Ancient history

battle of marathon

In the Battle of Marathon , an inferior force of Greek hoplites seized an opportunity to defeat their Persian foes, exploiting their superior armor and discipline to win one of the most famous tactical victories of the ancient world . However, this did not end the Persian threat against the independent Greek city-states.

Data of the Battle of Marathon

  • Who: Nearly 11,000 Athenian and La Plata hoplites, led on the day of the Battle of Marathon by the Athenian general Miltiades, faced a multi-ethnic Persian army numbering some 25,000 soldiers, under the command of the Persian Artaphemes and the Mede nobleman Dalis.
  • How: The Athenians weakened the center of their line and strengthened their wings, allowing the Persians to advance through the center, only to be defeated on the flanks and see their center surrounded by the victorious wings of the Greek army.
  • Where: The plain of Marathon, about 42 km from Athens.
  • When: August 12, 490 BC
  • Why: The Persians wanted to attack Athens to punish the city for its support for the rebellion of the Ionian Greek populations.
  • Result: The Persians were expelled from Greece for 10 years.

Background

Around 539 BC, the Persians, under Cyrus the Great They had conquered much of Anatolia, including the coastal Greek towns in Ionia. Initially, relations between the Persians and their Greek subjects were relatively cordial. During the following decades a series of tensions arose that soured that relationship . The Persians impeded Greek economic development with trade restrictions. In addition, the Persian autocrats imposed puppet tyrants on the Ionian city-states, which was against the ethos of the independent-minded Greeks. In 499 BC the Ionians eventually broke out in open revolt against the Persians. Their leader, Aristagoras of Miletus, looked to the mainland states of Greece for help.
His first attempt at alliance was with Sparta. The Spartans had the best army in Greece, and therefore were a good choice. Unfortunately. King Cleomenes did not understand that sending forces to fight for the distant Ionian Greeks was of any interest to the Spartans, so he declined to support the revolt. Aristagoras was better received in Athens. He delivered a speech before the Athenian assembly, in which he argued that the Persians were inferior to the Greeks in combat, and that the wealth of the great empire would provide much loot to the victors. The assembly debated the issue and decided to send aid to their Ionian cousins; a squadron of 20 warships. The Greek army stopped at Ephesus, where the troops landed. The army headed for the Persian capital, Sardis; the city was quickly taken and, at the approach of a Persian army, burned and razed. In a subsequent battle, the Greeks were defeated, and the Athenians decided to return home. The revolt continued until 495 BC, but the result was inevitable:the powerful and centralized Persian armed forces outnumbered the individualistic Greek states in fighting a protracted war.
Although the revolt had been successfully put down, the Persian king, Darius I, learned of the Athenians' involvement and was furious. A story by Herodotus tells that Darius ordered a slave to tell him Master, remember the Athenians three times before each dinner, so as not to forget to punish them for their interference. And so, in 492 BC, Darius sent an expedition under his son-in-law, Mardonius, to do so, but hostile Thracian tribes and bad weather off Mount Athos forced the forces to return home. /p>

