By October 1940, Axis 1 forces (Germany, Italy, Japan) had occupied Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Denmark and Poland. Italy, from the beginning of April 1939, had occupied Albania, installing a pro-Italian government in Tirana under Prime Minister Shefqet or Shefqet Bey Verlaci (Shefqet bej Vërlaci, 1877-1946).
In April 1939, three divisions with several light tanks were landed in Albania, alarming Britain and France, who were quick to guarantee the independence and integrity of Greece and Romania. However, after the unfavorable development of the Battle of Dunkirk (26 May 1940 – 5 June 1940) between the Axis Powers and the Allied Powers (Britain, France, Belgium), France was forced to capitulate with Germany (22 June 1940) , and Britain, which had managed to limit the losses in its human resources, could provide limited aid to Greece.
In the Balkans, in October 1940, Yugoslavia manifested a friendly policy towards the Axis, while Romania, which had been occupied by German troops on October 7, was now cooperating politically with it. Greece, having found itself in a difficult position, as it was no longer possible to implement the Balkan Pact of 1934 (Greece, Turkey, Romania, Yugoslavia), was called upon to prepare militarily for the defense of its territorial sovereignty. At dawn on October 28, 1940, the Italian attack took place. The Greek Army counterattacked successfully, repelling the invasion of Italian forces in the Battle of Pindos (28 October 1940 – 13 November 1940), the Battle of Elaia – Kalama (2 November – 8 November 1940) and penetrated deep into Italian-occupied Albanian territory. Then, the Greek forces entered Kortsa (November 22, 1940), Pogradec (November 30, 1940), Argyrokastro, Delvino and Agios Saranda (December 5-12, 1940).
The Battle of Himarra
Heimarra is located in the south of Albania, between Agioi Saranda and Cape Liguetta (Glossa Avlonos). During the Greco-Italian War it was a difficult battlefield. Because it is surrounded by the Akrokeraunia mountains, it stands out for the difficult terrain of the area and the adverse weather conditions during the winter. The Battle of Chiemarra took place against the Italian invasion from December 20 to 22, 1940. Its victorious outcome opened the way for the Greek forces in the direction of Avlonos and strengthened the Italian leadership's concern about the fighting ability of the Greek Army.
On 13 and 14 December 1940, units of the First Army Corps proceeded to prepare for the next offensive operations, despite continued bad weather, difficult terrain and strong Italian resistance. In general, his plan of action aimed, firstly, at the capture of the Tepeleni junction and the clearing of the Drinos and Zagoria valleys by the IV Division. The ultimate goal was the cutting off of the Tepeleniou - Avlonos road, as well as the anchoring of the enemy forces in the area. Secondly, with the forces of the III Division, it was intended to open the valley of the Siusitsa River, through the occupation of the Kutsi neck and the simultaneous action in the coastal sector, so as to also hook the enemy forces in the area. With the order of December 15, the 1st Army Corps entrusted the Divisions with the immediate execution of the above offensive actions.
On December 13, the III/40 Evzona Regiment (40th Infantry Regiment, Detachment of Colonel Thrasyvoulos Tsakalotos) advanced the I/42 Battalion in the Ftera-Tzora area to replace the 1st Reconnaissance Group and the II/40 Battalion in the Mali Itera massif with the ultimate goal of conquering the Koutsi neck through the occupation of the Papathia massif. According to the planning of the Division, the start of the offensive action was set for the morning of December 15. The 12th Regiment with its attack would aim to capture the line hill 117 – Mali e Varit – hill 613 near the sea.
Initially, the 40th Belted Regiment would maintain its positions on the Galisti – Konyak ridge, but also towards Ftera – Tzora, until parts of the IV Division arrived on its right. Then, it would head towards Jora – Mali e Djoret, with the ultimate goal of capturing the Mali e Djoret – Papathia line. However, according to the Report of the Detachment Commander Thrasyvoulos Tsakalotos, in the area of action of the right Detachment the territorial difficulties were serious.
