The risky conception of the Gallipoli operation is only admissible 'if surprise plays out, but if we remember the din caused by the errors and false maneuvers at Lemnos, we should not be surprised if the Turks, commanded by German Field Marshal Liman von Sanders, put the Fifth Army covering the straits on heightened alert.
Three of its six divisions are massed in the south of the peninsula, the other three serve either as a mobile reserve or as cover for the works on the Asian coast where the Turks fear an Allied incursion. Liman von Sanders has one month to prepare the defense of the mountainous massifs which dominate the south of the peninsula. He begins by training his 60,000 men to advance rapidly through the steep hills, then disposes them at a distance from the coasts to escape the artillery preparation of the invading fleet, leaving only a defensive curtain on the escarpments dominating landing beaches. He had roads opened up where there had been only goat trails, strewn the already difficult terrain with stakes and iron wires torn from the fences of fields and agricultural enclosures, extended these rudimentary defenses to the edge of the beaches in such a way that the water covers them and hides them.
Admittedly, the Turkish army was not famous in this period of decline of the Ottoman Empire, but the German marshal could count on the solid Anatolian infantry whose bite will partly compensate for the insufficient armament and the precarious supply. He can also trust
a young Turkish general who commands the 19th division, Mustapha Kemal Pasha, whom history will recognize as Ataturk.
On the Allied side, the expeditionary force of 78,000 men is finally at work and is only waiting for an order to leave its bases in Lemnos. A powerful fleet must support the landing which will take place before daybreak, the troops piling up in canoes towed by motorized pinnaces, until the approach of the beaches. At 50 meters from the shore, the pinnaces will cast off the moorings and the canoes will finish the way rowing. To maintain a certain discretion in the operation until the end, the preparation of the naval artillery in front of Gaba-Tépé was cancelled. The naval guns will support the advance of the infantry along the slopes. Then, the dismounted artillery will have to take over. Unfortunately, the naval guns. like the howitzers of the artillery on the ground, are incapable of providing effective aid to troops engaged in uphill combat, practically hand-to-hand combat.
On April 18, 1915, the Anglo-French expeditionary force was again ready to act. The ships, suitably loaded this time, sailed in long convoys, heading north, towards the Gallipoli peninsula.
On April 23, General Sir Ian Hamilton, in a sober agenda, announced the beginning of the operation, its aims and its means.