The surrender of France on June 22, 1940 was a serious threat to England. To prevent the French fleet from falling into Hitler's hands, Churchill ordered ... to sink it.
As Winston Churchill stated, it was the most terrible, painful and unnatural decision he had ever considered. The conditions surrounding it were, in fact, unusual. You had to put your own conscience and allied loyalty on the same scale. On the second - strategic interest. But it was definitely something that went well beyond "friendly fire" ...
Unexpected result of France's surrender
From the moment the Third Reich finally took control of France, the situation of Great Britain became more and more difficult. It was not just about the Nazis taking over French territory and the famous evacuation of Dunkirk ... There was another very important element:the French fleet in the Mediterranean Sea. The question was: what if Hitler put his hand on these ships, taking them over one way or another? Getting them under German control could radically change the balance of power.
Obvious objections to Operation Catapult were expressed by Vice Admiral Sir James Fownes Sommerville, on whose shoulders direct responsibility would rest.
Among the most improbable fairy tales were Hitler's assurances that he would not engage the French fleet in hostilities. And he was also thinking about the invasion of Great Britain ... What could be done in this situation? Ideally, the French should stay on the right side of the front - and history . But also the pessimistic variant had to be taken into account. And Churchill was well aware of this. In that case the French ships had to be neutralized, or at worst ... just destroyed. And that was what operation "Catapult" was supposed to serve. But how would France itself react to it?
The Minister of the Navy in Marshal Petain's government, Jean Louis Xavier François Darlan, issued the order on June 20. He ordered the fleet to fight as long as the legitimate French government gave no other orders. At the same time, it made a reservation that you can never return an intact ship to an enemy. Already after the conclusion of the humiliating truce by France with the Third Reich Darlan ordered, inter alia, preparing means of self-destruction so that no foreign country could use French units . Controversial, but probably related to the aforementioned armistice, was the point that the ships that will find themselves abroad cannot be used against Germany or Italy without an order.
Towards the inevitable ...
The British were particularly concerned about the possibility of using French ships located in Algeria, at the Mers el-Kébir base and in its annex - Oran. It was a massive flotilla that included 2 battleships, 2 battleships and 21 other types of units, including submarines . Time was pressing. The threat of the situation was added by the fact that the Germans had already started to use French maritime codes ... A meeting was organized at night in Churchill's office on Downing Street, attended by admiralty commanders Sir Dudley Pound and Albert Victor Alexander, as well as the minister of aviation production Max Aitken, known to the public. as Lord Beaverbrook.
It was the latter who uttered the words quoted by Erik Larson in the book The Year That Changed Everything words that reflect the seriousness of the situation: " The Germans will force the French to joining the Italians, thereby taking power over the Mediterranean Sea "He said. "They will get their way, because in case of resistance they will threaten with burning Bordeaux on the first day, Marseilles on the second and Paris on the third" . Such emotional blackmail could make the right impression.
The text was created, among others based on the book by Erik Larson "The Year that Changed Everything", which has just been released by the Znak Horyzont publishing house.
Obvious objections to Operation Catapult were expressed by Vice Admiral Sir James Fownes Sommerville, on whose shoulders direct responsibility would rest. He telegraphed to the British admiralty, insisting that avoid the use of force at all costs . However, it was used earlier, incl. in Portsmouth and Plymouth. With more or less resistance from the crews, the French ships moored there were seized. At the same time, the radio stations were seized so quickly that information about it did not get out. It also meant that the later order of the French admiralty (Vichy), ordering them to leave the ports, did not reach the addressees ... because he had no one else to contact.
The tension rises
a fleet code named Force H was delegated to perform this extremely ungrateful task. . It consisted of a total of 17 ships. He was in command of Vice Admiral Sommerville . The final orders were sent to him on July 2 at 4:26 am. At dawn, the ships docked in Gibraltar towards French bases in Algeria. They arrived on July 3 at 3 a.m. Talks with the French command began. An appropriate ultimatum has already been prepared. The French were given the choice of leaving base and joining the British fleet, sailing to British ports or reaching remote overseas French bases where ships would be disarmed or transferred to the United States.
A fleet code-named Force H was delegated to perform this immensely ungrateful task. It consisted of a total of 17 ships.
What if the French did not choose any of these variants? Erik Larson quotes the Vice Admiral's message: If you refuse these sensible proposals, I must regret with the deepest regret that you sink your units within the next six hours . If this does not happen, I have been ordered by His Majesty's Government to use whatever it is necessary force, to prevent your ships from being taken over by the Germans or Italians .
The ultimatum became necessary because the French admiral Marcel Gensoul refused to meet the command of Force H. This was not the reaction the British expected. For example, the folding of the roof on French ships was taken as a good coin and a sign of the intention to go to sea. In addition, Admiral Gensoul assured that he would not allow the fleet to fall into the hands of the Germans . On the other hand, however, he announced that in defense of his fleet will not stop at anything .
Infamous Attack
Originally, Sommerville gave Gensoul until 2:30 pm. Finally, at 4:15 pm, the admiral met the British representative on board the French ship. It did not bring any particulars. Gensoul mentioned, inter alia, on Darlan's 3rd order, that he was to lead the ships to the USA in a forced situation. However, he felt that the situation was not yet ripe for it.
Sommerville gave the French again time, this time until 5:30 pm. It should be emphasized that the admiralty insisted on making the decision, as they feared the arrival of French reinforcements. Eventually the attack did not start until 5:54 pm . The battleship Bretagne was quickly eliminated, which, hit several times, broke in two as a result of the explosion. The French tried to resist. As Churchill (perhaps ironically) commented: The French started to fight vigor for the first time since the war broke out . However, the damage on their ships was increasing. Admiral Gensoul Dunkerque's badly damaged flagship was run aground. The crew of the battleship Provence did the same.
The entire fire exchange lasted only a dozen or so minutes. In total, it cost about 1,300 French seamen.
Ultimately, Gensoul radio asked for a cease-fire due to the fact that all of his ships were no longer capable of combat. He also displayed a white flag. The entire fire exchange lasted only a dozen or so minutes. In total, she cost about 1,300 French seamen . There were hardly any losses on the British side. Several French ships managed to escape, but - probably fearing submarines - Sommerville decided not to pursue the pursuit.
Was it really impossible to avoid it?
Was there a risk of a French response? Yes. At least that was what Admiral Darlan wanted, who retaliated by ordering the fleet to concentrate near the Balearic Islands and then attack Force H, returning to Gibraltar. But it didn't happen because the order was… canceled. Surprisingly - due to the intervention of ministers from the Vichy government. On July 4, there was a French raid on British ships moored at the base near Gibraltar however, the result of this operation was poor. Darlan himself, without consulting anyone, tried to persuade the Italian admiralty to launch a joint attack on Alexandria.
When Winston Churchill informed the House of Commons of Operation Catapult on July 4, he was backed by all the political forces in the British Parliament. Public opinion also supported the prime minister. Support for him even soared - to a record 88%. However, the questions remain. How to evaluate this operation? And how would the war have turned out if the Vichy government had nevertheless decided to approve Admiral Darlan's plans? There were a lot of issues hanging in the balance then…
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