Irrespective of the other supply difficulties that had caused them to reach the vertical, the problem was initially that the artillery would pass through the Galitsi massif under enemy pressure, with only a difficult and stair-like road from Tatezati to Konyak and from there to Ftyera. The use of the Borsi - Ftera route was impossible, because the enemy possessed Borsi, and the attack on the Kushi neck, effectively resulted in a wedge within the cordon, reinforced by the persistent fortification under the enemy, after a series of barbed wire. This was and it is seen that he is considered impregnable on the front.
The Detachment, descending towards this cordon, would find itself, as it was found, under the following conditions:In front of its front the enemy possessed the neck of Malie Joret and far behind on the flank of the Regiment, the Castle of Borsi. Under the above conditions, it was first necessary to raise the artillery to Mount Galichi (1500 m.), to support the actions of the Regiment from there and to try (before all wedges in the cordon, when the mountainous massifs of Mali Joret Malie Joret - hill) were overcome 1400 and Mali Iteras), of the supraceras of the neck. The difficulties caused by the artillery class constitute, in terms of neutralization, a monumental effort, they honored the Greek artillery. The ascent took place, one on the shoulders of the soldiers, and the other on the halflings.2
On December 14, the situation showed no change. The divisions of the Division were busy preparing for the next day's attack. However, throughout the day the Italian Air Force was very active, bombing command posts and any visible target. From the morning of the next day, the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 12th Regiment attacked to capture the eastern and western heights of Kiparos village. However, the attack failed for the II/12th Battalion, on the one hand due to the poor choice of base of departure, although the artillery provided significant support, on the other hand due to the immediate reaction of the Italian divisions. Meanwhile, the I/12th Battalion managed to partially approach the eastern slopes of hill 613.
At about the same time, Colonel Tsakalotou's Detachment, although making contact with the Italian positions on the Koutsi Pass, through the I/42nd Battalion, nevertheless moved slowly with the II/40th Battalion towards Mali Iteras due to enemy resistance and snow , which was 0.80-1.20 m high. At the same time, the 41st Regiment of the Siena Division held the heavily defended area between Mali e Joret and Mali Iteras with 2,000 meters of trenches and barbed wire. In particular, a line had been established in Mali e Joret, while the Papathia hill, which was also defensively organized with barbed wire, was held by the 141st Blackcoat Battalion, which also had mortar companies.
From 15 to 17 December, the 12th Regiment, under the difficult conditions of blizzard and dense fog that did not allow the support of the infantry fighting day and night from Artillery, manifested all forms of offensive action - continuous, close, as well as repelling counter-attacks . The losses of the Italians were significant, but also of the 12th Regiment, since it lost 4 officers and 49 soldiers, and 13 officers and 301 soldiers were wounded.
The 1st Army Corps, knowing that the Papathia massif posed a threat to the flanks of the III and IV Divisions, ordered for December 17 the combined action of the right part of the III Division and the left part of the IV Division with the ultimate goal of capturing it. The mission was assigned to the corps of Colonel Tsakalotos, who sent a platoon of the II/40th Battalion to ascertain the enemy force occupying the hill, and consequently the possibility of overtaking it. However, the battle could not be advanced enough due to both the impassable snow and the aggressive reaction of the Italian forces, who were stationed on the Mali Itera hill.
Therefore, Colonel Tsakalotos, perceiving that the over-conquering was impossible, decided to extrude the height of Papathia through the Koutsi neck. According to his plan, the attack would be carried out by the I/42nd and II/40th Battalions north to the Tzora Heights and by the III/40th Battalion north to the Ftera Heights. His ultimate purpose was to ensure the advance of his Detachment's maneuver and to maintain contact with the enemy force located in Mali Iteras.
