An issue that has occupied the various scholars of the eponymous battle of Marathon for centuries concerns the presence and action of the Persian cavalry in the battle of Marathon. Much has been said about this particular subject, from the fact that the Persians did not even have cavalry, until the Greeks were helped by some "secret" forces (group E and other phaedras). The first point of view is easily refuted because never in the history of wars did the Persians fight without cavalry. The theory also that wants the Greeks to be involved in Marathon only with the Persian rear guard, also does not seem to be correct.
As for theopinions concerning the mystical invocation of "secret" groups from the stars or from the arcades and holes of the ground, these are not only frivolous and completely unsubstantiated, but they are harmful, in the final analysis, since they attribute the Greek victory to something or someone other than the Marathoners themselves. And yet it is so simple. The only "secret" weapon of the ancient Greeks was common sense, which unfortunately tends to disappear nowadays. It is therefore at least disrespectful to his heroic memory to tarnish his proud victory with stupid and unfortunately silver-plated theories.
Cavalry was indeed the weapon of choice of the Persians. But the same is subject to certain limitations. Cavalry could not remain in battle positions indefinitely. The horses also needed daily grooming. At night also the horses had to be tied by the legs, so that they could not run away, even if they panicked. The Persians feared, rightly, that it was possible for a Greek to infiltrate their camp at night and frighten the horses, for example by lighting a fire near them.
Animals operate on the instinct of self-preservation. So if they were not well bound they would run away. On the other hand, however, the tying of the horses deprived the Persian horsemen of valuable time to prepare. A horseman anyway needed twice as much time to prepare before battle as a footman. This time they were now increasing. Under normal circumstances this event would not have catastrophic consequences. But what if the Greeks launched a surprise attack? Would the elite Persian horsemen have time to prepare and take part in the battle?
Fearing precisely this possibility, the Persians attempted to challenge the Greeks to battle. The Persians lined up at the most favorable point of the field for them and awaited the Greek attack. Of course the Greeks did not move. It would be very foolish of them to engage the enemy under conditions favorable to him. Instead, they decided to wait, keeping the initiative of the movements themselves.
The Persians, after waiting in vain for hours, finally broke their formations and returned to their camp. In the meantime, the first step Miltiades took, after the Greeks decided to attack, was to advance his positions closer to the Persians. The Greeks approached to a distance of about 1,500 m. – 8 stadia according to Herodotus – from the Persian outposts, carrying with them also wooden dams they had constructed. These they placed mainly on the flanks of their line, so as to be protected from Persian attempts to outflank. At the front the artillery phalanx was too strong to be broken, even by a cavalry charge.
The horses, thanks to the instinct of self-preservation, categorically refused to advance against the forest of lances of the phalanx. The favorite tactic of the Persians against the Greek phalanx was to attack it from the sides. But now that the flanks were covered by the wooden barriers the whole Persian design was overturned. In the best case scenario for them, the Persian horsemen would maneuver in front of the Greek formation, unleashing their javelins against it, but receiving the projectiles of the Greek psils. Despite his aggressive move to approach the enemy camp, Miltiades did not order the attack to be carried out. Deeply familiar with the Persian mentality, he tried to "put his opponents to sleep".
The Persian generals, seeing the Greeks not attacking, relaxed their precautions, as the days passed and the two opposing armies became accustomed to each other's presence. The Persians especially, who because of their until then invincibility by the Greeks, but also because of their great numerical superiority, which now became tangible, since they saw the small size of the Greek army, began to feel very confident about themselves, a fact that leads with mathematical precision to destruction, as many historical examples prove.
From their new positions the Greeks carefully observed the enemies. They watched their every move, their every habit. Based on their observations, the final battle plan was drawn up. Miltiades drew up the plan of action, which he presented to the other generals, who apparently accepted it. Miltiades knew that every army of the Great King, which included Persian and vassal divisions, fought with the Persians in the center and the vassals on the flanks. The Persians formed the hard core of the army and were prepared to fight to the death if necessary. On the contrary, the subject soldiers, and rightly so, did not show the same willingness to die for the glory of the Persian king.
Miltiades therefore studied in depth the plan of action of the small Greek army and concluded that it should be arrayed in a manner inversely analogous to the Persian one, that is, with strong horns and a relatively weak center. The small number of men at his disposal, in relation to the enemy, did not allow him to cover the entire length of the front except in its narrowest part. There the Greek army of 10,000 men could be deployed with 4,000 men per horn, arrayed to a depth of eight cubits (simple phalanx) and with 2,000 men in the center arrayed to a depth of only four cubits (half a phalanx).
Calculating a front per man of the order of 0.90 meters (based on the diameter of the hoplite shield), the total length of the Greek front would not exceed 1,400-1,500 meters, including the small gaps between the sub-units. The exact number of men Miltiades had is not known, although the difference is small (10,000 or 11,000 men). The Persians, on the other hand, could line up to 150,000 soldiers on the same length of front, lined up with a front of 1,500 men and a depth of up to 100 yoke (sparabara formation).
All scholars of the battle also agree that Miltiades was waiting for the "emptying" of the Moon to attack. The full moon had passed and between the setting of the Moon and the rising of the Sun there was a "dead" spot, with total darkness. Some Ionians took advantage of this darkness and defected to the same-sex Athenians, unseen by the Persians because of the darkness. The Ionians who were forcibly following the Persians, apparently as sailors, reported to Miltiades that the Persians had relaxed their security measures and withdrawn their cavalry behind the infantry positions, between the marshes and the Blessed Fountain.
