Although Indonesia had been independent from 1949, the Dutch government held on to New Guinea until 1962. The frustrations about the loss of Indonesia are said to be the reason for this frenzied policy. Bart Stol now proves the opposite in his dissertation.
New Guinea was part of our paradisiacal archipelago, the Emerald Belt. The fact that the Netherlands had to cede the Dutch East Indies in 1949, under pressure from international powers, caused frustration and emotions. This was not the main reason for holding on to New Guinea, claims historian Bart Stol. “Emotions were not the originators of the policy, but only its enhancers.”
The sources studied by Stol also show that in the Netherlands and the Indies the idea took hold from the 1920s to keep New Guinea under Dutch administration in the event of the Indies becoming independent. “The decision on the separate future of New Guinea was actually taken before Indonesia's independence.”
Frustrations
In his research, Stol proves that Dutch policy was indeed based on rational cost-benefit analyzes instead of emotions. In addition, this policy was widely supported by other colonial powers, such as Great Britain, France, Belgium and Australia. The image of a desperate clinging to the last remnant of India, which was condemned by the rest of the world, is incorrect, according to him.
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The image of a colonial frustrated and resentful Dutch has existed since the 1960s. “This is due to the perspective of previous studies, in which historians mainly looked at Dutch-Indonesia relations. Or to the involvement of the United States, in the perspective of the Cold War. For the first time, I have chosen a broader perspective, paying attention to the attitude of the other colonial powers. They supported the Netherlands until at least the end of 1961. This was the year of a turnaround, in which many Dutch people began to doubt their own policy.”
Colonial Restart
After World War II, colonies in Asia were lost due to the rise of independence movements. This did not mean the end of colonialism, but brought about a second colonial wave. “European countries started to focus on other less developed areas within the borders of their vast empires. They saw the moral obligation to fulfill their self-created civilization mission here.”
The Netherlands too, and from 1952 the official policy was to prepare New Guinea and its inhabitants, the Papuans, for self-determination. Some politicians, such as Minister of Foreign Affairs Joseph Luns (1911-2002), hoped for a long time that they would eventually opt for permanent affiliation with the Netherlands. Then the Netherlands would retain political influence in Asia.
Opinions divided
After the 1950s, however, belief in this colonial relaunch declined, when nationalism also emerged in the new focus areas. However, the Papuans were not yet ready to become independent in Western eyes. “Indonesia was willing to use force if we didn't give up the island. The question was how we as the Netherlands could best handle this.”
As with the refugee issue now, opinions were divided in The Hague. The PvdA has been of the opinion for years that the Netherlands should not interfere in power politics in Asia. Luns wanted to defy Indonesia and for a long time got the majority. The minister publicly screened the possibility that the United States would intervene militarily if Indonesia attacked New Guinea.
Later, Luns was accused of providing misleading information, as a statement of support was not put on paper in such a way. “New sources show that Luns did not lie about promises made by US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. He was open to his fellow ministers and the standing parliamentary committee on Foreign Affairs about the fact that Dulles had not promised anything concrete. He himself also had a hard time thinking that the Americans would come over with military support, but he thought he could at least bluff with the suggestion."
Sit out
In Indonesia, President Sukarno gained more and more power in the 1950s. “The Netherlands was initially prepared to compromise such as joint administration of New Guinea, until the country was developed enough for self-determination. Sukarno only wanted to negotiate a transfer, and the Netherlands did not agree to that.”
In the course of 1958 Sukarno had all Dutch companies in Indonesia nationalized and threatened with war. The Netherlands sent troops to New Guinea, but there would be no war for the time being because the Indonesian army still had to be built.
From 1958, Sukarno's position began to falter. “It was quite fermented within Indonesian politics. Several politicians and generals toyed with the idea of committing a coup. There were also four assassination attempts on Sukarno between ’57 and ’62. A change of power seemed very possible. Sukarno's intended successors were more pro-Western, so there was hope for new negotiations over New Guinea. Dutch policy was waiting for a new regime. This is a very different picture than holding on to the past out of spite.”
The cover
1961 and 1962 were years of change, in which Luns slowly but surely lost the support of the majority in The Hague. First, Democrat John F. Kennedy became America's new president. Kennedy had announced that he would rather side with the colonized countries on colonial issues.
In addition, Sukarno threatened that he would focus more on the Soviet Union if he didn't get his way. In the United States, there had been discussions about how to deal with this for some time. The United States wanted to maintain influence in strategically important Indonesia, but they did not want to succumb to blackmail.
Changes in the Netherlands were ultimately the deciding factor. Stol:“In the course of 1961 and 1962 the threat of war increased. Thanks in particular to Russian weapons and training, the Indonesian army had become strong enough to launch a successful attack on New Guinea. This ensured that the number of supporters of negotiations with Sukarno grew in The Hague.”
Goodbye
Because of this growing willingness to accommodate Sukarno, the United States was no longer forced to support the policy of Minister Luns. In April 1962, the Kennedy administration introduced a new plan for a phased transfer of New Guinea to Indonesia. Sukarno was able to annex the area within two years. In 1969, under pressure from the Indonesian army, the Papuans opted for a future within Indonesia.
“Most Papuans did not want to become part of Indonesia. They wanted to remain under Dutch administration and eventually become independent. They had also reported this to the United States, but the Papuans were sacrificed because of the Cold War.”
In 1962 the Netherlands handed over western New Guinea to Indonesia. This put an end to more than three hundred and fifty years of Dutch colonialism in Asia.