Operation "Pigeons" lasted from December 22, 1948 to January 30, 1949. Its objective was to clear the Peloponnese, in view of the major offensive effort that the Hellenic Army (HS) intended to undertake in Vitsi, so that to restore order in the Peloponnese and to save forces for the main operations.
The rebel Peloponnese Administration until the end of October 1948 did not believe that there was any possibility of serious clearing operations in the Peloponnese by the ES. From the beginning of November, however, he changed his opinion because according to the information he had from the general headquarters of the Democratic Army of Greece (DSE), the forces of the Greek Army were maintaining a defensive position on the Vichi front.
This fact was a sign that ES was gathering its forces to strike somewhere else. Both the leadership of the DSE and the ES knew that the Peloponnese was the Achilles heel of the rebels, since few were in the area – not by chance, if you consider the action of ELAS in the Peloponnese in the period 1943-44 – but also it was extremely difficult to resupply.
Until then, the DSE forces there were usually supplied by small boats, which carried weapons and supplies from Albania. However, thanks to the close surveillance imposed by the Navy, the boats disappeared.
The episode of the small patrol boat of the PN "Polemistis", which was captained by the Northern Epirotian Pyrros Spiromelios, spotted a supply boat, followed it and located one of the remote shores where the materials were being unloaded.
The leadership of the DSE Peloponnese, which had the III division, began to expect an attack, but not in the heart of winter. The leaders believed that the SS would not dare to attack before the spring of 1949.
Thus they suffered a strategic surprise from the beginning, when they received the first attacks, even at the moment when, until then, they had maintained the initiative of the movements – attacks in Dimitsana, Chalandritsa, Zaharo, throughout the entire area of the prefecture of Ilia, etc. strong>
Based on the perception it had of the opponent's reaction, the DSE leadership in the Peloponnese planned its next moves. Its plan of action provided for a firm defense in positions on Mount Erymanthos, with the aim of wearing down the ES. Half of the available forces of the DSE would be available for this mission. The rest of the forces would operate on small scales, attacking the lines of communication of the attacking IS forces.
For this reason, it was decided to systematically destroy infrastructure projects in the Peloponnese – technical works, road network, power plants.
At the same time, organized defense positions were created both on Mount Erymanthos and on other mountain ranges in the Peloponnese. But after the surprise suffered by Tsakalotos' unexpected and unexpected blow, the plans of the leadership of DSE Peloponnese changed, under the pressure of events.
Thus, it was decided, at the last moment, to avoid in any way the forces of the DSE from lining up in a line-by-line battle with the ES, the divisions of the DSE to try to slip between the arrangement of the forces of the ES that would carry out the clearing operations and to distraction attacks are performed.
Opposing Forces and Plans
The DSE in the Peloponnese had the III division with the 22nd and 55th brigades, the Peloponnese officers' school, with the headquarters of Erymanthos, Aroanion, Mainalos, Taygetos and Parnonas, the local fields and the local Self-Defence. In total these forces numbered around 5-6,000 men and women. Of these, however, approximately 2,500-2,800 were combatants. Based on ES calculations, the numerical strength of these units was as follows:
– 55th brigade 950, based in Parnonas
– Taygetou complex 300
– command company III of division 130
– officer school 120
– 22nd brigade 750
– Arcadia complex 300
– Achaia – Ilia complex 250
– Argolis – Corinthia complex 250
The morale of the DSE forces in the Peloponnese was not as high as in other regions. The main reason for this was generally unfavorable conditions in the region. Also some of the fighters had joined the DSE following violent recruitment and they did not have much zeal for the fight.
Also, always based on the information of the ES, there were dichotomies in the leadership of the DSE Peloponnese, regarding the advisability of continuing the struggle. Finally, the armament of the DSE Peloponnese included 17 position machine guns, 404 machine guns, 17 81 and 50 mm mortars, 138 submachine guns, 1,850 rifles, 500 panzerfausts.
The clearing of the Peloponnese was entrusted to an excellent leader, Lieutenant General Thrasyvoulos Tsakalotos. Tsakalotos was one of the greatest Greek soldiers of recent times. He performed unsurpassed feats in 1940-41 in northern Epirus against the Italians and his name became legendary . He then fled to the Middle East and was assigned command of the 3rd Greek Mountain Brigade, leading which he fought and defeated the Germans at Rimini.
Returning with his men to the Homeland, he found himself in the midst of the December uprising, to the suppression of which he contributed the most. With the official start of the Civil War, he fought from various positions and in 1948 assumed command of the 1st Army Corps. In this capacity he was sent to the Peloponnese with the aim of its complete and final liquidation by the forces of the DSE.
For this purpose, the forces allocated were as follows:
The headquarters of the First SS , with the IX MP, the ASDP (Higher Headquarters of the Peloponnese Command), the 41st, 42nd, 43rd, and 72nd Infantry Brigades, 4 Light Infantry Battalions (LTB), the A, B, C and D Commando Squadrons, the so-called Northern Group , consisting of the TSE (Tactical Headquarters of the National Guard) Argos with 3 ETPs, an armored battalion and a Gendarmerie battalion and the so-called Southern Complex consisting of the TSE Kalamatas and the TSE Sparta with a total of 3 ETPs.
