D.F. Dr. Adrian Goldsworthy, in your case, what was the spark that sparked his interest in Roman history?
A.G. Several things. As a child, every Christmas and Easter they used to broadcast movies like Spartacus, Ben Hur, etc. And then there were the Asterix books, which he adored. I have always been fascinated by history. My father belonged to the generation that lived through the war; he had a small shop, quite quiet, which gave him plenty of time to chat with customers. Many of them had been veterans in the colonies of the British Empire, and used to recount their experiences. Listening to them, he had the feeling that the story was something very real, about real people. He also lived near the ruins of the Roman camp at Caerleon, which he could visit. The Romans therefore belonged to “my history”. In any case, I always try to emphasize the human element of the story, since it deals with people who, although they lived 2000 years ago, are not so different from the ones I heard in my father's store. If we forget that, that they are different cultures but essentially very similar to us, we will not understand anything.
D.F. And does this approach also mean moving away from nineteenth-century military history, from Kromayer and Veith, from the analysis of battles from the perspective of a general?
A.G. Yes, of course you have to avoid the simplicity of that model. One of the problems with the Prussian tradition is that it believes that a science of war can be made. The British, French or Spanish, with the experience of having owned an empire, are aware of the enormous differences between the different armies, not only technologically but also in the way of conceiving war. This allows us to intuit that the armies of Antiquity could also be very different from ours, with different objectives. The human element is crucial.
D.F. To your credit you have works that range from an essay about Augustus to novels about the Spanish War of Independence. Is it difficult for you to jump from one register to another?
A.G. Yes, of course; It forces me to completely change my work system and I can't do both at the same time. And it is that they are very different styles, which cannot be mixed. The truth is that for me it is a lot of fun, because it allows me to write dialogues and situations that I am not obliged to document. On the other hand, we have so many references for the Napoleonic period, which we do not have for the Roman period, which is very interesting because it serves as a reminder of everything that has not been preserved about the daily life of the ancient Romans. For example, a document from the 1st century AD has recently been discovered. C. found in Egypt consisting of a report written by a Roman horseman about a military assault, and it is written in a way that is almost reminiscent of John Wayne movies! It looks like a western . It is therefore a small sample that makes us intuit the large number of stories of which we have no documentation left. By this I mean that I believe that the study of the armies of more modern times can help us understand the armies of Roman times, if only because it reminds us of the importance of small matters such as the need to supply all soldiers with boots, etc. which are matters of crucial importance but generally ignored by classical authors. For example, we know that on the eve of the Battle of La Albuera a British brigade lacked boots, so they had to be made locally. But these were of poor quality and the seams were on the inside, and that's one of the reasons why this unit seldom takes part in battles:they can't move anywhere! And one wonders how many similar episodes occurred in ancient times, but we don't know.
D.F. Following this same thread, we have all heard of the so-called "military revolution" of the 16th century, but other authors, such as Fernando Quesada, suggest that the war did not change that much either, at least not until the end of the s. XIX, and therefore Caesar could have included a battle of Napoleonic times. What do you think?
A.G. If possible. However, on the one hand, the presence of artillery implies an important difference. On the other the number of combatants as well. If we think of the Battle of Leipzig, it is hard to imagine such a concentration of troops in the Ancient World, as well as the succession of tremendous battles leading up to it. But effectively the rest of the characteristics are very similar:the communication is the same, the soldiers still dress to be seen, with bright colors, and not to camouflage themselves from the enemy. Likewise, a large part of the combats are carried out in close order, and the troops must carry out marches and maneuvers. Transport is also in mules, or you live off the land. So there are indeed important similarities, which are what explain the fact that Napoleon read – and understood – Caesar. This is also an advantage of the nineteenth-century historians over us, since they were at least able to conceive the size that a certain number of troops deployed on the ground would occupy, something that for us is very difficult. I once witnessed a re-enactment of the Battle of Hastings in which he had managed to muster a hundred horsemen, and the truth is that they took up a very large space, and that was only a hundred horses; Let's imagine the real case, with much higher figures.
D.F. You mentioned that it is necessary to know how to communicate to the general public. Is this perhaps despised by some academics?
A.G. Definitely! There are many who after having worked as teachers for years are still unable to teach. On the other hand there are many fans who deserve to be written for them. In addition, military history has the virtue that it forces you to explain a victory or a defeat, which prevents the historian from getting entangled in postmodern interpretations, as we sometimes see in classrooms; you have to explain the logistics, the figures, etc. so you have to keep your feet on the ground.
D.F. In fact, his thesis was about the Roman army but trying to accentuate the pedestrian vision, of the combatant.
