The concept of mutual assured destruction was first articulated by RAND Corporation researcher and strategist Bernard Brodie in his 1946 book "The Absolute Weapon". Brodie argued that the only way to prevent nuclear war was to ensure that any aggressor would know that it would face certain destruction if it launched a nuclear attack. This could only be achieved, he said, by maintaining a credible second-strike capability—that is, the ability to launch a retaliatory nuclear attack even after absorbing a first strike.
The doctrine of mutual assured destruction has been a central tenet of U.S. nuclear policy since the 1950s. It has also been adopted by other nuclear-armed countries, including Russia, China, and the United Kingdom.
Critics of the doctrine of mutual assured destruction argue that it is based on a false premise. They argue that there is no guarantee that a nuclear war would actually lead to the destruction of both sides. Even if it did, they argue, it would be immoral to commit mass murder in order to deter an enemy.
Proponents of the doctrine argue that it has been successful in preventing nuclear war for over 70 years. They argue that the threat of mutual assured destruction has made it too risky for any country to launch a nuclear attack.
The doctrine of mutual assured destruction is a controversial and often misunderstood concept. However, it remains a key part of nuclear strategy and national security policy in the 21st century.