferrar de Couto, J. Trafalgar naval combat history:preceded by the Renaissance of the Spanish navy during the eighteenth century . Editors of the History of the Spanish Royal Navy. 1851. pp 132-133).
[30] Quadrado and De-Roó, F. o.c. , p. 151.
[31]Biography of Don Federico Gravina y Nápoli , all to port. Available at https://www.todoababor.es/articulos/bio_grav.htm.