A.G. Yes, I think you need to know the terrain, but you can't go to the opposite extreme of turning contingents into pushpins on a map. Classical sources are full of allusions to the value of the combatant's morale. In the past, only panoply and tactics were studied, disdaining the human part. At the beginning of my doctoral work Hanson had already published The Western Way of War:Infantry Battle in Classical Greece , inspired by Keegan, and I thought no one had tried to apply it to Ancient Rome. It is surprising to see that there were several people, such as Sabin or Quesada, working in a similar line but without knowing each other. And it is that there are still many who try to write history ignoring the importance of the war; I myself have received criticism because in my book on Augustus there is a lot of military history; but we are talking about Augustus, imperator ! The Res Gestae They are full of conquests! There is no doubt that the war is historically relevant.
D.F. Have you ever felt that military historians are associated with a certain political ideology?
A.G. Definitely! In the academic world, declaring that you are working on military history is equivalent to saying that you want to invade Poland. As I understand it, the University of Virginia was once offered money to develop a chair in the History of the American Civil War, and the department almost turned it down because it was a military subject. It is thought that studying the military world is the same as glorifying it, but it is just the opposite. It is necessary to analyze it to understand it, exempt from prejudices and emotions. In the case of Rome, it cannot be understood without considering its military history. In this sense, Eckstein's work is fundamental because it avoids the mistake that some make when they study Roman imperialism or its borders, such as studying exclusively the Romans and assuming that all the others are mere victims. Or that the peoples neighboring Rome were peaceful and innocent. The Romans were no worse than the people around them, just more efficient! And on the other hand, they built a stable and peaceful state, and not just one of prey. Precisely part of this transformation is due to Augustus. After decades of civil war, Rome longed for peace. One of the things that struck me when studying Augusto is the amount of time he spent traveling. It gives the impression that it will be Tiberius, and not Augustus, who establishes the model of the Roman emperor with a stable seat. Somehow Augustus almost seems to advocate the third century AD. C., with its model of "itinerant emperor". In addition, it is not so clear that it was a perfect autocracy. If we think of Agrippa, Tiberius, Drusus, etc., it seems that Augustus always shares the government with others. We tend to think of the Empire as an autocracy, but that's because the experiments in collegiate power by the emperors that followed all failed. It gives the impression that the model of Augustus was that of several princes , with one dominant among several others, somewhat similar to the tetrarchic model. However, the emperors that follow lack sufficient authority to be able to support the rest, and everything seems to indicate that a model with several principes it demands that one of them has supremacy over the rest, otherwise it doesn't work. Augustus had a brilliant reputation and was Caesar's heir, which allowed him to submit to the rest. They are also non-ideologized wars. Brutus and Cassius talk about freedom, but to recruit they have no choice but to bribe, pay huge sums, etc. Appian recounts, with great cynicism, how the day after Caesar's death, Brutus makes a speech about freedom, and then distributes money to those present!
D.F. Can it be said that the conflict in Rome was more de-ideologized in the time of Caesar and Augustus than in the time of Marius and Sulla?
A.G. I think that once you have used the army in the political struggle, you can no longer stop doing it. The truth is that there were many intermediate conflicts between Mario and Augustus (Sertorius, Catilina, etc.). People like Caesar, Pompey, Augustus were born into this state of confusion, none of them having known a functioning republic. At any moment your enemy could raise an army and exterminate you. The idea was to hit first, before your opponent did.
D.F. And was Augustus a participant in such a maxim consisting of kill or be killed?
A.G. Once Augustus declares himself to be Caesar's political heir, there are only two options left:win or die. They are wars for power, which only end with the death of the opponent. Cicero's plan was to use Augustus as a tool to destroy Antony, and then get rid of him. As a 19-year-old boy no one expected him to become the central figure of the Roman state. On the other hand, we should not underestimate the ability of Augustus as a military commander. On the other hand, there weren't many alternatives either. Marco Antonio, for example, has gone down in history as a great general, but the truth is that he was much more of a skilled politician, or even a political manipulator, rather than a great soldier. The great moment of his was the speech he gave at Caesar's funeral. On the other hand Augustus got a certain military reputation, like in the Balkans when he was wounded twice, or when he saves the legionary eagle. He is also present in the battles, and in the camps. But of course Augusto had to win the sympathy of his troops thanks to numerous victories and similar events, it was not something immediate. And, after many victories, the troops understand that to fight with Augustus is to be on the winner's side, even when victory is achieved thanks to Agrippa's talent. And it is that the troops have no interest in the rhetoric of the aristocrats, but they do want to survive the battles and, if possible, get hold of the spoils of war. Augusto managed to show himself as favorable to his troops and his interests, which earned him his sympathy and trust.
D.F. Could the Hellenistic concept of divine sovereignty have influenced this process of growing popularity of Augustus?