The Gendarmerie also allocated 3 battalions of reduced strength. In terms of armored units, the 1st Reconnaissance Regiment was available, equipped with light armored, wheeled vehicles Marmon Herrington and Daimler Dingo. In addition to these forces, the 144th Mountain Artillery Squadron, the 704th and 711th Engineer Companies, a battalion of Pioneers from Makronissos were also deployed.
These forces were deployed in two tactical groups. The first, led by the commander of the IX MP (Lieutenant General Manidakis), had the IX MP with the 41st, 42nd and 43rd Brigades, the 5th Gendarmerie Battalion, the 101st Field Artillery Regiment (SPP), minus a squadron, the 144th MOP, the squadron of Skapaneans, and the 704 and 711 Engineer Companies and an armored company.
The second group was headed by the ASDP commander (Lieutenant General Petzopoulos) and had the Corinthian Tactical Group, with the 72nd Brigade, 3 ETP (72nd, 76th and 77th Argos) and an armored island and the Peloponnese Southern Group, with 7 ETP, the 15th Gendarmerie Battalion, the Motorized Gendarmerie Battalion and the other islands of the 1st Reconnaissance Regiment and the 105th SPP (minus squadron). Tsakalotos kept as an immediate reserve the Commando Squadrons, headed by the famous colonel Kallinskis.
Tsakalotos had carefully planned the operation and had decided to act in an organized manner. His intentions were summarized in his report to the GES where he wrote:
"Liberation of the Peloponnese from factionalism as soon as possible through its complete destruction, restoration of order and security, restoration of communications and raising the morale of the population so that they too contribute, by all means, to the consolidation of order. Especially and continuous effort to completely exhaust self-defense".
The plan of Tsakalotos provided for the conduct of operations in three phases. The specific mode of operation was a product of the territorial configuration of the business area. "The Achilles' heel is not the gang members", wrote Tsakalotos, "but the space within which their escape is always possible".
Precisely to avoid the escape of the forces of the DSE, in the first phase, he would start the clearing operations in the coastal areas, at a sufficient depth in order to control the main road junctions.
Then the main operation would start from the height of Tripoli and the river Neda and north of them, with converging attacks from the North - East and South towards Mainalo, with the aim of the total crushing of the DSE and self-defense units there and the restoration of communications .
Like Kolokotronis in 1821, Tsakalotos had realized that if he did not manage to control Tripoli and the central Peloponnese, he would ultimately achieve nothing. In this phase the divisions would act in successive echelons, increasing the depth of the attacking formation and limiting the chances of the opposing divisions to escape.
At the same time, attacks would occur in the regions of Parnon and Taygetus, so that the DSE would believe that the ES had transferred to the Peloponnese forces much larger than the existing ones and that it was able to carry out liquidation operations in the entire range of the Peloponnese.
At the same time, the ES should effectively protect all the important urban centers of the Peloponnese, not allowing the DSE to be supplied with loot, nor even to gain a moral advantage from any success. As an old soldier Tsakalotos knew better than anyone the importance of the Morale factor in battle. The second phase of operations would operate in addition to the first.
Its aim would be to clear the southern Peloponnese, but also to clear any remaining enemy pockets in the northern or central Peloponnese. The third and final phase provided for the consolidation of order in the region, by exploiting the results of previous operations.
Both the Air Force and the Navy would also participate in the operation. The then EBA deployed 337 Spitfire Fighter Squadron, 345 Observation Squadron, a squadron of 855 Bombardment Squadron and a transport squadron.
A total of 14 Spitfires, 2 modified Dakota bombers, 4 Dakota transports, 6 Harvard scouts and 2 Oster liaison aircraft, which arranged the artillery fire, took part in the battle.
The PN would also have its boats, which would patrol the Peloponnesian coasts and at the same time have 3-4 patrol boats ready for any eventuality in the ports of Patras and Corinth.
The "Pigeon" spreads its wings
Based on his plan, Tsakalotos ordered his divisions to begin clearing the coastal areas from 22 December. This mission was carried out without any surprises and with great success with the assistance of the PN.
When this phase was completed Tsakalotos hit DSE exactly where it hurt. Considering self-defense and the related supporting organizations as a source of strength for the SE forces in the Peloponnese, before starting the main military operations, he began dismantling the specific support network of the opponent.
If this network collapsed, the DSE forces would no longer have information about the movements of the ES units, they would not have critical supplies and food, they would literally have nowhere to stand, as they would be constantly pursued throughout the length and breadth of the Peloponnese .
So on the night of December 27th to 28th, based on the available information, parts of the Army, the Gendarmerie and the National Guard made a surprise raid and completely dismantled the support network of the DSE, arresting in one night 4,500 people, throughout the Peloponnese and mainly in its large urban centers. Of those arrested, 2,500 were immediately transferred to Trikeri and Makronissos.
The rest were transferred to camps in the Peloponnese. The blow was extremely heavy for the DSE, which in a single night lost its entire network of informants and logistics. Only after this success and after deliberately allowing a few days to pass, Tsakalotos, on January 3, 1949, ordered the start of military operations.
