The code name of the plan was "Esigenza G" and it was none other than the Regio Esercito invasion plan in Greece. In theory, it wasn't "bad" at all. One could even call it bold, innovative and promising. The code name of the plan was "Esigenza G" (Contingent G), also known as "Emergenza G" (Emergency G)[1] and it was none other than the Regio Esercito's [2] invasion plan in Greece . In theory, it wasn't "bad" at all. One could even call it bold, innovative and promising.
OF THE MONTH
SOURCE:NEWSPAPER OF THE EDITORS
According to this, a relatively small force, so as not to provoke the mobilization of the Greek Army, would decisively breach the border with Albania and advance in two phalanxes, one south, parallel to the western coast with a view to eventually heading to Athens, while the second would turn to the east with the aim of capturing Thessaloniki. A necessary condition was for the attacking forces to move in a coordinated manner and, above all, quickly. In two days (!) the goals should have been achieved!
All of the above, of course, in theory, because in practice things developed completely differently. The strong resistance shown by the Greek advance guard units, combined with the great organizational weakness of the attacked and the bad weather conditions, resulted in it taking 5 days to cover the 10-30 kilometers that separate the border line from the main fortified site defense of the VIII Division in the straits of Kalpaki!
The Greek defensive arrangement had the shape of an "overflowing" horseshoe with the open part facing north. Its western edge started from the steep hill where the monastery of Sossinos was built and ended in the east at the Kakotrachalo hill of Grabala. A natural bastion that actually stood as a guard of the narrow crossing of Kalpakio, the mandatory road that led from the border to Ioannina.
The first phase
The defensive horseshoe was manned by the recruited and reinforced VIII Division which patiently awaited the main attack of the invaders in positions thoroughly fortified, with all approaches carefully marked by the Greek artillery. Two Italian Divisions moved against the Greek front, the 23rd MP Ferrara in collaboration with the 131st TM Centauro.[3]
Thus, in the early hours of November 2, 1940, when the Italian attack finally began, the most intense bombardment, by the Italian artillery and the Air Force, was suffered by Grabala, towards which two Italian phalanxes moved menacingly.
The Solinas phalanx from the north and the Trizio phalanx from the west:
The Greek defense against the two Italian phalanxes was organized as follows:
Although the bombardment continued throughout the morning, its results were particularly meager, with most shells landing in ravines.
At 15.00 the infantry advance began. From Kalivia - Aristis (XIV) and Auchena Aristis (II/MFA)[5] to Grambala and from Diakopia (I/47, Gramos)[5]) to Psilorachi. But unlike the Italian, the Greek artillery proves to be extremely effective.
His well-aimed concentration shots, aided by machine gun fire, decisively repel successive waves of assaults. Attackers return fruitlessly to their starting positions. At about 20.00, taking advantage of the darkness, but also of the low clouds that now covered the battlefield, the company of the Albanezi Volontari )[6] climbs from the steep western slopes and reaches the southern peak of Grabala (1160), which is almost unguarded. He surprises the unsuspecting small platoon there and occupies the plateau.
Behind her comes a platoon of machine guns from the Gramos battalion that has just been repulsed by Psilorachi and coincidentally joins their compatriots, the Volontari Company. Both divisions turn towards the northern peak of Grabala (1,201 m), strike from behind and put to flight the 10th company, which retreats towards Kozako. Grabala is now in the hands of the "Italians".
The situation for the Greek defense is critical, if Grabala is lost the consequences will be disastrous. At midnight, the deputy commander of III/15, Anchis Georgios Kyriazis, hastily arrives in Styliana, bringing reinforcements from the 1st (I/15) and 7th (II/15) Companies. To make a direct counterattack, no discussion. In addition to the darkness, there is a raging windstorm, accompanied by cold rain. Everything is necessarily postponed until the next morning.
The counterattack
Early in the morning, at 05.00 on the 3rd of November, the counterattack is launched. The Greek power is divided into 2 levels. The first consists of 80 men of the 1st Company, led by Officer Vasilas. The second with 70 men of the 7th Company led by Officer Karabatis. Among them the commander of the III/15 battalion, K. Pantazis, with the machine gun platoon of Anagnostopoulos.
Men carry machine guns on their shoulders almost running. At this point, the race turns into a fast climb race. Panting, the men approach the Albanian positions as quietly as they can. Without respite, as soon as they "make" contact with the enemy, the order is whispered "Forward through the lance".
The chilling metallic sound made by the long bayonet as it is unsheathed and "feminized" on the Mannlicher [7] electrifies the tense atmosphere and signals the final charge. Bursts of machine guns and explosions of grenades come to sonically "invest" the sad "music" of a hand-to-hand battle.
The startled Albanian garrison stubbornly tries to resist, but the mischievous 'Volontari' have no training in spear fighting. And the more daring and enthusiastic they are, the more easily and quickly they are disappointed [8]. Given the crucial fact that someone "in charge" had sent back to Kalivia Aristis the greater part of the force, so that they could spend the night, with the condition that they would return in the morning. They capsize and flee backwards.