On the morning of December 17, Colonel Tsakalotou's Detachment launched its attack resulting in close contact with the organized location of the enemy force, near the barbed wire. However, the flanking action of the IV Division from Papathia to Koutsi was not carried out, with the result that the Tsakalotou Detachment ended up in an enemy line, fired upon by the enemy artillery. The unfavorable situation, which occurred, forced his faster exit from the rope. The next day, a surprise attack was decided, during the night of December 19-20, through the foothills of the Mali e Djoret and Mali Iteras mountains. An infantry platoon of elite men, of the II/40th Battalion under Captain Dimitrios Kourkoumbas, would climb the steep slopes of Mali e Djoret from the village of Tzora, engaging the enemy forces on the hill during the night.
On December 19, parts of the III Division operating in the coastal sector, after a hard fight and with heavy losses, captured Giami Hill. At dawn of the same day further north, the Chakalotou Detachment, without artillery preparation, launched a successful surprise attack against the important target of Mali e Joret, which was strongly organized by Italian forces and was located east of the Kuchi pass and Heimarra. Throughout the day there was hard fighting on the heights of Mali e Djoret and Mali Iteras, as well as on the inside of the Kouchi pass. During the night hours the match was stopped.
Captain Kurkoombas with his ulama, after displacing the enemy forces from Mali e Djoret, retreated to the village of Tzora. Around 200 prisoners were taken at the Kutsi pass, among them was the Defense Commander, Lt. Col. Jan Domenico. Also, an artillery and important war material were captured. The Detachment's losses amounted to 1 officer and 13 hoplites killed, 6 officers and 95 hoplites wounded.
On December 20, the Tsakalotou Detachment controlled Kouchi Neck. II/40 Battalion's platoon continued to defend strongly and engage the enemy forces on Mali Iteras. The next day, Tsakalotos continued with the regrouping of the divisions and the preparation of his movement towards Calarati. In addition, he took measures to neutralize the enemy forces on Mali Iteras, deploying III/40 to encircle the Papathia hill in the direction of Koutsi and a company with a mortar team from Ftera. On the same day, the forces of the Division occupied the Tzipista hill northwest of Heimarra.
At noon on December 21, Colonel Tsakalotos sent a note in French to the Italian commander on Papathia Hill, asking him to surrender. The Italian command, after a twelve-hour offensive effort, got in touch with the commander of the III/40th Battalion and informed him that the entire 141st Blackcoat Battalion - 29 officers and 677 soldiers strong - was on the Papathia hill. After it became clear to the Italian commander that his corps had fallen into a critical position, as the Greek Division had advanced more than thirty kilometers to the west, the 141st Blackcoat Battalion surrendered, ending the battle at Koutsi Pass with Greek success.
At dawn on December 22, Greek forces liberated Heimarra. The local population welcomed the Greek bodies with enthusiasm. By the evening of the same day, the Division occupied the line east of the Kputs hill counterattacks – Gusmari ch. – Progonati ch. – Buzae Sefer Agait. The Tsakalotou Detachment continued to move without resistance to Kalarati with the II/40th Battalion and to Bolienne with the I/42nd Battalion, which it occupied until December 27.
The successful outcome of the hard fight, which took place in the area of Heimarra, was of particular importance because with the capture of the Koutsi pass, access to the Siousitsa valley and the outskirts of Avlonos was facilitated. The Italian forces suffered heavy losses in prisoners, dead and war material. On December 24, Italian Prime Minister Benito Mussolini (1883-1945) sent Italian Commander Ugo Cavallero (1880-1943) the following telegram:
Whatever happens to you, I order you to defend to the last in the Progonati-Tepeleni-Kleisoura sector, even if tomorrow they wanted to be so completely surrounded. I make you personally responsible for the execution of my order after full understanding. On January 6, the Greek General Headquarters notified the Major Units of its decision to suspend major offensive operations from the end of December. The severe cold had caused great difficulties in transportation and consequently in supplies and deliveries.
