Around noon, Montgomery realized what the New Zealanders' "nibbling" actions were going to cost and he decided to direct the effort in a northerly direction, ordering the 9th Australian Division to destroy the German units. the salient formed between Tell-el-Eisa and the sea. The 10th D.B. received the order to push west to threaten enemy communications and the rear of the salient, but it could hardly advance until the night of the 26th to 27.
General Morshead's Australians, on the other hand, gained ground, inflicting heavy losses on the Germans. The defenses in this sector were extremely developed; I believe the fiercest fighting of the whole battle took place there; they were going to provide a major contribution to the final victory.
On the 1st, the New Zealand and South African divisions made little progress and the army commander ordered a regroup. The 30th corps asked to mark a pause to reorganize its device. Although we managed to get past the minefields, the enemy was still able to oppose us with powerful anti-tank defenses.
The regrouping made it possible to reconstitute the reserves essential for the decisive phase of the battle. The New Zealanders went into reserve (their place being taken by the South Africans and the 4th Indian Division); they were given priority for the replacement of disabled tanks, and they were able to rest for a day, which they spent partly in bathing, forgetting the horrors of Miteiriya Ridge and preparing for the trials to come.
During the day of the 27th, it was learned that two enemy oil tankers and a freighter had been sunk at the entrance to the port of Tobruk, which could have important consequences in the ongoing battle.
At 2 p.m., Montgomery held a conference to explain the regrouping, and to give his instructions regarding the continuation of the attack on the salient. He also ordered the 13th Corps to send the 7th D.B. and a few other units to the northern sector, because on the night of the 26th to the 27th the 21st Panzer Division had itself moved north; we had located his new P.C. by radio-goniometry.
All day the DAK launched counter-attacks on counter-attacks, which we expected. The 1st D.B. performed magnificently, destroying 50 tanks and damaging many.
For its part, the RAF bombarded the concentrations of German tanks. So it was an exciting day. Montgomery then decided that the 1st D.B. needed a rest and moved it to reserve. It was replaced by two infantry brigades from the 13th corps, which took up defensive positions. wedged into the enemy positions, almost reaching the coastal road between Sidi-Abd-el-Rhaman and Tell-el On the 29th, the Germans multiplied the t to reduce this point, but all counter-attacks failed.
This day of the 29th was passionate, it was spent establishing the plans and making the arrangements for the attack on ri which received the code name of "Supercharge"
Montgomery wanted to launch the more to the north possible, but many of us believe that we would have better chances by choosing a more southern axis; the closer to the main road would be our axis of attack, and the more Germans we would have in front of us, and more solid defences.
In the morning, the Commander-in-Chief, General Alexander, came to visit us accompanied by Mr. Casey, Minister of State. The Commander of the 8th Army, Rays of Confidence, explained the situation and his intentions. He pointed out that he had predicted that he had predicted that we would have to fight like dogs for ten days; he was now assured victory. But he understood that in the cabinet in London - perhaps also in Cairo - some were beginning to wonder whether Montgomery would live up to his "complete victory" promise. This is why the discussion centered on "Supercharge" and I saw that McCreery, Alexander's chief of staff, agreed with me that it would be better to attack further south.
After these figures left, I felt even more concerned about my leader's intention to attack in the north. I was certain that Rommel would do his best to cover his main depots and his communications, of which the coastal road was the lifeline. He could take no risks in this sector of the front. I opened up about my fears to 2nd Bureau 8th Army Chief Bill Williams - and saw that he shared them. Fortunately, the last information that reached us told us that the German 90th Light Division had moved north, probably as a result of the successes obtained by the Australians. It was therefore obvious that, further south, the enemy's position was weakened accordingly. I decided to go with Williams to Montgomery to inform him of these changes. The general, who had already been impressed by the explanations given by Williams during a recent conference, on the way in which the German units "corseted" the Italian divisions, understood immediately that the opportunity presented itself to attack a enemy weak point. He decided, on the spot, to modify the axis of attack. This filled me with joy and I telephoned the news to McCreery who was very happy to hear it. I was convinced that the decision taken would be a decisive contribution to victory.
The Australians continued to attack on the night of the 30th to the 31st and they crossed the coastal road. It seemed for a moment that the Germans occupying the salient were going to be cut off from their rear; but they managed, by engaging tanks, to extricate themselves. This attack in the direction of the north had at least brought large dividends:it had caused significant losses to the Germans and above all it had led the enemy to concentrate his attention on the coastal zone.
On November 1 it was learned that the 21st Panzer Division had moved even further north; all was looking well for the final phase. morning of November 2. Some 300 25-pounder guns and 30th Corps artillery supported the attack, the front of which was initially limited to 3,600 meters, the initial objective being at 5,400 meters. "Infantry engaged at the head reached their first objective without great difficulty and tanks passed it. Through the breach thus created, it was proposed to pass the armor of the 10th Corps. The 9th Armored Brigade passed, and reached its objective, but at the cost of heavy losses. The 1st D.B. arrived in turn and a hard armored battle ensued.
On November 3 it was known that the adversary was beaten; our planes reported units retreating west and we knew that Rommel would run out of trucks and fuel to pull all his forces back. However, this day of the 3rd did not yet see us emerge into open ground, because the enemy was trying to seal the breach with anti-tank guns. But on the night of the 3rd to the 4th, the breakthrough was completely achieved thanks to a sudden, remarkably led attack by the 51st and 4th Indian divisions.
The battle was therefore won after eleven days of fighting, at the end of the time precisely foreseen by Montgomery. The enemy was now in full retreat; our reconnaissance vehicles and tanks operated in open terrain.
We knew very well that our air force would wreak havoc in the enemy columns. The pilots described to us convoys rushing west all along the main coastal road, four vehicles abreast, sometimes even eight, which followed one another to touch each other. We had the impression of a rout, and having complete mastery of the air we imagined a massacre. This was far from the case and when I followed the road from El-Alamein to Daba, where I expected a spectacle of devastation, I was very disappointed to see only a small number of vehicles 'destroyed . The reason is, I think, that we had not yet, at that time, learned the technique of "strafing" in skimming flight. Our planes attacked with bombs dropped at medium altitude, simply because the pilots had not been trained to attack with their on-board weapons while flying very low. I realized that we had lost an opportunity to hinder, and make much more expensive, the retreat of the Axis forces.
Another cause of disappointment was that we were unable to cut off the retreat of what was left of Rommel's forces, and thereby avoid a whole series of operations which we would therefore have to mount to get to Tripoli and beyond. of the. But Montgomery knew it was only a matter of time and it must be said that he was unlucky, for the forces he had launched to intercept the enemy in Fuka and Matruh Gulches , narrowly failed in this mission:storms of quite unusual violence in this region paralyzed them as they came within range of the enemy. »