After the war, the researchers of the reicharchive they concluded that the failure of the offensive was motivated by Moltke's alterations to the original plan and its failure to execute. On the other hand, subsequent reviews suggest that the plan was fanciful, irresponsible and unfeasible due to serious miscalculations and the logistical impossibility of materializing it. Even more transgressive recent approaches suggest that the so-called Schlieffen Plan never existed, but rather it is a story constructed to exonerate the High Command and point to Moltke, who died in 1916, as the person most responsible for the defeat. Be that as it may, the fact that the Germans were not far from achieving it invites speculation with an alternative reconfiguration of the world stage.
Germany during the Armed Peace
After the victory in the Franco-Prussian War of 1871, « Otto von Bismarck insisted on the annexation of Alsace and Lorraine only because the General Staff considered them indispensable for the defense of his eastern border."[1] In his opinion, France thus became a potential enemy, eager to recapture the provinces from her [2] and tried to keep her isolated. The chancellor focused his efforts on preserving the status quo and promote understanding with Russia, « through agreements such as the League of the Three Emperors in 1872 or the Reinsurance Treaty in 1887«.
The dismissal-resignation of Bismarck in 1890, due to tensions with William II, meant a change in the direction of German diplomacy in favor of the expansionism of weltpolitik and the abandonment of cooperation with Russia. On the other hand, the Third French Republic saw in the Russian need for capital the opportunity to break out of its isolation. The rapprochement culminated in 1894 a secret military convention [3] that left Germany surrounded. With military support from Italy less and less feasible, Austria-Hungary remained the only reliable ally.
Great Britain, wary of Germany's economic boom and its program of naval expansion, saw the need to break out of its splendid isolation. It began to iron out rough edges with its traditional enemies, reaching successive pacts:the Entente Cordiale with the French in 1904 and the Anglo-Russian entente in 1907.
The Schlieffen Legacy
Schlieffen, chief of the Imperial General Staff since 1889, was obsessed with Germany becoming involved in a war of attrition with a dubious outcome. From the conviction of German military superiority, he believed that a total victory through the offensive was possible, considering that smaller forces, maneuvering with greater skill, could defeat larger contingents.[4]
Germany could not divide its forces to wage an all-out war against France and Russia at the same time, so it would contain an enemy on one front while the bulk of its forces would seek a quick victory in the other. Once the first contender was defeated, her railway network would allow the troops to be transported to the other front and destroy the second enemy.[5]
The immersed territory that the Russians had to retreat from, led Schlieffen to seek their decisive battle in the west. The offensive could only be successful if the system of fortresses on the Franco-German border was outflanked through Belgium, Luxembourg and Holland. A mighty right wing would sweep the Netherlands, "with the sleeve of the last soldier brushing the English Channel", and would encircle Paris to the west, while a much smaller left wing would be posted south of Metz. Whether the French attacked in Lorraine or stayed on the defensive, the right wing would turn and corner the French forces behind their eastern strongholds, forcing them to surrender. [6]
Schlieffen reflected these ideas and the conclusions of his war games in the memorandum War against France December 1905.[7]
Moltke's modifications and the execution of the Schlieffen plan
However, Helmuth von Moltke he did not refuse to be Schlieffen's successor. An unfortunate choice in the eyes of Schlieffen himself.
The situation after 1906 had become more dangerous for Germany and some of the assumptions made by Schlieffen were no longer valid. Russia had recovered from her revolution after the defeat against Japan and her relative power with France was increasing while that of Austria-Hungary was deteriorating. Unlike Schlieffen, Moltke could not ignore the eastern front due to increasing Franco-Russian military cooperation and, moreover, British intervention seemed increasingly likely.[9]
Moltke discarded the rest of the alternative planning after 1913, which meant activating the French invasion through Belgium regardless of the casus belli . In case an agreement could not be reached for the passage of troops, he considered that the possibility of confronting the Belgian army and the British expeditionary forces was more promising than a frontal attack on the French fortifications.[10]
While in public Moltke was confident of a quick victory, in private he harbored serious doubts, [11] which led him to dismiss the invasion of Holland. He could thus use his neutral ports to supply himself in the face of a possible British maritime blockade. In exchange, he was forced to spread his wide right wing across a narrow strip into Belgian territory.[12] This retouching made the taking of Liège essential. to secure road and rail routes as soon as war was declared.[13] Despite unexpected resistance and heavy casualties, Liège was taken only two days later than planned.[14]
But Moltke's most controversial alteration was the reassignment of his forces. He weakened up to three times the right wing, which Schlieffen had conceived as the hammer that would hit the French army.
