In the penultimate year of the conflict, 1597, he had place the largest naval encounter of the war. It came in the weeks following the second Japanese invasion, in October. The result was a coup de grâce for the Japanese forces and an unstoppable morale boost for the Koreans. An episode of such magnitude deserves careful study and reflection. The sources consulted were the diary written by Admiral Yi and his biography written by his nephew, Yi Pun [1].
The day of the great battle of Myeongnyang
On the 15th day of the ninth Moon of the Cheong-yu year, the Korean army led by Yi Sun-sin was at Usuyeong, north of the Myeongnyang Channel. The position was of great importance since if the Japanese were able to overcome it they would have the western coasts of Korea at their mercy. They were opposed by the last remnants of the Korean fleet, the twelve or thirteen panokseon who had survived the Chilcheollyang disaster. The admiral was aware of the clear numerical inferiority and his limited resources, hence he chose to engage in battle in what we could call the Korean “Thermopylae”, that is, the Myeongnyang Strait. This enclave was known as "The Roaring Canal"[2], surely in a clear allusion to the noise caused by the strong currents of water. From the information provided by the newspaper, it is known that the small Korean naval force positioned itself with its bow towards the channel, a smart decision for two reasons. The first was that they would force the Japanese to make the first move, to attack, and the second was that they would have a low-risk route of retreat if they were outmatched. The admiral delivered a harangue reflecting his knowledge of military treaties, probably Chinese, the day before the battle. He said like this:
Those principles of strategy could well be the ones that Sun Tzu collected in his Art of War . Although it is not surprising that Yi Sun-sin was aware of the rest of the Chinese treaties[5], since the cultural influence of that country on Korea was very powerful. At the same time, the importance given to the defensive position is more than evident, since with such small forces the option of attack was ruled out.
The following morning, Korean lookouts reported the entry of some two hundred Japanese ships into Myeongnyang. To these should be added another hundred and thirty-three that, according to the newspaper, began to surround the defenders. It is convenient to make a point about the figures of the contenders once this point has been reached. If we take into account Korean fonts, such as the Nanjung Ilgi and the Yi Ch'ungmu-kong Cheonseo , twelve panokseon would have faced each other against 333 Japanese ships[6]. It is very likely that among that huge number there were ships of a very varied typology, from a few heavier ones to other auxiliaries or even kobayas much smaller in size. These data are not specified, but we already know that facing an enemy far superior in number has not been an exception in ancient chronicles. If you are defeated, you can always allude to that difference in strength. On the contrary, the victory is more meritorious, if possible, since it is David who defeats Goliath. Although in the Japanese documentation consulted there are no references to the number of ships, I tend to think that the figure must have been lower, but I have no doubt that the Koreans were outnumbered, hence the choice of a battlefield that reduced maneuverability and numerical power to the enemy.
The psychological impact of such a powerful adversary caused a great commotion among the Korean sailors who were "paralyzed by terror"[7]. Added to this critical situation was the fact that some Korean ships began to retreat and break formation. The panorama became more complex by the moment, so Admiral Yi ordered to concentrate the fire on the Japanese flagship. This battle could not be won conventionally, so he sought to demoralize the enemy while encouraging his men. In an action bordering on hopelessness, Yi Sun-sin raised his flag as a sign that he would not retreat, while threatening his hesitant captains “Do you want to be hanged by a military court? […] Could you live knowing that you fled?”[8] Finding themselves between a rock and a hard place, the Korean captains returned to battle. The Japanese managed to board some ships, an action that Admiral Yi had always tried to avoid. Your panokseon and that of An Wi, who was beginning to be in trouble, fired at close range and destroyed “two of his ships with the help of heaven”[9], in a clear allusion to the use of artillery, since “Heaven” or “Paradise” It was the name given to one of its cannons. The Korean ships managed to get away by acting as battering rams. With nightfall ended the first day of confrontation, which left 15 Japanese ships sunk and some Korean wounded. Thanks to the narrowness and currents of Myeongnyang, the defenders avoided being completely surrounded, which would have meant their total extermination.
With the arrival of the second day, the Japanese launched a new attack. The Korean response was to withdraw slowly so that the enemy fleet could enter the strait. The maneuver was not done with all the order that the admiral would have liked, although he allowed the Japanese to be shelled without them being able to do anything. This shows the clear artillery superiority of the Koreans. Finally the Japanese navy began to board the panokseon . The description of that chapter gives an idea of the weapons used by the defenders:“Then, the enemy hordes, which resembled black ants, assaulted An Wi's ship. His sailors fought desperately with sharp sticks, long spears and stones until they were all exhausted”[10]. With the exception of heavy artillery and bows, the weapons used by the Korean sailors do not seem too sophisticated, rather humble and rudimentary, unlike those used by the Japanese (muskets, katanas...).
