"Battle of the Forts" was the name given to the four-day defensive struggle of the defenders of the so-called "Metaxa Line" against the German forces which at 0515 on April 6, 1941 attacked Greece without warning. Germany, having already decided to invade the USSR, was forced, on the occasion of the final failure of the Italian invasion of Greece, to intervene in order to fully control the Balkans, one of the basic conditions for the success of the Russian campaign. To this end, he activated the "German-Italian Pact of Friendship and Alliance", also known as the "Steel Pact" and rushed to help Italy by invading Yugoslavia and Greece at the same time implementing the plan codenamed "MARITA".
The unexpected military collapse of Yugoslavia within a week eventually led to the capture of Thessaloniki, sealing the fate of the Greek forces of the Eastern Macedonian Army Department (East Macedonia) defending the forts. At 0800 on April 9, 1941, the German 2nd Armored Division entered Thessaloniki. Cut off from the rest of the country and with the German forces having outflanked the Greek ones, Lieutenant General Bakopoulos was ordered by the General Headquarters to cease operations. He himself negotiated the surrender of the TsAM forces in order to avoid the futile sacrifice of blood. At 1400 the surrender was signed and at 1600 the ceasefire was imposed.
In recognition of the heroic struggle of the defenders the terms of the surrender gave the Officers the right to keep their swords and the Greek divisions to withdraw without being captured as prisoners of war. In several cases, the surrender of the forts was done with the rendering of honors by German divisions to the departing Greek officers and soldiers. Despite the final outcome, the acts of bravery of the fighters of the forts won the respect of their opponents and over time were recorded in the collective memory of the people as the "Thermopylas of the North".
The German designs
German planning for operations in the Balkans had already begun in November 1940 when the decision to invade the USSR under the code name operation "BARBAROSSA" was finalized. After the mishandling and failure of the Italians in their Balkan campaign against Greece the Wehrmacht high command now made the start of operations against the USSR dependent on securing control of the Balkans as, according to the plans, the right flank had to be secured of the German advance of Army Group South from possible Allied actions. Furthermore, control of the valuable Romanian oil fields on which the Wehrmacht depended was to be maintained at all costs. Finally, there was the assessment that the presence of German forces in the Balkans would force Turkey to join the Axis. Therefore, given the failed manipulations of the Italians, the area of the Balkan peninsula took on a special strategic importance.
Germany prepared for operations by first securing its lines of communication to the Balkans. He achieved this by exerting firm political control over Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania. On November 23, 1940, Romania joined the Axis followed by Bulgaria on March 1, 1941, which received in return Germany's commitment to cede Western Thrace and Eastern Macedonia at the end of operations. The importance Hitler attached to the Balkan campaign is reflected in the volume of forces deployed. The 12th Army under Field Marshal Wilhelm von List, which had undertaken the operations, included the following formations:the XL Tank Army Corps (W. Bulgaria), the XVII Mountain Army Corps (S. Bulgaria), the XXX Army Corps Infantry (SE Bulgaria) and the 16th Tank Division. The 1st Tank Group and the L Army Corps were available as auxiliaries.
Against Greece, the German plan of attack was based on the assumption that, due to the main weight given to the Albanian front, the Greek forces would be deprived of sufficient manpower as well as material means to defend themselves on the borders of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. In application of the Blitzkrieg doctrine, which they had already successfully implemented in France, the attack was planned on the basis of gaining superiority through a hyperkerotic maneuver which would lead the armored forces to the rear of the expected defensive positions. At the same time, specially trained and experienced forces would attack the fortified locations head-on.
In order to implement the aforementioned, von List allocated three Army Corps to the operations against Greece. The XVIII Mountain Army Corps, consisting of the 2nd Tank Division, the 5th and 6th Mountain Divisions, the 72nd Infantry Division and the reinforced 125th Infantry Regiment, concentrated its forces on the western side of the Greco-Bulgarian border in order to splitting of the "Metaxa Line", the occupation of Thessaloniki and the isolation of the whole of Eastern Macedonia. The 2nd Tank Division in particular would cross Yugoslav territory in order to turn south and then Thessaloniki.