A.G. I think the reality is simpler. People wanted a competent state that would solve problems, not like the Republic, where stopping your opponent was more important than the common good. The absence of a clear political head prevented unequivocal behavior with respect to neighboring provinces and towns. The vassal kings of Rome feared that a change of power in the city would cause a change in their relations with the metropolis. Consequently, they wanted stability to reign in Rome, and if Augustus promised them something, that promise would be kept. It is usually thought that Caesar, while assassinated by a tyrant, was less subtle than Augustus, who knew how to hide his true pretensions. This is ridiculous, everyone knew that Augustus had absolute power, as evidenced by the monuments, for example his mausoleum. He is also eternally young, so stability is assured. It is evident that Augustus was applying symbolic elements of monarchy, but people accept it. We must not forget how devastating the civil wars were and how eager the population was for peace.
D.F. And what role could the new rising social groups play? What is true about R. Syme's thesis on this point?
A.G. The truth is that many aristocrats had died in civil wars, and others considered that their privileges were not worth risking their lives for. Augustus constantly insists on the need for aristocrats to have children, and it is precisely to compensate for the lack of them in Roman society. Syme was comparing himself to the reality of Mussolini's Italy, which he knew, in which the traditional elites were displaced by new groups. But this is not new to Augustus, already in Sulla's time a large number of his supporters entered the political scene, after the civil wars. In fact, the progressive expansion of the power group is characteristic of Rome. This is not about a tiny elite from a small town dominating the world, but about a progressive extension of political participation, and citizenship, to new social groups. Auxiliary troops belong to this phenomenon, receiving citizenship in exchange for their participation in the Augustan system. It is therefore a completely opposite policy to that of the Roman aristocracy, consisting of closing access to power to a privileged group. Augustus manages to integrate many other social groups into the Roman project.
D.F. Since he mentions the auxiliary troops, it seems that precisely Agrippa, Maecenas, and Augustus discussed what form the Roman army should take from now on, whether it should be a citizen militia or a professional army.
A.G. Yes, Agrippa proposes that the traditional system of citizen soldiers be maintained, while Maecenas argues that if the veterans are not recruited, they will become bandits. The key is the officers, who have made war their way of life, and are not capable of recycling themselves. Augusto wants these people to continue participating in the system. When Augusto speaks, a clear patriotism is perceived, he wants everyone to feel part of the state (military, politicians, citizens, etc.). On the other hand, military service has become a burden, no one wants to go on a campaign that can last for years, with no prospect of loot, many chances of dying, and upon your return you find your family plunged into misery. That model is no longer sustainable. For example, if we think of the army of Alexander the Great, we have to remember that it was a machine of immense efficiency that has almost become a professional army, and whose origin was indeed a model of a citizen army. Alexander's successors are not able to maintain this model:they retain some professional soldiers but are forced to recruit citizens, otherwise they are not able to amass a sufficient number of troops. So they are clearly inferior armies in quality to Alexander's. Alexander's army could handle anything that got in its way, and so did Caesar's legions; They were very seasoned troops, practically professionals, and therefore tremendously effective.
D.F. So can we say that the key to Augusto's success was his ability to integrate everyone into his system?
A.G. Augusto has made the world work again, with peace and stability. The borders are stable and the quality of life has improved substantially. It's not perfect, but it's infinitely better than before, and if a problem arises, Augusto is there to fix it. The alternatives to Augustus were much worse.
D.F. And at the same time he offers gifts to the aristocracy to please them?
A.G. Exactly, he manages to integrate them into the system. Just as the noble can pursue a political career, so can the lowly join the army and prosper. And we are witnessing widespread economic prosperity that many are taking advantage of. They all have a place in the Augustus system.
D.F. As for the old debate of whether Rome reached its own limits to growth, what is her opinion?
A.G. Augustus himself defends the same idea:we already have everything worth having, there is no point in continuing the conquest, because we will only find barbarians and desolation. I think it is evident that in the time of Augustus the Empire was exhausted, its resources depleted; the Pannonian rebellion demonstrated the empire's military weakness. And then we see the terrible defeat of Teutoburg, in which three legions are massacred. And to all this is added the fact that, after Augustus, the emperor Tiberius has no interest in continuing the expansion. He has already achieved the military prestige necessary to govern and does not need more. In many aspects we must understand that it is Tiberius, and not Augustus, who configures the general characteristics of what the Roman Empire will be. Now, I think the Augustan system worked better, as its model of various princes ruling together was more stable and ensured a better succession to the throne. I believe that the Augustan model could have been conceived as a circumstantial solution, and that once the State was restored, other models of government could be considered.
D.F. Thank you very much Dr. Adrian Goldsworthy, it has been a real pleasure.