The Battle of Midway saw the destruction, carried out by US aircraft carriers, of the Japanese carriers that had attacked Pearl Harbor. Thanks to signal intelligence and good luck, a Japanese plan to lure US aircraft carriers into a trap spelled the end of Japanese naval dominance of the Pacific instead.
Midway battle data
- Who: A Japanese navy of four aircraft carriers carrying 256 aircraft, 11 battleships, and numerous smaller craft faced an American force comprising three aircraft carriers, 234 land-based or carrier-based aircraft, and assorted smaller craft.
- How: US carrier aircraft attacked and destroyed Japanese aircraft carriers, thus eliminating Japan's long-range strike and scouting capabilities.
- Where: In the Pacific Ocean, northwest of Midway Island.
- When: From June 3 to 6, 1942.
- Why: The Japanese had desired to capture Midway Island as a forward base and as a means of drawing the American fleet into a decisive battle.
- Result: The US destroyed the Japanese aircraft carriers, gaining an advantage in the crucial Pacific war.
The surprise Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941 had been a remarkable tactical success, although as the American carriers had been sailing, it was an incomplete victory. One such carrier, the Hornet, carried 16 B52 bombers to attack Tokyo and Nagoya, inflicting little serious damage but offering the Americans a major morale boost in what was called the "Doolittle Raid."
In May, the Americans again used their aircraft carriers to limit Japanese moves toward Australia in the Battle of the Coral Sea . These two incidents led the Japanese high command to the conclusion that they had to eliminate the remaining US aircraft carriers to give Japan strategic space.
The japaneseplans
Japanese Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto (1884-1943), architect of the attack on Pearl Harbor, tried to lure the Americans into a carrier battle, which he hoped to win with his more experienced sailors and aviators. The capture of Midway Island by Japan , he predicted, would force the Americans to go into combat on terms advantageous to the Japanese. With the US fleet crushed, Japan could then turn Midway into a major air base, and a safe place from which to monitor US actions in Hawaii. The erroneous report of the sinking of the Yorktown in the Battle of the Coral Sea it gave the Japanese even more confidence that they outgunned and outgunned the Americans. The Japanese navy mustered some 200 ships, eight aircraft carriers, 23 cruisers, 65 destroyers and 20 submarines. This force represented the bulk of the Japanese fleet. Japanese admirals confidently expected this huge navy to dispatch any American force sent against it.
Partly because of this overconfidence in the material (and supposedly moral) superiority of Japan, Yamamoto made the fateful decision to split his forces . He sent a breakaway force, including four battleships and two cruisers, north to the western Aleutian Islands in Alaska. These ships played no part in the battle and, as it turned out, they also failed to entice any American ships to take the bait. The main force, which in turn was the largest navy in the history of the Pacific Ocean, was also divided. The submarines advanced ahead of the main Japanese forces, to determine the position of the American ships, record those situations, and then prepare to join the battle. The vanguard, or main strike force under the command of the able Admiral Chuichi Nagumo (1887-1944), included four mighty aircraft carriers:the Kaga , which carried 30 fighters, 23 bombers, and 30 torpedo bombers, and the Hiryu , the Soryu and the Akagi , each carrying 21 fighters, 21 bombers, and 21 torpedo bombers. The vanguard also included battleships, cruisers, and destroyers to protect the carriers. The last part of the Japanese force was the landing force at Midway, with surface ships and troop transports.
US moves
Two great feats of the Americans undermined the Japanese preparations. Lieutenant Commander James Rochefort, an eccentric cryptographer, had cracked enough of the Japanese naval code to guess the outlines of the Japanese plan. Rochefort had intercepted plans for a major Japanese operation against a target codenamed 'AF'. Rochefort's instinct told him that "AF" had to be Midway, but the naval commander, Admiral Chester W. Nimitz (1885-1966), still feared that "AF" might be Oahu. To make sure, Rochefort devised an ingenious ruse. He sent an unencrypted message on a frequency he knew the Japanese were monitoring, stating that Midway's drinking water system was malfunctioning. A few days later, when he saw a decoded Japanese order for potable water tanks to be sent accompanying Operation AF, he had the confirmation Nimitz needed:naval assets could be concentrated on Midway without compromising Oahu's security.
The other great American success had to do with the aircraft carrier Yorktown . After becoming so damaged in the Coral Sea that Japanese pilots reported her sinking, the Yorktown it had limped back to Pearl Harbor, where repair crews worked furiously, for just three days, to get it ready in time to sail for Midway with Rear Admiral Jack Fletcher's 17th Expeditionary Force on May 30, 1942. aircraft carrier was not in ideal condition, the Japanese plans did not count on their airplanes. Both Rear Admiral Raymond Spruance's 17th and 16th Expeditionary Forces sailed from Pearl Harbor before the Japanese submarines could reach their positions.
Thanks in no small part to Rochefort's efforts, the US Navy was not fooled by the Aleutian lure. However, with the Yorktown, the Navy could count on three aircraft carriers, which included the Enterprise and the Hornet. They had a total of 233 carrier-based aircraft and 127 land-based aircraft to meet the 248 aircraft in the Japanese force. The US, still recovering from the Pearl Harbor losses, had nothing to oppose Yamamoto's seven battleships, although they were now in a position to fight the battle using aircraft carriers at long range, thus leaving the battleships isolated. . In the Coral Sea, the entire battle was fought from aircraft carriers; the surface ships were never seen, due to the great range of the embarked aircraft.