XX Army Corps would attack the "Metaxa Line" from the east with the aim of capturing Western Thrace and then the Northern Aegean islands. The XL Army Corps would advance on the Monastiri-Florina-Grevena axis, in order to threaten the Greek forces on the Albanian front and the Greco-British forces in Vermio from the south. As far as the motorized forces were concerned the Germans had assembled 1,365 light, 344 medium and 198 heavy tanks while the whole operation would be supported by about 1,000 planes. Indicatively, the Greek side had 27 light tanks at the disposal of the XIX Motorized Division which had the role of reserve for the Beles - Nestos defense line.
Greece
The problems that concerned the Greek side, in view of the German threat, were the choice of the defensive location and the amount of British aid. After a series of meetings of the Greek and British political and military leadership, it was decided that the defense would be conducted at the fortified "Metaxa Line" and at the Vermio site. The presence of allied forces in Greek territory would be a challenge for the Germans. Thus, it was decided that their landing would take place when the German troops would enter Bulgaria. But because of this delay the British forces, weak in numbers of men and firepower, were not able to offer substantial assistance,
The British allies had agreed since March 4, 1941 to help Greece on the basis of a defense plan which was the fruit of complex and painful negotiations. The plan in question provided that, in order to send British forces to Greece, the main purpose of the operations would be the defense of the Kaimaktsalan - Vermio - Aliakmonas location which would be defended by the bulk of the available Greek forces and the British Expeditionary Force. Instead of the abandonment of eastern Macedonia and Thrace, which the British had originally proposed, it was agreed to slow down the enemy on the fortified Beles-Nestos border line with the minimum possible forces (3 divisions). Therefore, the defense of the Beles-Nestou fortress site was left, mainly, to the Greek forces of the forts and the endurance of the Yugoslavs, who had to repel the German attack against their territories in order to prevent the Germans from passing through Yugoslavia to the rear of the defense line.
At the start of the German attack, the bulk of the Greek forces (Western Macedonian Army Department - TSDM and Epirus Army Department - TSI) were on the Albanian front having just repelled the Italian spring attack (operation "PRIMAVERA"). According to the plans, in the fortified location of Beles-Nestos ("Metaxa Line"), the Tactical Complex of Eastern Macedonia (TCAM) had been deployed, under Lieutenant General Konstantinos Bakopoulos, which had the XVIII, XIV and VII Infantry Divisions, the XIX Mechanized Division, the Nestos Brigade, the Evros Brigade and the Krusia Detachment.
The mission of TSAM, according to the orders of the General Headquarters, was the constant defense of the fortified location and, in the event of the inability to secure the location, the collapse of its forces towards Thessaloniki. The Krousia Detachment would bar the German advance towards Thessaloniki in the event of a breach of the Beles site. East of Strymons were the VII and XIV Infantry Divisions, while west of Strymons was the XVIII. The Nestos Brigade was deployed in the wider area of Xanthi. The XIX Mechanized Division was kept as a reserve, south of Lake Doirani.
The condition of the Greek divisions was far from what the situation demanded. The XIX Mechanized Division was undermanned, consisting of spoils from the Albanian front whose quality and quantity were far below average. In the other divisions the situation was not better. The officers of the Units were 80% reservists, the average strength of the Battalions was about 500 men, the majority of them local conscripts with little or no combat experience, the Permanent Second Lieutenants commanding companies had just graduated from the School while the armament of the Units was obsolete. Indicative of the chaotic difference in firepower is the comparison of the number of tanks:27 light tanks in total at the disposal of the Greek forces against 1365 light, 344 medium and 198 heavy tanks that the Germans had. As far as air coverage is concerned, Greece did not have any planes on this particular front.
6th April 1941 – Day 1
At 0515 on April 6, German forces attacked the entire front from the Greece-Bulgaria-Yugoslavia border to the north of Komotini. The main effort of the Germans was against the Beles and Rupel forts. Against Belles the Germans sent 2 mountain divisions (the 5th and 6th) and against the Rupel fortress complex the 125th Reinforced Regiment which had fought on the "Mazino" line and had significant experience against fortified locations.