The first, by increasing the size of the left wing. Moltke foresaw a French attack and did not dare expose southeastern Germany to an invasion that would endanger the industrial regions of the Rhine.[15] Schlieffen, on the other hand, believed that «the French should not be deprived of the opportunity to “get into a sack” between Metz and Strasbourg».[16]
When the French activated their plan XVII by successively attacking Alsace, Lorraine and the Ardennes, they favored the German tactic. The French offensive was a complete failure, but they managed to withdraw so quickly that they avoided being encircled.
Schlieffen planned to reinforce the right wing with troops from the left wing as soon as the left wing could spare them.[17] On the contrary, Moltke weakened the right wing to reinforce the left in the face of his successful advance on the Verdun front, which has been interpreted as an adulteration of the Plan and a catastrophic error of judgement.[18] Instead of drawing the French right wing into German territory, away from his supply lines and diverting them from the critical zone, he pushed the French inland by shortening their lines of communication and concentrating his forces instead of dividing them between the defense of Paris and the advance towards Germany. For their part, the Germans accused the sabotage of railway lines, bridges and tunnels and the multiple breakdowns of their small fleet of trucks as they entered French territory.[19]
Despite the German decentralization doctrine, the magnitude of the operation required coordination that the remote location of the headquarters in Luxembourg made impossible. Easily decipherable orders and reports could take up to 20 hours, preventing a real idea of the situation from being obtained.[20] Relying on exaggerated reports of outright victory in the west[21] and facing the possibility of a Russian invasion after the defeat at Gumbinnen, Moltke sent two right-wing army corps to the eastern front. Unrequested reinforcements that arrived two days after the crushing German victory at Tannenberg.
Failure on the Marne
For the first time, the German right wing was outnumbered, right at the decisive stage of the campaign.[22] Due to the prevailing lack of coordination and his aggressive character, Alexander von Kluck, general of the 1st Army, exposed the German flank to the newly concentrated French army in Paris. By attempting to right his mistake, he caused a breach in the German ranks, leaving the bulk of the right wing in a very compromised position. Faced with the dangerous Franco-British counterattack, the Germans decided not to risk it and withdrew to the Aisne River, in the so-called "Miracle of the Marne". [23]
Germany had managed to occupy northern France, abundant in resources and with a powerful industry. However, he failed to achieve a quick victory in the west. The exhaustion and numerical inferiority at the decisive moment, the lack of coordination between the commands and other strata such as the navy and the operational errors condemned all the combatants to four long years of war of attrition.
Bibliography
- M. Hastings, 1914 The year of the catastrophe, Ed. Planeta S.A., 2013.
- G. Ritter, The Schlieffen Plan, Critique of a Myth, Oswald Wolf (Publishers) Limited, 1958.
- T. Zuber, "The Schlieffen Plan Reconsidered," War History , 6, 1999.
- L. W. L., European Alliances And Alignments (1871-1890), New York:Alfred A. Knoff, 1956.
- M. McMillan, 1914 From Peace to War, Turner Publicaciones S.L., 2013.
- D. Stevenson, 1914-1918 History of the First World War, Penguin Random House Grupo Editorial, S.A, 2014.
- A. Mombauer, German War Plans, In:Hamilton, Richard F. and Herwig, Holger H. eds. War Planning 1914. UK:Cambridge University Press, p. 48–79. , 2010.
- R. C. Schuette, Effects of Decentralized Execution on the Germany Army during the Marne Campaign of 1914, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas:Master of Military Art and Science U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2014.
- W. D. O'Neill, The Plan that Broke the World. The Schlieffen plan and World War I, 2014:Createspace.
Notes
[1] Ritter 1958, p.39
[2] Langer 1956, pp. 9-10
[3] McMillan 2013, pp. 123-126
[4] Ritter 1958, p.53
[5] McMillan 2013, p. 420
[6] Ritter 1958, pp.7-8
[7] Ritter 1958, p17
[8] Hastings 2013, p.68 and McMillan 2013, p.426
[9] Stevenson 2014, p.100
[10] Mombauer 2010, pp.58-63
[11] Hastings 2013, p.68
[12] Mombauer 2010, p.59
[13] Stevenson 2014, p.100
[14] O'Neill 2014, p.78 and Mombauer 2010, p.67
[15] Stevenson 2014, p.112 and Ritter 1958, pp.54-55
[16] Ritter 1958, p.40
[17] Ritter 1958, pp.63-65
[18] Mombauer 2010, p.70 and Ritter 1958, p.61
[19] Stevenson 2014, p.110
[20] Schuette 2014, p,44
[21] Schuette 2014, p.48 and Mombauer 2010, p.72
[22] Mombauer 2010, p.72
[23] Hastings 2013, pp.68, 380-372