The first attack
So, unknown to the Japanese, the Americans had an idea of what to look for and where to find it. Shortly after midnight on June 4, 1942, American patrol planes discovered the Japanese vanguard less than 600 miles from Midway Island. Although American attempts to inflict damage on the Japanese fleet from the air failed, early warning allowed Midway to prepare its defenses and its planes. For his part, Admiral Nagumo was unfazed by what he took to be a casual American flyby of his carrier. Consequently, he launched his air attack from
108 planes against Midway at 04:30 in the morning when her ships were still 240 miles away from Midway. The Americans, prepared for the raid, shot down 67 Japanese planes. At the same time, the American planes were heading towards Nagumo's aircraft carriers. He still had half of his planes held in reserve, though he had to keep the decks clear to retrieve returning planes. The Japanese attack did not cause as much damage on Midway as would have been necessary to ensure an easy invasion. The Japanese raid commander radioed that another attack on the island was needed.
Thecrucialmoments
Meanwhile, the first American attack had hit Nagumo's carriers. He failed, suffering heavy losses, although he revealed to Nagumo the presence of American carriers nearby. Nagumo now faced a dilemma. He had planes over the sea that he had to pick up, and he had to choose between arming his aircraft for a second attack on Midway Island or attacking the enemy carriers, the exact location of which remained unknown. The first operation called for high-explosive bombs, the second required torpedoes.
Nagumo initially ordered to arm the second wave with bombs for a further raid over Midway, but at 07:40 a.m. a signal came from a Japanese cruiser reporting that the American carriers were east of Nagumo and fast approaching. Nagumo thus had the worst possible situation, with enemy carriers nearby, but the planes armed with inadequate artillery to attack them. In addition, he still had airmen returning to their carriers low on fuel, several of them wounded. He ordered his carriers to prepare for the recovery of the first attacking force, thereby wasting time.
At 09:30 and 09:40 AM, two waves of American torpedo bombers attacked the Japanese carriers, but were annihilated by the faster and more agile Japanese fighters. The Americans lost 47 of their 51 planes. The torpedo attacks prevented Nagumo from launching his aircraft and distracted the Japanese fighters from a larger wave of American Dauntless SBD dive bombers. The Dauntless bombers had arrived over the Japanese carriers at the perfect time. Due to the confusion caused by the change of armament, the Japanese carriers had bombs and torpedoes piled on the decks, instead of being safe below in the magazine. Furthermore, because of the need to refuel returning planes, the decks were also littered with gasoline pipes, and the confusion of all this activity prevented Nagumo from getting his reserve fighters off the ground.
In this vulnerable position, the Japanese had to contend with dive bombers launched from Yorktown and Enterprise. At 10:22 in the morning US planes attacked the Kaga , eventually overtaking it four times. In a few minutes, the Soryu and the Akagi they had also been hit and put out of action. The fires spread out of control and, in at least one case, the fire spread to the main magazines. All three carriers were subsequently abandoned and scuttled. It was an amazing example of the confluence of chance and skill at the exact moment. Within minutes, the balance of naval power in the Pacific had shifted.
Finalactions
The planes of the only remaining Japanese aircraft carrier, the Hiryu , caused severe damage to Yorktown, to the point of forcing Admiral Fletcher to order her abandoned. Later in the day, US aircraft located the Hiryu and scored four direct hits, causing fires that forced their crew to abandon ship. The Japanese had now lost all four carriers they had committed to the attack. Total Japanese losses included four aircraft carriers, two heavy cruisers, three destroyers, 229 aircraft, and 3,500 men. US losses numbered one carrier, one destroyer, 150 aircraft, and 307 men.
The Americans knew they had won a major victory; however, they decided not to risk night action against the now unprotected Japanese surface ships. They therefore withdrew east to the safety of Midway Island's defences, although American cruisers and submarines continued to harass the remaining Japanese ships. They took advantage of the time to retreat to a safe place. Yamamoto knew how serious the disaster had been for Japan:"I am the only one who should apologize to Her Majesty" for the defeat. He resigned, although it was not accepted.
Aftermath
Within a day, the Japanese losses had been really heavy. Japan had only two aircraft carriers left. The Americans had also lost an aircraft carrier, but they had an industrial base that eventually built 35 more carriers before the end of the war. In that same period, Japan was barely able to even make up for the losses at Midway.
Midway did not give the US victory in the Pacific war. However, he transferred the strategic initiative to them. Without aircraft carriers, the Japanese could not think of conducting any more surprise long-distance operations. As various other actions of the war demonstrated, surface ships, the true strength of the Japanese fleet, were vulnerable without air cover. Later naval battles in the Pacific confirmed this maxim, because Japanese battleships could not operate with impunity while American aircraft carriers were in the vicinity. America's pre-war faith in the aircraft carrier had been justified, and as American industry built more aircraft carriers and more airplanes, the balance tipped more in America's favour.