The sources we currently have are woefully scarce . In any case, we can highlight some such as the famous Tabera-Fonseca lawsuit, or the work of the Galician hidalgo Vasco de Aponte "Recount of the old houses of the Kingdom of Galicia", written in the first decades of the 16th century. Among the current researchers, Anselmo López Carreira and Carlos Barros stand out, among others.
The second irmandiña revolt, we cannot separate it from the Castilian political context, where we find the stormy reign of Enrique IV . During this period, we see that the conflicts between the monarchy and the nobility were constant, the latter taking sides with the infant Alfonso. Point out as a representative event, in 1465 the burlesque ceremony known as "Farsa de Ávila", which clearly demonstrates the great distance that occurred within Castilian politics.
Galicia is a territory where the noble presence is very prominent . It is occupied in almost all of its extension by the manorial domain, highlighting the Church, especially the archbishopric of Santiago as the main landowner. Therefore, the realengo was practically testimonial. This caused an even greater weakening of the figure of the monarch since he hardly had jurisprudence, and means that since Henry II, no king will set foot in Galicia, thus leaving total freedom to the nobility to exercise their power without restrictions. With this distribution of property, the nobility cannot expand their territories, and seeks new alternatives to increase their income. Among the solutions they found is increasing taxes, or attacking the defenseless territories of the Church lands, to later reach an agreement with the ecclesiastical establishment and become encomenderos of that territory. This will cause an increase in violence and abuse by the nobles, which will imply a worsening of Galician society, which was at the service of the ambitions and interests of the nobility.
It will be in this context when the “irmandiña” rebellion takes place. Contrary to what many people think, this does not arise in the countryside but is an urban revolt. In this period the brotherhoods were a free and voluntary association of individuals regardless of their profession, level of wealth or status. It is a complex institution that requires financing, a hierarchy that directs its actions and a meeting of its members that decides the lines to follow. It is therefore not generally a spontaneous organization. It is usually regulated by some chapters drawn up in common, and is not always sanctioned by the monarch. In this aspect, before the formation of the Galician brotherhood, in November 1466, the Junta de Fuensalida took place. of the brotherhoods of Castilla y León, of great importance for Galicia because the "Chapters of Fuensalida" will govern the operation of the Santa Irmandade of the kingdom of Galicia.
The brotherhood was organized on a simple structure, which was repeated several times on a small scale, so that the organization and mobilization capacity of individuals started from small but numerous groups. . However, this capacity had a serious problem, since it was not easy to coordinate the actions of these small groups, a weakness that would prove to be essential for understanding the Irmandiña defeat.
The Santa Irmandade and the irmandiña war
The uprising organized by the Santa Irmandade , comes from the chaotic situation, as well as the continued abuses caused by the nobility during this period, but in no case was the intention of the irmandiños to modify the current social system. In fact, the support on the part of the Santa Irmandade towards Enrique IV is manifested with total clarity, which influenced the good disposition of the monarch towards the Galician events, as shown by the writing of the letter of July 6, 1467 in Cuéllar, protecting the actions of the irmandiños and freeing the lieutenants , merinos and wardens of the fortresses of his oath to defend them. This fidelity on the part of Galician society comes from the idealization that existed among the Galician peasantry of the fifteenth century of the figure of the king, promoted by the continuous abuses suffered under the noble rule, hence they sought the protection of the monarch. In fact, Barros shows in one of his studies how many peasants who fought among the irmandiños did not even know the name of the king.
As for the social groups represented in the Santa Irmandade, we must point out the bourgeoisie, the peasantry and even sectors of the lower nobility. Among them, the hidalgos Diego de Lemos, Pedro Osorio and Alonso de Lanzós stand out, who were the captains of the main army corps of the irmandiños. It is believed that there may have been other nobles who, out of fear, did not openly join the cause, but must have supported it in some way, as evidenced by the pardon extended to the castle of Pambre owned by Sancho Sánchez de Ulloa.
