Testimony of Sossidis – Acheson Plan:The USA gave us Cyprus but we...

"In "To Vima tis Kyriaki" (13.01.2002) an article was published under the title "The Acheson and Rhodes Plan", which is full of inaccuracies and claims that could only be characterized as figments of a morbid imagination. The columnist, among other things, argues that the then Prime Minister George Papandreou "hastened to accept the Accession Plan without thoroughly studying it and realizing the risks, accompanying the rejection with a new epigram of the crown, that they give you an apartment building and ask you to they rent out the penthouse or an apartment and you refuse to accept the donation", says the ambassador in 2002, just three years before his death, in a letter. Ioannis Sossidis, one of the protagonists of the negotiations with the USA for the plan in question.

"Regardless of the style of the columnist, the then Prime Minister (Georgios Papandreou) had neither accepted the Acheson Plan "without carefully studying it and realizing the risks", nor had he ever thought about the territorial mutilation of Greece and in particular "the concession of two or three, smaller than Rhodes, islands, including Kastelorizos", as the columnist claims casually, if nothing else. Because many "irresponsible" have from time to time formulated and persist in formulating various inaccuracies regarding the then Geneva negotiations and for the fuller information of the readers of "The Step", I quote below the exact text of Dean Acheson's only and definitive proposals, as they were transmitted to the late George A. Papandreou, by message from the President of the USA L. Johnson, delivered by the then ambassador to Athens H. Labouisse, on 20.08.1964, in the presence of two employees of the American Embassy, ​​Counselor N. Anschutz and Secretary D Brewster, and S. Kostopoulos, A. Papandreou and the undersigned, from the Greek side.

"So your readers will also be able to judge whether the actions of the then Prime Minister and his Government were careless and whether those who rejected the Atcheson proposals, without even reading them, and today's late critics of G. Papandreou, with 38% of Cypriot territory under Turkish occupation and with 200,000 Greek-Cypriot refugees, they were bona fide and selfless:

"At Geneva, on the 20th day of August 1964

A P O R R H T O N

Dear Mr. Prime Minister,

"Allow me to begin this letter by expressing my deep satisfaction for the help you have given to our work, here in Geneva, with your unceasing attention and thought, and by allowing Mr. I. Sossidin to join our efforts. Today, the President informed me of the urgency which he believes has been given to our work by the imminent Soviet involvement in the Cyprus problem, after which he asked me to let you know our common point of view, in which little time remains, within the with which it would be possible to reach an agreement, and to make you a communicant of my views, which he has adopted, about the general nature of the agreement, which happens, in my opinion, to be feasible and just.

"I know from our conversations after Mr. Sossidis that you were impressed, as were we, here, by the danger, which was intensified by the Russian movements, that Cyprus would come under communist influence and by the extensive consequences that would follow this fact on the political and strategic situation in the Eastern Mediterranean. I am sure that they agree that the risk creates for Turkey and for Greece a common interest, far exceeding the exact lines on a map that will be drawn to reach an agreement. The problems that are raised, by each side, are political, and I deal with them from that point of view.

"I am ready to exert the greatest possible pressure and persuasion in order to achieve that the Turks renounce all demands for a territorial area under their sovereignty in Cyprus, in order to reduce the extent of their demands for a military base in the Peninsula of Karpasia, as well as for the determination of the rights of minorities, based on the lines we discussed after Mr. Sossidis and which I can formulate in a Plan, which will be ready tomorrow.

"I will especially urge the Turks to limit their design to a lease for 50 years of that part of the Karpasia Peninsula which is defined from its most south-eastern extremity to a line drawn north and south, just west of the COMI KEBIS. I am convinced, after the study of the situation in which I proceeded, assisted by Military advisers, that the existence of such a base is absolutely justified, from a military point of view, for the defense of the approaches to the Turkish interior and for the defense of this base from a surprise attack.

"It is possible that the proposed drawing of the western line of this area will create a political problem for you at this time. This problem could be avoided if the line remained undrawn, with the prospect of it being determined, after study, from a military point of view, under the Supreme Allied Commander for Europe and on the condition that the Greek Government would give the assurance of that in case of drawing the line as above it would be accepted. I will have to be notified of the intention of the Greek Government to accept such an arrangement, so that it is not required, at present, to undertake an immediate obligation towards the Turkish Government.

"This assurance would allow me to do everything possible, and I believe that they would succeed, to reach an Agreement after the Turkish Government, as it did not intervene to prevent or to demand an intergovernmental agreement before the realization of the Union of Cyprus after Greece. In the absence of the above, the Turks would, of course, believe that their contractual rights are annihilated, almost in contempt, and that they themselves do not face the possibility of either an unconditional Union or the unconditional independence of a Cyprus under Communist rule.

"What I propose will cause serious difficulties for the leaders of both Greece and Turkey, as well as for the people they lead. However, I am convinced that in view of the impending common danger, every Nation will be united to support solutions which aim, beyond momentary antagonisms, at the fundamental security and well-being of the great States of Greece and Turkey, and at their support, in the external, on behalf of the great Alliance of Free States, from all interference in the realization of them. Allow me, dear Prime Minister, to request the speedy return of Mr. Sossidis to Geneva, in order to help us achieve this solution.

Sincerely yours
DEAN ACHESON”

Besides, it should be noted:

Archbishop Makarios had graciously accepted the Zurich and London Agreements, by which the Union of Cyprus after Greece had been completely excluded, a Turkish military force had been installed on the island, a regime of co-administration between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots had been established (with a Turkish Cypriot Vice-President ) and had been granted two important and extensive sovereign British military bases and military facilities in various other parts of Cyprus.