The opportunity Miltiades was looking for had appeared! However, Herodotus does not mention the information about the Ionian automoles. But it is mentioned in the famous Lexicon of Souda (or Suida), which mentions that the Ionians reached the wooden fortifications and informed Miltiades that the Persian cavalry was unprepared. Then he, taking advantage of the opportunity, attacked the enemies and defeated them.
Greek attack
We do not know the exact date of the battle. Already from ancient times there were many conflicting opinions. Plutarch placed the battle on October 6, 490 BC. However, according to more recent calculations, three are considered the most likely dates for the battle, August 10, September 9 and October 8. However, we know that a Greek attack took place an hour before dawn, surprising the Persians and rendering their main weapon, the cavalry, useless. About 1,500 meters separated the two rivals. The Persians, upon hearing the Greek attack, hastened to take battle positions.
The horsemen and grooms were trying to prepare the horses and equip themselves. But he was behind the lines of the friendly infantry, and fatally, even when he prepared for battle, he was thrown behind it, in the second line, as a general reserve, since there was no room for him to be in the first line. At this point Herodotus mentions that the Greeks ran against the Persians to the point that the latter mistook them for madmen. Such a thing, however, would be rather unlikely to have happened. Carrying weapons weighing at least 30 kg, the Greek hoplites would not have been able to run to cover the 1,500 meters that separated them from the Persians and then fight them for at least three hours.
Besides, the Greek hoplites never performed the approach movements by running, because such a movement would cause fatigue in the men and, above all, it would disrupt the cohesion of the phalanx. The strength of the phalanx was precisely its cohesion. Besides, there was no reason for the Greeks to cover the entire distance running, since the effective range of the Persian bows reached about 200 meters. It was enough for them to run exactly those 200 meters, in which they were invulnerable to the Persian arrows and to fall with flourishing forces on the enemy line.
That's exactly what they did. A little after 05.30 in the morning, the Greek phalanx, after overcoming the Persian barrage of arrows without serious losses, rushed into the enemy formation and got involved in a fight from the cluster. Then there was the horrible clang of weapons as the shields clashed together and the spears took the floor. The Greeks immediately began to press the Persians on the two horns. They broke through the barrage of Persian shields and began slaughtering the Saka archers by the dozens. However, the number of battles was so great that the losses did not cause, at least immediately, the dissolution of their lines.
In the center, on the other hand, the thin Greek line, consisting of 2,000 Athenians, was pressed in turn and pushed back by the mass of elite Persians. It is worth noting that Themistocles was fighting in the center, as a simple soldier and the later savior of Greece. However, Miltiades' plan was developing normally.
The Greeks broke through the two wings, now killing the Sakas by hundreds. The short spears and akinakes (Persian swords) of the barbarians did not make the slightest impression on the well-armored and well-trained Greek hoplites. Gradually the pressure and losses paid off and the Sakas began to "break" their formations and leak, initially in small groups, towards the rear. Soon panic spread and the two horns of the Persian army were dispersed. At the same time in the center the 2,000 Athenians withstood the Persian pressure and although they were forced into a small retreat, they did not break. Thus they gave the necessary time to the two victorious Greek horns to converge towards the center and to outflank, initially, and to surround, by ¾, the Persians. A savage slaughter of the enemies followed.
Miltiades took care not to completely surround the Persians, leaving them an escape route to the ships. This move could be criticized by some. But she was completely justified. If he completely surrounded the Persians, the latter, having no other way out, would fight to the last. But the Greeks did not have much time at their disposal. They had to quickly destroy the Persian infantry before the cavalry could intervene. By thus leaving an escape route open, Miltiades achieved two things. First, he provoked the Persians to prefer flight from the fight to the end and secondly, he prevented their cavalry from engaging in battle. As mentioned the Persian cavalry as soon as they were ready, for lack of space, were placed in a second line behind the infantry.
The flight of the Sakas, however, who fled through his ranks, caused confusion and perhaps panic. Before the cavalry could regroup they found themselves facing a new wave of fugitives, Persians this time. Thus literally entangled among the panicked footmen, the horsemen could not do the slightest thing, not to fight, but not even to move. Fatefully, faced with the continued pressure of the Greeks, the men of Datis and Artaphernes panicked and made a general flight to their ships, trying to get into them and escape by sailing away.
But there the Greek land also intervened and avenged the insult done to it by the Persians by trampling on its soil. The Persians panicked and fell into the marshes. The feet of men and horses got stuck in the mud and met horrible deaths. Several others were falling into the sea and drowning. The Greeks meanwhile pursued the Persians. Knowing the terrain better, they made a short detour, avoided the marshes, and fell upon the enemy as they attempted to board their ships. Then the warlord Callimachus, head of the Greek right, fell. His death, however, did not stop the Greeks from their work.
Pursuing the Persians, the Greeks finally reached the ships. There new fierce skirmishes took place, as the Greeks tried to capture the enemy ships and the Persians to save their lives. Homeric scenes unfolded, with the Greeks rushing the enemy ships. In this phase Kinaigerus was killed , the brother of the tragic poet Aeschylus . In the end only 6 enemy ships were captured, the rest set sail and sailed south. The time was about 08.30. the glorious battle had only lasted three hours.
Marathon:The conflict despite the Persian ships.