At the height of the battle, when things were starting to get desperate for the Koreans, a Japanese deserter they had on board discovered the body of Kurushima Tosho, Angol's general. Yi asked to be pulled out of the water and torn to pieces. Once this was done he ordered his men to shout and beat the drums on board. The psychological impact on the Japanese must have been so severe that they withdrew, leaving thirty-one ships behind. In total, these two days of combat had cost them forty-six ships, while their rivals had come out unscathed.
The data provided in the Yi Ch’ungmu-kong Cheonseo they are similar, although Yi Sun-sin's nephew highlighted other aspects. Among them the presence of Toshisuna, the aforementioned Japanese deserter who went on to become a faithful informer of the admiral.[11] There is no doubt that the knowledge he possessed about his compatriots, camps in Korean territory, army movements... were excellently used. The second most relevant piece of information that Yi Pun bequeathed us is related to the role played by the refugees during the confrontation. Despite their hardships, they did not hesitate to provide the Korean military with food and clothing. Admiral Yi asked them to move away from the battlefield but “none of them left him. Moreover, in the battle of Myeongnyang they stood with their ships in long lines, like reinforcement squadrons in the rear, while we fought in the vanguard”[12]. Such an attitude reflected in an unbeatable way the commitment of the civilians with the situation that their country was experiencing. At the same time, it is a reflection of that extreme devotion they felt for Admiral Yi, a man who was risking his life for them and their land. The role played by these refugees during the battle was nil. However, his help was evident by giving the navy what it needed most, food. I dare say that without civilian support, the armies of the hermit country[13] would have had a much more difficult time.
Conclusion
By way of conclusion I would like to invite the reader to reflect on an element that we all think of when we read about the Imjin Wars, the keobukseon or turtle ship. Although this vessel has enjoyed great fame in popular culture, it is possible to glimpse in ancient chronicles that the greatest weight of the war fell on the panokseon . She was a versatile and well-armed ship, the backbone of the Korean navy. This vessel was the true protagonist of the naval battles that were fought during the confrontation. Sadly, she has been overshadowed by the keobukseon , much more spectacular.
Excerpt from the bibliography used
- TAE-HUNG, H. and LEE, C., Imjin Changch’o , Seoul, Yonsei University Press, 2007.
- TAE-HUNG, H. and POW-KEY, S., Nanjung Ilgi. War Diary of Admiral Yi Sun-sin, Seoul, Yonsei University Press, 1977.
- TURNBULL, S., Samurai invasion of Korea 1592-1598 , London, Cassell &Co, 2002.
Notes
[1] Such a work is found in the Yi Ch'ungmu-kong Cheonseo, compiled by Minister Yi.
[2] TAE-HUNG, H. and POW-KEY, S., Nanjung Ilgi. War Diary of Admiral Yi Sun-sin, Seoul, Yonsei University Press, 1977, p. 311.
[3] The similarity in form with the biblical quotation ("He who loves his life loses it and he who hates his life in this world will keep it in eternal life. Jn. 12:25") is curious, although the meanings are different.
[4] TAE-HUNG, H. and POW-KEY, S., Nanjung Ilgi… op. cit., p. 311.
[5] The seven military classics of ancient China, which were as follows:“The six secret teachings of Jiang Ziya ”, “Sima's methods ”, “Sun Tzu's Art of War ”, “The Wuzi of Wu Qi ”, “The Wei Liaozi ”, “The three strategies of Huang Shigong ” and the “Responses between Tang Taizong and Li Weigong ”. For more information, see:SAWYER, R., Seven Military Classics of Ancient China. The History and Warfare, United Kingdom, Basic Books, 2008.
[6] Turnbull places the figure at 133, a more realistic number. TURNBULL, S., Samurai invasion of Korea 1592-1598 , London, Cassell &Co, 2002, p. 201.
[7] TAE-HUNG, H. and POW-KEY, S., Nanjung Ilgi… op. cit., p. 312.
[8] Ibid .
[9] Ibid , p. 313.
[10] Ibid , p. 314.
[11] TAE-HUNG, H. and LEE, C., Imjin Changch’o , Seoul, Yonsei University Press, 2007, p. 228.
[12] Ibid , p. 229.
[13] Old name of Korea.