In the period 22/12/1948 to 3/1/1949 only minor skirmishes took place between ES and DSE, in which DSE was always the loser. However, these skirmishes had their importance, since during their duration or as a consequence of them, the DSE lost 1/4 of its initial strength in the Peloponnese. In total it had 59 dead and 500 prisoners and 200 killed.
When everything was ready, the sections from the designated line of departure (Kato Figalia, Lykouresi, Lala, Foloi, Prostavitsa, Erymanthos, Kalavryta, Trikala Corinthia, Lake Stymfalia, Achladokampos) began to virtually comb the area. The tactical group of the IX MP moved towards Mainalos with the aim of clearing the mountain mass.
According to the plan, the divisions of the tactical complex were scaled to a great depth, not allowing the enemy detachments to slip through - the leadership of the III division of the DSE ordered its forces to split into small detachments and attempt to escape, behind the forces of the ES . And this tactic did not work.
The Erymanthos headquarters was annihilated and a battalion of the 22nd DSE brigade that attempted to infiltrate Ilia met the same fate. As the operation was in full swing another battalion of the 22nd Brigade, together with forces from the Aroanian headquarters attempted to penetrate the south of the 72nd Brigade in mountainous Corinthia.
But again they failed and were even pursued day and night until they were neutralized by 3/4. On 13 January what was left of the 22nd Brigade, together with the command company of the III Division and the officers' school attempted to penetrate into the area of Stymphalia.
But they did not succeed and were fiercely pursued. After a two-day pursuit, these units of the DSE were found behind the IX MP. After a short battle, this force was divided into three divisions, two of which fled towards Erymanthos and the third towards Mainalos, and the IX MP was ordered to reverse its formation and pursue these divisions until they were finally destroyed.
The maneuver was executed in an exemplary manner and the pursuit continued. Finally, on January 27 and 28, these units of the DSE were forced to fight (in the areas of Foli and Lala) with their strongest opposing forces, in which they were defeated, leaving behind 107 counted dead, 97 prisoners and the entire archive of the III division, together with the radios.
This defeat, of the most elite forces of the DSE, essentially sealed the fate of the entire enterprise. It was time for Tsakalotos to throw into the battle his elite reserves, the terrible scouts. A part of them was ordered to continue the pursuit of the defeated in the mountain ranges of the central Peloponnese.
However, their bulk was thrown at Parnon and the glorious Taygetus, now fiercely pursuing the 55th DSE brigade. On January 22, with a night operation, the C and D Assault Squadrons climbed Parnonas and suddenly attacked the 5th brigade.
Result of the battle - in Ag. Vasilios Parnonas – it was the crash of the 55th that lost an entire battalion, its supplies and transports. In the battle, 181 DSE fighters were killed, while another 78 were captured. The pursuit of the tragic remnants of the 55th brigade continued unabated.
At the same time, behind the business zone, the Engineering worker was feverishly restoring the damaged road network. In just 40 days, a road network with a total length of over 800 km was restored, which is a real feat given the conditions.
The Engineer also built a new airstrip in Lechaio. The Air Force also played an important role in this phase of the fight, mainly with its reconnaissance aircraft, but where necessary also with those equipped with Spitfire rockets.
Thanks to ensuring excellent links, the Air Force intervened directly and crucially. The contribution of the Navy was also great, despite the miserable weather conditions that prevailed at that time.
According to the saying of the time, "not a mosquito has crossed the sea", while we also gathered the land operations - case of Leonidio. The Gendarmerie's contribution to this fight was also very important, a contribution that some have never forgiven and for this reason they took the disastrous decision to disband it.
Τα περίφημα μεταβατικά αποσπάσματα της Χωροφυλακής, ακολουθούσαν τα στρατιωτικά τμήματα, αυξάνοντας την εις βάθος κλιμάκωση των δυνάμεων, εκκαθαρίζοντας τις τελευταίες εστίες αντίστασης, επιβάλλοντας την τάξη και ενισχύοντας το αίσθημα ασφάλειας του πληθυσμού.
Η επιχείρηση «Περιστερά» εκτελέστηκε υποδειγματικά και ολοκληρώθηκε με απόλυτη επιτυχία. Οι απώλειες του ΕΣ και της Χωροφυλακής ήταν μικρές και έφτασαν τους 41 νεκρούς (οι 2 αξιωματικοί) και τους 105 τραυματίες. Από τη άλλη πλευρά οι απώλειες ήταν σοβαρές. Οι νεκροί έφτασαν τους 649, οι αιχμάλωτοι τους 1601, ενώ άλλοι 628 παραδόθηκαν εκούσια.
Οι απώλειες αυτές αφορούσαν την μάχιμη δύναμη του ΔΣΕ Πελοποννήσου. Επίσης στα χέρια του ΕΣ έπεσε και σημαντικός αριθμός όπλων – 2 πολυβόλα, 40 οπλοπολυβόλα, 22 αυτόματα, 597 τυφέκια, 18 πιστόλια, 2 όλμοι, 5 ασύρματοι, 4 τηλέφωνα και 39 κτήνη.