At the same time, the Italian reinforcements (II/MFA) were coming up from the western slope. The fugitives drag them back as well accompanied by rain from the Greek fire. At 06.00, a concentration of enemy units is observed at Kalivia Aristis (XIV). Four Greek artillery units begin active fire, dispersing the Italian battalion.
At 07.30, it's all over. Grabala, to the great relief of the Staff of the VIII Division, is again in Greek hands. K. Pantazis mentions in his book that the attackers had 3 soldiers dead and Captain G. Tsitos wounded, as well as 5 soldiers. On the Italian side, the diary of the 47th Regiment records 7 dead and 1 officer and 14 soldiers wounded.
On the evening of 3 November, the 7th Company was sent back to its battalion, except for the Sarri platoon, which was held in reserve. However, two new platoons of the 3rd Company (Lieutenant G. Stypas) were sent, which took over the guarding of the "vulnerable" southern peak of Grabala (1160), while the northern peak (1201) was manned by the 1st Company with Lt. Basil.
Psilorachi (1060) is held steadfastly by the 9th Company, with the machine guns of General P. Tsantilas repelling all attacks. So, since November 4th, we have the promotion to the Kozako-Suremadia heights of the entire I/15. III/15 is limited to Grabala – Psilorachi – Styliana and the two battalions are placed under the direct command of His Excellency G. Kyriazis.
In the conclusions of this first serious attempt to occupy Grabala, we can only point out [9] what was also the biggest problem of the Regio Esercito, as it was seen from the very first days of the invasion, which was decisive throughout the war .
Combined with the equally thorny problem of the lack of military experience of the Italian officers [10] it led, apart from a few exceptions, to his poor performance on the battlefields. This problem was none other than the complete lack of coordination of the Italian units at the regimental level and below.
The battalions appeared to act completely in isolation without covering each other and, even worse, without being able to take advantage of any potential successes of the other. Classic proof, the night of November 2-3 in Grabala. The "Volontari" company accidentally finds the gap in the Greek defense and occupies the southern peak.
Gramos' platoon [11], from the left of the I/47 fails to cover the attack on Psilorachi and turns northwards, assisting with his machine guns the attack of his "Volontari" compatriots towards the northern peak. In I/47 they assume that the platoon fell back, without being informed of its turn. They fight back and abandon the attack as well. Always wrong:
A small garrison remains in Grabala. Solinas and Trizio are informed of the situation, when precious time has been lost, with the result that the reinforcements coming up the western slope become, as we have seen, an easy target for the Greek machine guns (II/MFA), or a boon to the accuracy of the Greek artillery (XIV). .
We will see similar mistakes repeated on the night of November 7-8, in the Second Part of this article!
References
[1] The letter G refers to Grecia, but there is also a version that it comes from the name of General Carlo Geloso
[2] Royal Army. The official name of the Italian Army during WWII
[3] These are the famous Centaurs of Greek literature. Armored Division although essentially the "cans" CV33/35 (or L33/35) would hardly be characterized as "tanks", opera and proved to be easy prey for the Greek artillery
[4] The Gramos Battalion and the Albanian "Volunteer" Company formed from 10/28 to 10/31 a separate phalanx that joined the main Trizio phalanx for the needs of the attack on Grabala
[5] The Gramos battalion was one of the six "regular" battalions of the Albanian Army that together with the "sister" Dajiti battalion joined the Ferrara Division. It consisted of Albanian officers and soldiers. Its commander is Major Rexhep Gjilani. The 2nd Battalion of the 1st Legion of the Milizia Fascista Albanese was the corresponding "version" of the Albanian Blackcoats. They were commanded by Italian Officers and accepted into their ranks, apart from the Albanian black-skinned and fascist Italian settlers in Albania, mainly as non-commissioned officers. They were distinguished from the regular Albanian army by the black shirts worn under the uniform and the classic Albanian white fez. Its commander is the 1st Seniore (Commander) Vicenzo Stramenga
[6] A company of Misfits, without training, without uniform and of course without a sense of discipline. Their motivation is more loot...!!! Typically and in this particular case, the IV Battalion of Albanian Volunteers from Premet, to which this Company belonged, was supervised by the Italian Major Grandi. (See P. Crociani p. 199)
[7] Even the length of the Italian Mannlicher Carcano of 6.5 mm. it was clearly smaller (920 mm), compared to the 1226 mm of the Greek Mannlicher Schonauer. The longer length of his lance completed the whole picture and combined with the lack of training of the Italians in spear fighting, explained the weakness of the Italian infantry in hand-to-hand combat. (See K. Margaritis p. 73)
[8] The IV Battalion of Albanian Volunteers was disbanded by the Italians on 28/11/40
[9] The conclusion does not belong only to the writer but is the product of many hours of discussions with the distinguished expert of Military History, Pier Paolo Battistelli, whom, for his help, I want to thank publicly!
[10] On the contrary, the vast majority of Greek officers had valuable experiences from the battlefields of the Balkan wars and above all from the furnace of the Asia Minor Campaign
[11] These are the "levents" of Captain Karafil Osman
's 12th company