Due to the unfortunate initiative of Archbishop Makarios on 03.12.1963, which took place without the knowledge of the Greek Government and at the behest of the British High Commissioner, a "de facto" situation of partition of Cyprus had been created, and since then a Turkish invasion was threatened, which was prevented, repeatedly , only thanks to the defensive shielding of Cyprus under Greece, and

According to the resolution of the UN Security Council, of March 4, 1964, the solution of the Cyprus problem should be the subject of negotiations between the interested parties. The Powers that had signed the Zurich and London Agreements were understood as interested parties. The Geneva dialogue began in 1964, indirectly through the United Nations mediator Tuomioya and then through the former US Secretary of State Dean Acheson, following a warm recommendation by the UN Secretary General to Prime Minister George A. Papandreou in a meeting between the two, in New York, where the signatory was the only third party present.

Besides, the Acheson proposals also provided for the following:

* Regime for the Turkish Cypriots similar to the regime of the Muslims of Western Thrace , by which the obligation of appointing, on the proposal of the Greek Commander-in-Chief of the Island, a Turkish Cypriot Councilor, for the issues of the minority, as well as two Turkish Cypriot Districts, would be undertaken under the Greek Government, in two of the seven up to then five provinces of Cyprus, by rotation and of each choice regardless of the population composition of the Greek Government.

* Repatriation of expatriates who left or were expelled from Constantinople, since 1955, as well as the regulation of various issues related to the return of their property, compensation, etc. , and

* Restoration of the previous special status of the islands of Imbros and Tenedos.

On August 21, 1964, the writer returned to Geneva and, in accordance with the instructions of the Prime Minister, announced, together with the blessed D. Nikolareiz, to the American mediator the acceptance by the Greek Government of his proposals, and voluntarily requested the following improvements, which Dean Acheson accepted:

* The demarcation line of the base that would be granted to Turkey to be moved 20 thousand to the east, and

* The Monastery of the patron saint of Cyprus, Agios Andreas, at the end of the Karpasia peninsula, and the surrounding area of ​​20-25 square meters. thousand., as well as the road connecting the Monastery with the rest of the island, to remain outside the base, under Greek Administration.

Nevertheless, in the afternoon of the same day, I received a phone call from G. Papandreou, who instructed me to meet with Dean Acheson and to inform him of his inability to accept his proposals, due to Makarios' refusal to accept them. accept.

When I asked him to clarify what had intervened and changed his mind, the Prime Minister replied:"Get Petros (Garofalia) to tell you." And the Minister of Defense added that "acceptance of the proposals would lead to bloodshed in Cyprus". This telephone communication was attended by, apart from Blessed D. Nikolareizis, today's Ambassadors E.T. Vassilikos and Petropoulos, then serving in the Permanent Representation in Geneva. After that, we went with D. Nikolareiz to Acheson's apartment, at the "Richmond" hotel, and we informed him of the inability of the Greek Government to accept his proposals.

On my return, on 24.08.1964, in Athens, I fully informed the Prime Minister about the Geneva negotiations and after a day I submitted to him a multi-page memorandum about everything that had happened, as well as some of my personal thoughts about what should be done in the future. This memorandum, also submitted to the then Minister of Foreign Affairs S. Kostopoulos, is in the Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

After about a week, the late Prime Minister gave me the order to go to a meeting with the then Leader of the Opposition P. Kanellopoulos and to inform him fully about the latest developments in Cyprus, which I did, visit the blessed P. Kanellopoulos on the same day and for two hours, in the house that he used as an office, in the garden of the residence of the nephew of D. Livanos, in Kifissia.

Immediately after this and with the agreement of P. Kanellopoulos, G. Papandreou sent a message to President Johnson, essentially accepting Dean Acheson's proposals, with a few minor variations. Unfortunately, President Johnson's response was not encouraging, as he accepted to repeat the mediation between Turkey and Greece, but indicated the transfer of sovereignty of the base to the Turks instead of leasing it for 50 years. I keep a copy of the American President's reply in my Archive. Then, on 04.09.1964, Prime Minister G. Papandreou sent a letter of thanks to N. Acheson and thus the mediation ended and the unifying solution of the Cyprus issue was thwarted.

The Finnish mediator of the United Nations Tuomioja declared to the members of the Greek Delegation in Geneva "that Archbishop Makarios thwarted the Union of Cyprus with Greece". After some time, during his visit to Athens, Makarios visited Prime Minister G. Papandreou at the Politburo. Present were the then Vice-President of the Government S. Stephanopoulos, the Minister of Foreign Affairs S. Kostopoulos, the Cypriot Minister of Foreign Affairs S. Kyprianou, the son of the Prime Minister Andreas G. Papandreou and the writer.

During the discussion that followed, the Prime Minister and the Vice-President S. Stephanopoulos scolded the Archbishop, because while according to the Zurich and London Agreements, by which the Union was excluded, he had accepted the establishment of Turkish co-dominion in Cyprus and the granting of two sovereign British bases, and while in November 1963, through his proposals, which included, as is known, 13 points, dictated by the then British High Commissioner in Cyprus, for "improvement " of the antithetical Cypriot Constitution, had provoked a new international crisis, in order for the Union of Megalonisos with Greece, no one, even a relatively painless concession, would be accepted, demanding sacrifice only on behalf of the Greek leadership and the Greeks of Constantinople.

In response, Makarios stated that he only knew about the Acheson plan what he had read in the press last July (it was about the Turkish proposals that had been sent through Acheson in Athens) and he had never received knowledge of its exact content. The scribe then, summoned by the surprised G. Papandreou, explained to the Archbishop in detail the final proposals of N. Acheson of August 20, 1964. The Archbishop assured those present that he completely ignored these proposals, that he had never been informed of of those under the Greek Minister of Defence and that, therefore, it becomes evident that he never reacted, nor could he have reacted to them.