The irmandiños' way of proceeding was fundamentally to attack the fortresses . In any case, it was not something homogeneous, surely assaults were organized in a generalized way but without real strategic planning. This will cause the nobles, initially frightened by the events, and with their forces divided by the conflict with Enrique IV, to have to flee. At this point we must point out that the level of destruction by the irmandiños was not as high as what tradition has wanted to grant them.
Once they take power, we see that the Irmandade begins to exercise justice, wanting to impose order. Try to return to the old customs before the usurpation and imposition of manorial abuses. In fact, we even have evidence of resolutions against peasants and in favor of monasteries, as was the case of Oseira among others.
Finally, in 1469, with the Castilian struggles temporarily paralyzed as a result of the agreement reached in 1468, between the monarchy and the nobility, in the pact of the Toros de Guisando, the nobles Galicians will return to Galicia ready to overwhelmingly defeat the Santa Irmandade. The crown in this case decided not to interfere and left the nobles free. The return of the nobility took place from several fronts, which undoubtedly posed a problem for the irmandiña military organization. In spring, the army led by Pedro Álvarez de Sotomayor, count of Camiña, enters Galicia from Portugal, defeating a group of irmandiños in the battle of Castro de Framela . Later, he will continue his march to Santiago. Nearby were the armies of other nobles who entered through Castile, led by Fonseca and Pimentel. Here the irmandiños will propose battle on the mount of Almáciga , where they awaited the arrival of new contingents. Anticipating this, the nobles will charge without delay against the bulk of the irmandiñas troops commanded by Pedro Osorio, who cannot cope with the charge assuming a total defeat. Meanwhile, in eastern Galicia, the Count of Lemos defeats another Irmandiño army at Pedrosa , also occupying Monforte. In the northwest, in the land of the Andrade, the irmandiños resist at the hands of Alonso de Lanzós, although all their offensives are repulsed by the noble troops. He will eventually end up giving up. Destroyed the main irmandiñas forces, the lords dedicated themselves to eliminating small redoubts of resistance. The last of them is supposed to have been a small group of 30 irmandiños, who resisted in the old archbishop's castle of La Lanzada, commanded by Xoán de Chinchón and Xoán García de Barca from Pontevedra. Finally the fortress falls due to betrayal and the survivors will be taken to Pontevedra to be executed.
Regarding the repression on the part of the nobility, it should not be magnified. It is evident that it existed, as evidenced by the executions of which we have evidence, but they were not massive. Apart from this, the repression consisted of the collection of contributions, economic or personal, to compensate for the damage caused. Especially working on the repair or reconstruction of the fortresses. Following the year 1469, we see that noble abuses continued as well. The king could not cope with the enormous lordship of the territory. In fact, the power of the nobility will continue without restriction until the Catholic Monarchs, whose involvement in Galician politics can be symbolized in the visit they carry out in 1486, the first time that a monarch has visited Galicia since Henry II in 1376.
Bibliography
- GALBAN MALAGÓN, C.J. (2010) “A war two irmandiños” Ed.Lóstrego, Santiago de Compostela.
- BARROS, C. (1996) “Long live the King! Imaginary king and revolt in late medieval Galicia ”, Ensaios Medievais. Vigo, Xerais.
- BARROS, C. (2006) “Os irmandiños de Galicia. A revolt in Pontevedra » Murguia, nº9, p. 39-68.
- BARROS, C. (1990) “Justice mentality of the irmandiños, XV century ” Madrid, XXI Century of Spain, “History of Social Movements” Collection, 298 pp.
- LÓPEZ CARREIRA, A. (1987) “A irmandiña revolution ”, Santiago de Compostela.
- LÓPEZ CARREIRA, A. (1992) “Os irmandiños. Texts, documents and bibliography ”, Vigo.
- COOPER, E. (1991) “Stately castles in the crown of Castile”, Ed. Junta de Castilla y León.
- CLARAMUNT, S. PORTELA, E. MITRE, E. GONZÁLEZ, M. (2006) “History of the Middle Ages” Ed.Ariel.