The German power plan involved successive waves of bombing by Stuka planes and artillery. Under the cover of continuous fire and bombardment it was planned to advance the infantry forces. Despite the heavy fire, the group successfully resisted the attacks. His losses on the first day were 6 dead and 36 wounded while 3 anti-tank guns and three machine guns were destroyed. The forts of Istibei and Kelkaia on the left edge of the defensive location received similarly heavy fire. The fighting reached epic proportions when the forts were isolated by the forces of the XVIII Division supporting them. During the evening of the first day of operations in Istibei all the frontal weapons and observation instruments had been destroyed and the fighters had retreated to the underground galleries with their individual weapons.
The Kelkagia fort in the evening of the same day is in an even more unfavorable position as it had been surrounded and its armament had been put out of action while enemy forces had been found on the fort. In the other defense sector, to the right of the Roupel Narrows, the main brunt of the attacks was received by the Perithori Fort complex which at the end of the day found itself with several of its works destroyed but had managed to repel the combined enemy actions of two battalions.
But the match was unequal from the start. Already on the evening of April 6th, the German 6th Mountain Division reached an altitude of 2100 meters and crossed a mountain pass, considered inaccessible until that moment. On the 7th of April he had entered the valley of Rhodopolis and reached the railway line to Thessaloniki. This was followed on the 7th of April by the overshooting of the defenses of Fort Rupel by the 5th Mountain Division, which exposed the pass to an attack from the south. At the same time, the 72nd Infantry Division arrived in the NE area of Serres on the evening of April 9th. The final result of the combined actions of the first day was the breaking of the left of the defensive position, the encirclement of the Istibei and Kelkaya forts, which had been put practically out of action, and the capture of Beles Ridge by the 6th Mountain Division. The line of defense was already overstretched.
April 7th 1941 – Day 2
Even though the German forces had outflanked them, the defenders of the forts refused to lay down their arms and remained in their positions defending themselves. The Germans had to fight hard for every meter of ground as every single strong point of the "Silk Line" required a combination of frontal and super-canonical actions as well as strong air support until it was neutralized. Characteristic of the intensity of the fighting is the fact that the reinforced 125th Infantry Regiment, which had fought against the French on the "Mazino Line", attacked the "Rupel" fortress head-on under the cover of air bombardments that preceded it. The water pipeline and two machine guns were destroyed by the bombings. The most critical blow, however, was the penetration of two companies to the rear of the fort and the capture of Kleidi. Eventually the 125th Infantry Regiment suffered such a number of casualties that it was forced to withdraw from further action once it had achieved its objective while the fort continued to successfully resist attempts to capture it.
At the left end of the location, the evacuation of the Beles enclave was completed by the forces of the XVIII Division, while the forts of Kelkaya and Istibei, which had been put out of action the day before, were occupied by the German forces. As a result of the loss of the two forts and the collapse of the Division, Arpalouki Fort was isolated. The Germans focused their bombardment there and were preparing for an occupation action. At the request of the Commander of the Fort, it was ordered to be abandoned. The Germans managed to enter Perithori fort but were decimated by the fort's garrison as the Commanding Officer ordered a blackout. The defenders of the fort, well trained from the peaceful period, surprised the Germans who in the dark suffered a total loss.
At the right end of the defensive position the combined German attack on the Perithori fort was repeated. After fierce battles, the Germans finally manage to break in, but after a two-hour battle inside the fort, its defenders manage to expel them. Considerable damage is noted to machine guns and observation instruments which further reduce the combat power of the Fort which nevertheless remains impregnable.
With the morale remaining high and due to the stubborn resistance of the defenders of the forts, the location of Beles - Nestos, despite the capture of the Istibei and Kelkaya forts, remained virtually intact. But the battle of the forts has already been decided on another front. On the evening of April 7, the Yugoslav resistance collapses, resulting in the release of additional forces for the Greek Front. At the same time, the advance of the 2nd Armored Division through Yugoslavia to the south, west of Lake Doirani, through the Axios valley to Thessaloniki begins.
8th April 1941 – Day 3
Forts Rupel and Perithori are severely tested for the third day in a row but still resist victoriously. At the left end of the site, the Germans complete the clearing operations by occupying the Popotlivica Fortress and settle near the south of the Rupel complex.
