After the capture and looting of Arachova, the forces of the so-called "Democratic Army of Greece" (DSE) then retreated towards Platanos in Nafpaktia. Immediately the 1st SS reinforced the small garrison there with a platoon of the 2nd Commando Squadron, a company of the 501st Infantry Battalion (TP) and a company of the 3rd National Guard Battalion (TE) under the then Major Ioannis Korkas, an experienced fighter of the 3rd Mountain "Rimini" Brigade.
At the same time, the administration ordered to prepare a deterrent artillery fire on the heights west of the village (Alonaki Heights, Psoriaris Heights). Also, an army and gendarmerie force was guarding the Evinos river bridge while it began to gather forces for immediate reaction if the DSE struck.
The goal of the administration was the stable defense in Platanos with the parallel movement of units from three directions with the aim not only of strengthening the defenders, but, if possible, of destroying the attackers. Thus, a troop of reduced composition (150 gendarmes) was ordered to move along the route Ano Chora-Podos-Agia Triada-Platanos, while an army troop (Captain Papadopoulos' Trilochy) was ordered to move from Thermo to the Alonaki hill.
Attack
On 17 January 1948 the expected attack broke out at 0600 in the morning. The DSE provided the "Western Continent headquarters" (headed by Charilaos Florakis - "Captain Yotis") a brigade of 3 battalions and a command company with a strength of 1000 fighters and the 3rd Gionas (Nikiphoros) battalion of the Fthiotida-Fokida headquarters with a strength of 130-150 fighters. The DSE suffocated the defenders in Platanos. The DSE attacked as follows:The Roumeliotis company with 10 groups attacked in the direction of the Psoriaris-Platanos hill with the objective of capturing the Alonaki-Psoriaris line and the capture of the two army outpost lines in the area. The 3rd Battalion of the Fthiotida-Fokida headquarters, reinforced with mortars and machine guns, attacked, with the strength of a reinforced platoon, north of Platanos with the aim of capturing outpost 15 and reinforcing the Roumeliotis company.
The rest of the battalion attacked to capture outposts 1 and 4, east of Platanos and the final goal was to infiltrate the village and capture the church and the building where the command of the guard was stationed. Another force was tasked with blocking the advance of army reinforcements from the direction of Thermos, while another section would cover other crossings from which reinforcements could arrive.
Immediately after the attack began the garrison informed the command and the advance of reinforcements began. But things did not develop pleasantly. The gendarmerie trolochia retreated, rather than advanced, without serious pressure from the enemy, while the army trolochia also failed miserably. Only one artillery unit managed to get ready to fire – 9 hours after the start of the attack – and open fire on the heights of Psiriari and Alonaki, but with limited results – only 2 guns what would they do?
The air force also intervened, but to a limited extent and without significant results – only 3 exits due to bad weather. So the night came with the garrison alone enduring the continuous attacks of the DSE, which stopped for a while, but at 21.00 in the evening they started again more fiercely. But Korka's power did not bend even now despite the fact that the forces to be reinforced were just criminally inactive! Finally, the furious attack of the DSE was repelled around 22.30 and a "heavy" silence prevailed around the village.
The night passed with sporadic fire and attempts by the DSE, but the garrison, encouraged by Major Korkas and Major Galiotou, endured exemplary. Before dawn on January 18th, the DSE attacked again but nothing succeeded except that its units suffered heavy losses.
In the meantime, due to the inactivity of the gendarmerie and Papadopoulos' troop, the administration sent a detachment of 630 Infantry Battalion to reinforce the defenders. This platoon, energetically commanded, managed to advance towards the village and join the garrison in the afternoon (at 19.00) of the 18th of January. Despite this, the DSE made a last attempt but again failed and so at 22.30 it stopped the attack and began to retreat.
Absolutely reprehensible was the behavior of Captain Papadopoulos, head of the army patrol, who, although reinforced with artillery and armored personnel carriers, did not move from his position. The bodies of 65 DSE fighters were found on the spot. The defenders had 12 dead and 24 missing.
The official report
According to the command's official report on the battle:"Despite the superiority of the enemy in numbers and infantry fire, the Platanos Guard managed to deal with the 48-hour attacks of the gangs mainly thanks to the skill and bravery of the D/Thou Korkas complex , Director of Litigation O.K. Thou Galiotou P. and the mental fortitude and heroism of the axians and soldiers of the group.
"If reinforcements were sent to the area, firstly 2 Trilochiai (one from Ano Chora and the other from Thermo) were not able to achieve their objectives and help the defenders in Platanon, on the one hand because the gangs had occupied strong points commanding bridges to prevent the arrival of reinforcements, on the other hand due to the inexperience of the D/to of these divisions and the lack of training of the soldiers in operations of this nature (forcible river crossing).
"In the same way, Trilochian, which moved from Thermo, was observed not to take advantage of this creation of a bridgehead from the night of the 17th - 18th, but withdrew the bridgehead for fear of being destroyed by the comrades. Strong bases of fire had not been organized even though the means were available. The Trilochia 6 T. Hor/kis did not notice any attempt to cross the Kotsalo river, it remained inactive for more than 24 hours, and finally turned back despite its mission and was diverted from Agios Triads to Paleopyrgon.
"...The Dilochia 630 T.P. under Tchis Ruphon, although it started from Symos at noon on the 18th, arrived at Platanon on the 19th, easily overturning the resistances, met, under these disadvantages of terrain and enemy resistances, and the two aforementioned trilogies. If the entire Battalion had moved, surely the night would have been active and no
"...The Army detachment and the Infantry Platoon on the Evinos Bridge left the eastern heights of the bridge without pressure, being confined to the western ones. Thus the existing bridgehead was abandoned without enemy pressure.
"The conduct of Trilochia Papadopoulou was mildly characterized by hesitation despite repeated orders and intercessions. This reluctance is due, firstly, to a lack of trust in the armed men who have not undergone full training and secondly to the incompetence of Captain Papadopoulos.
"...The conduct of Trilochia 6 AD was uncharacteristic, because I met resistance in Ag. Triada instead of attacking or bypassing the resistance, it gave up its attempt and went to Palaiopyrgon without receiving a relevant order".