The Campaign

Darius was not going to give up on his plans to punish the Athenians . Thus, the following year another expedition was prepared. This was going to cross the Aegean to punish the Athenians and the Eretrians, who had also supported the revolt, burning their cities and enslaving the populations. This force would be transported by sea, thus avoiding the problems that had beset Mardonius's expedition. The naval component of the expedition was composed of almost 600 ships. Perhaps 200 of them were warships that served as escorts for the fleet, while the other 400 were transports that would carry the soldiers and their supplies. Among the transports were a number of units specially designed for horses, which would carry the mounts of the Persian cavalry. The landing force numbered perhaps 25,000 armed men, including a small contingent of cavalry, perhaps 1,000 in all. This force was under the command of Darius's nephew, Artaphernes, and Datis, a nobleman of Median descent. Also present was Hippias, who had ruled Athens as a tyrant until he was ousted in 510 BC. The Persians understood the rebellious nature of politics in a Greek city-state, and no doubt saw the potential of using Hippias to raise a fifth column within Athens itself.
The Persian fleet put to sea from Tarsus and sailed west. The navy touched several islands along the way and reduced them by threats or by force. A major landing was made on the island of Euboea, to attack the city of Eretria, singled out by Darius, along with Athens, to be punished for their involvement in supporting the Ionian revolt. The people of Eretria were in a dilemma about what to do in the face of such a powerful force.
Some were inclined to try to defend the city, while others supported its abandonment and continued fighting from the nearby mountains. However, before a decision could be made, the city was handed over by a faction that had been bribed with Persian gold in exchange for opening the city gates. The temples of the city were burned in just punishment for the destruction of Sardis. From Euboea, the Persians went to Attica, where they landed on August 5 on the plain of Marathon, almost 42 km from Athens. The site was no doubt chosen in consultation with Hippias, as it offered everything the Persians needed, a long beach where ships could be beached, an ample water supply, access to Athens, and room to manoeuvre, especially for cavalry. if the Athenians decided to fight there.
When the Athenians learned of the landing of the Persians, they sent for help:the herald Pheidippides made a famous 225 km race to Sparta. Unfortunately, the Spartans could not send aid because of a religious festival, the Carneia, which would not allow them to march until August 12. With this news, the Athenians debated the measures to take. Some were in favor of preparing for a siege; though, given Hippias's presence and Eretria's betrayal, this seemed rather risky. Others argued that it was imperative to keep the Persians locked up in Marathon and not allow them to approach the city. In this group was General Milcíades. His opinion carried some weight, as he had had previous dealings with the Persians and had fought in the Ionian Revolt. As a consequence, the Athenian army of almost 10,000 hoplites, a heavily armed infantry, marched on Marathon. They were joined by a force of between 600 and 1,000 hoplites from the city of Plataea, a former ally of Athens.

Layouts

The Persians dragged their ships ashore along a narrow beach called Schoinia, behind which was a swampy expanse. Beyond the swamp was a town with a large expanse of open land that was near a spring; the Persians established their main camp there, because it would provide them with water and fodder. The Athenians and their Plataean allies camped at the southern end of the Marathon Plain, north of a small swamp, the Brexisa, between high ground and the sea. The Greeks protected their camp with fallen trees, provided with specially sharp branches.

The Battle of Marathon

The two armies stood face to face for perhaps four days. Both sides had good reason to wait. For the Athenians, each passing day brought Spartan help closer:with the Carneia ending on August 12, the Spartans could march to their aid, arriving perhaps on the 15th. , and the ability of the Persians to deploy and maneuver their cavalry there, it made no tactical sense for the Greeks to abandon the favorable ground near their fortified camp, which was situated between the sea and the hills. This would make the heavily armed hoplites, in their phalanx formation, a formidable force against the lighter-equipped Persians. For their part, the Persians also had reason to believe that time was on their side, at least initially. As had happened in Eretria, they expected help from within the city itself. In this case, they hoped that Hippias' supporters would betray the city to their favor, no doubt with the encouragement of Persian gold. The Persians were waiting for a signal, a highly polished bronze shield that would flash from Mount Pentele, signaling that all was ready.
Although the details of the plan are not known, it seems clear that the Persians would load the bulk of their troops onto ships and sail to Athens while the Athenian forces were still at Marathon. Furthermore, the Persians did not wish to assault the Athenians and Plataeans while they were in their strong positions at the southern end of the plain, because the terrain would nullify both their advantage in numbers and the mobility of their cavalry.
However, on the afternoon of August 11, the Persians were running out of time. They had received no signal from the Athenian fifth column with the shield, and the Spartan festivity would soon be over. This meant that the Athenians could expect Spartan reinforcements, and the presence of such tough, well-disciplined hoplites would dramatically transform the military balance on the plain of Marathon. As a consequence, the Persians began loading part of their forces onto transports so that they could set sail for Athens the following morning, while the rest of their forces kept watch on the Athenian and Plataean hoplites at Marathon. Even without the shield signal, the Persians could expect help from within the city if the army was absent.
This force was to be under the command of Datis and appears to have included most of the cavalry, which would be very useful in rushing towards Athens once the detachment landed at Faliro Bay. Artaphemes would remain at Marathon and maintain a tight blockade of the Athenian camp. He probably had about 15,000 men with him, almost exclusively infantry. Fortunately for the Athenians, they were tipped off to the Persian plan by some sympathetic Ionians who were serving the Persians. They sent the famous message the cavalry has departed , which galvanized the Athenian commanders' resolve to put up a fight. In fact, the 10 Athenian strategists, generals chosen from each of the 10 tribal divisions of Athens, were deadlocked as to whether or not they should stay and fight, return to Athens (they were also mindful of possible betrayal from within the city). ) or present battle, the option preferred by Miltiades.