Despite the capture of the Popotlivitsa fort, the Germans did not manage to breach the fortified site of Beles-Nestos even on the third day. On the contrary, the "Metaxa Line" seems to have been shaken but it is still holding despite three days of incessant shelling and artillery fire. On the right flank near the tried Perithori fort, the VII Division has improved its defensive positions and is able to launch targeted counter-attacks to neutralize the threat posed by enemy infantry in the forts.
Όμως την στιγμή που οι Ορεινές Μεραρχίες αγωνίζονταν για κάθε μέτρο εδάφους ενάντιων των υπερασπιστών η ΙΙ Τεθωρακισμένη Μεραρχία προελαύνοντας μέσω της Γιουγκοσλαβίας πέρασε τα ελληνικά σύνορα χωρίς να συναντήσει ουσιαστική αντίσταση. Υπερφαλάγγισε την ΧΙΧ Μηχανοκίνητη Μεραρχία και στις 2230 βρίσκονταν 20 χιλιόμετρα έξω από τη Θεσσαλονίκη απαιτώντας την άνευ όρων παράδοση της πόλης.
9η Απριλίου 1941 – Ημέρα 4η
Την 9 η Απριλίου 1941 η ΙΙ Τεθωρακισμένη Μεραρχία βρισκόταν έξω από την Θεσσαλονίκη, το XVII Σώμα Στρατού προωθούνταν αργά αλλά σταθερά διαμέσου της «Γραμμής Μεταξά» ενώ το ΧΧΧ Σώμα Στρατού είχε φτάσει στο Νέστο ποταμό. Προ του κινδύνου να αιχμαλωτισθεί το σύνολο του προσωπικού του ΤΣΑΜ το Γενικό Στρατηγείο διέταξε την διακοπή των επιχειρήσεων. Η συνθηκολόγηση υπογράφτηκε από τον αντιστράτηγο Μπακόπουλο και τον διοικητή της ΙΙ Τεθωρακισμένης Μεραρχίας στρατηγό Βέιλ (Rudolf Veiel).
Κατά την διάρκεια των μαχών τα οχυρά υπέστησαν και άντεξαν επί τρεις ημέρες τα αλλεπάλληλα κύματα βομβαρδισμού από αέρος και τα συγκεντρωτικά πυρά πυροβολικού. Οι υπερασπιστές τους, χωρίς εφεδρείες και με σοβαρές ελλείψεις σε πυρομαχικά και βαρύ οπλισμό, αγωνίστηκαν με πείσμα και απαράμιλλο θάρρος ενάντια στις διαδοχικές προσπάθειες κατάληψης που εξαπέλυαν οι ειδικά εκπαιδευμένες δυνάμεις πεζικού και μηχανικού των Γερμανών.
329 Αξιωματικοί και 9740 οπλίτες, το προσωπικό που επάνδρωνε τα οχυρά, στάθηκαν ενάντια σε 2 γερμανικά Σώματα Στρατού, αήττητα μέχρι εκείνη τη στιγμή και για τέσσερις ημέρες κράτησαν την τιμή ενός λαού στα χέρια τους. Όταν τελικά υπέκυψαν το έκαναν με το κεφάλι ψηλά και αναγκάζοντας τον εχθρό να αποδεχτεί πως αυτοί οι μαχητές ήταν τουλάχιστον ισάξιοι οποιουδήποτε δικού του.
Η πειθαρχημένη μέχρις εσχάτων αντίσταση των μαχητών των οχυρών έλαβε, με το πέρασμα του χρόνου, θέση στην εθνική συλλογική μνήμη αντίστοιχη της μάχης των Θερμοπυλών καθώς για άλλη μια φορά λίγοι στάθηκαν απέναντι σε πολλούς κρατώντας τις θέσεις τους αποφασισμένοι να πέσουν μέχρις ενός. Για τους Έλληνες των μετόπισθεν και ειδικότερα για τους ντόπιους κατοίκους της περιοχής οι μαχητές των Οχυρών ήταν οι δικοί τους ήρωες, αντίστοιχοι των υπερασπιστών του Υψώματος 731 που πριν ένα μήνα είχαν αποκρούσει την ιταλική επίθεση.
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