The Battle of Zama (October 19, 202).
Troop layout
He did not form his line in close cohorts, each arranged in front of his ensigns; but he arranged small intervals between the maniples, so that the elephants of the enemy could enter the ranks without causing disorder. Laelius, who had been his lieutenant, who was this year attached to his person as quaestor extraordinary by virtue of a senatus-consultum, was placed on the left wing with the Italian cavalry; Masinissa and his Numidians on the right. To fill the gaps left between the maniples of the antesignani, he made use of the velites which then made up the light troops:they had orders, as soon as the elephants gave way, either to withdraw behind the regular lines, or to scatter to the right or to the left and line up against the antesignani, in order to open a passage for the animals where they would fall under the blows of a thousand crossed lines.
Hannibal placed, as a means of terror, his elephants in the front line:he had eighty of them, a number which he had never mustered in any battle; then came his Ligurian and Gaulish auxiliaries, intermingled with Balearicians and Moors; in the second line, the Carthaginians, the Africans and the Macedonian legion; then, at a short interval, his reserve composed of Italians. They were, for the most part, Bruttians, who, out of compulsion and force, rather than goodwill, had followed him when he evacuated Italy. His cavalry also lined the wings; the Carthaginians on the right, and the Numidians on the left.
Hannibal tried every kind of encouragement to animate this confused mixture of men who had nothing in common, neither the language, nor the customs, nor the laws, nor the weapons, nor the clothes, nor the exterior, nor the interests. To the auxiliaries he showed a rich pay for the moment and richer spoils in the division of the booty. Speaking to the Gauls, he kindled in their souls the fire of that national and natural hatred which they harbored against Rome. In the eyes of the Ligurians he shone the hope of leaving their rugged mountains for the fertile plains of Italy. He terrified the Moors and Numidians by the picture of cruel despotism under which Masinissa would crush them. In speaking to others, it was other hopes, other fears that he stirred up in the bottom of their hearts. He spoke to the Carthaginians of the ramparts of their fatherland, of the penate gods, of the tombs of their fathers, of their children and of their parents, of their distraught women; he showed them ruin and slavery on the one hand, and on the other the empire of the world, a terrible alternative which left no middle ground between fear and hope.
While that the general was thus addressing his Carthaginians, and that the chiefs of the various nations of his army were haranguing their fellow citizens and, through the mouth of interpreters, the foreigners mingled with their bands, the Romans suddenly sounded the trumpet and of the bugle, and uttered such a formidable cry that the elephants fell back on their army, and especially on their left, on the Moors and the Numidians. Masinissa, who saw the terror of the enemies, easily increased their confusion, and deprived them on this point of the help of their cavalry. Nevertheless, some elephants, more intrepid than the others, swooped down on the Romans and caused great havoc among the velites, not without being themselves riddled with wounds:for the velites, falling back on the maniples, opened a passage for the elephants to n not be crushed by them, and when they saw, in the middle of the rows, these animals which lent the flank on both sides, they overwhelmed them with a hail of darts; at the same time the antesignani kept throwing their javelins at them. Chased at last from the Roman lines by these darts which rained down on them from all sides, these elephants threw themselves back like the others against the Carthaginian cavalry, on the right wing, and put it to rout. As soon as Laelius saw the enemies in disorder, he took advantage of their dread and increased their confusion.
Infantry combat
The Carthaginian army was deprived of its two-winged cavalry, when the two infantry set off; but already their forces and their hopes were no longer equal. Add to this a circumstance, very trivial in itself, but which had great importance in this affair; the cry of the Romans was more uniform and therefore richer, more terrible, while on the other side there were discordant sounds, it was a confused mixture of various idioms.
The Roman army stood firm and compact by its own mass as much as by the weight of its arms, with which it crushed the enemy. The Carthaginians fluttered about and displayed more agility than strength. Also, from the first shock, the Romans shook the enemy; they then pushed him with the help of the arms and the shield, and, advancing as he retreated, they thus gained ground without feeling almost any resistance. The last ranks pressed the first as soon as they noticed that the line was moving, and this maneuver gave them a great impetus.