Fortunately, Archon Polemarchus (a ceremonial post whose incumbent could cast a casting vote in a blockade situation like this) backed staying in Marathon and advancing against the Persians. The decision was made to launch an attack at dawn. If they could quickly and decisively defeat Artaphernes's soldiers, it would be possible to undertake a forced march along the coastal causeway to Athens and arrive before the Persian assault force.
The next morning he watched the opposing forces arrayed for the Battle of Marathon. Miltiades, who knew Persian tactics, was in command that day, and he deployed the Greek forces. He knew that the Persians would probably put their best troops in the center of their battle line, and that the number of Persians would make it likely that, if he had his phalanx eight deep along the entire front, the Greeks would win. were flanked. To avoid this he thinned out the center of his line, knowing that the Persians would have success there initially.
However, Miltiades also knew that the wings of the Persian formation would be made up of less enthusiastic and less well-armed levies, and that the heavily armed wings of the Greek army would be victorious. He ordered, therefore, that the wings not pursue the defeated levies but, once they had dispersed them, turn inward on the Persian center. The right wing was under the command of the Archon Polemarchus, Callimachus, and the left was made up of the Platenses.
Artaphernes deployed his troops as Miltiades expected. His best troop, Iranian regular army soldiers and tough sakas mercenaries , formed the center of his formation, with various levies, including unenthusiastic Ionian Greeks, on the flanks. In order to maintain his tight blockade of the Athenian camp, he advanced as far as eight stades, or 1.6 km. of the Greek positions.
The Greeks advanced from their camp towards the Persian lines. Herodotus relates that they did so on the run, in order to reduce the considerable number of arrows that would be fired by the Persians, many of whom carried bows. This is unlikely, because running more than a kilometer in the heavy armor of a hoplite would have been almost impossible and unnecessary; the Athenians probably broke into a short trot at about 150 m, the range of a Persian bow. The battle lines began the fight and the Persians took the best part of it in the center, where their best soldiers were, and the Athenians were repulsed. On the wings, on the other hand, the cams were crushed. Following their orders, the victorious Greeks turned towards the Persian center, catching it in a double envelope. A massacre followed, with 6,400 Persian casualties, mostly Iranian and Saka soldiers, and only 192 Athenians, including Cylimachus. and a handful of dead people from La Plata. The Greeks also captured seven Persian ships, though the rest escaped.

Consequences

The Athenians, however, could not rest after their victory. While a tribal division occupied the field, the rest made a forced march back to Athens. They arrived in time to prevent the landing of the Persians and so Datis, who was then joined by the survivors of Artaphernes, was forced to return home. Although the Athenians and the Plataeans had won a great victory, they had not really won the war.
The Persians returned home, where almost immediately they began preparations for another campaign; Although it would take 10 years, the Persians would return en masse with the intention of conquering all of Greece, not just punishing the Athenians.


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