On the side of the enemy, the second line, composed of Africans and Carthaginians, instead of supporting the folding auxiliaries, feared that the Romans, after having crushed the first ranks which resisted fiercely, would reach it, and let go. Then the auxiliaries abruptly turned their backs and threw themselves back towards their friends:some were able to take refuge in the ranks of the second line; the others, seeing themselves repulsed, massacred in revenge those who formerly had refused to help them and who now refused to receive them. It was therefore a double combat, so to speak, which the Carthaginians were sustaining, grappling at the same time with their enemies and with their auxiliaries. However, in the state of terror and exasperation in which they saw the latter, they did not open their ranks to them; they huddled against each other and threw them back to the wings and into the surrounding plain out of the fray, in order to prevent these foreigners in disorder and covered with wounds from going to bring trouble to a body of Carthaginian soldiers which was not yet started.
Besides, there was such a crowd of corpses and arms on the place which the auxiliaries had once occupied, that the Romans had, so to speak, more difficulty in clearing a passage there than they did. would have had enough to get through the serried ranks of the enemy. Also the hastats who were celebrating, pursuing the fugitives, each as best he could, through these heaps of corpses and arms and these pools of blood, confused their standards and their ranks. The same fluctuation was soon noticed also in the ranks of the principles, who saw the first line in disorder. When Scipio noticed this, he immediately ordered the hastats to beat a retreat, sent the wounded to the rearguard, and made the principles and triaries advance on the wings, to give more base and solidity to the corps. of the hastats, which thus formed the center. A new battle was therefore engaged; the Romans found themselves face to face with their real enemies; on both sides there were the same arms, the same experience, the same military glory, the same ambitious hopes, the same dangers to run; everything was equal. But the Romans had the advantage of numbers and courage; they had already routed the cavalry and the elephants; already winners of the first line, they came to fight the second.
Defeat of the Carthaginian army
Laelius and Masinissa, who had pursued the fleeing cavalry far enough, returned in time to attack behind the enemy line; this cavalry charge finally routed the Carthaginians. Some were surrounded and massacred before leaving their ranks; the others, who were fleeing scattered in the open plain around them, met the Roman cavalry which was scouring the whole country and cutting them to pieces. The Carthaginians and their allies left more than twenty thousand dead in the place; they lost about as many prisoners, one hundred and thirty ensigns and eleven elephants. The victors had to regret about two thousand men.
Hannibal escaped in the midst of the disorder with a small number of horsemen, and took refuge in Hadrumetum. During the combat as before the action, and until the moment when he left the field of battle, he had deployed all the resources of the military art; and, by the very admission of Scipio, as well as of the ablest men of war, we owe him this praise, he had that day disposed his army with rare talent. The elephants were in the front line, so that their unforeseen shock, their irresistible charge, prevented the Romans from following their standards and keeping their ranks, a tactic from which they expected everything. Then came the auxiliaries in front of the line of the Carthaginians, so that this collection of adventurers from all nations, whose faith had no other bond than interest, was not free to take flight. Hannibal had also calculated that by receiving the first shock from the Romans they would deaden their ardor and serve, in the absence of other service, to blunt the enemy's iron by their wounds. In reserve he had placed the corps on which rested all his hope, the Carthaginians and the Africans; he reckoned that all other things being equal, these soldiers coming to fight, still fresh, tired and wounded men, would necessarily have the advantage. As for the Italians, not knowing whether he should see them as allies or enemies, he had removed them from the main body of battle and relegated to the rearguard. After giving this last proof of his talents, Hannibal, who had taken refuge in Hadrumetum, returned to Carthage, where he had been summoned:it had been thirty-six years since he had left there as a child. Before the senate he declared that he admitted defeat not only in this battle, but also in the war, and that there was no hope of salvation except by obtaining peace.