Othon's dethronement (October 10, 1862) marked the beginning of a new chaotic situation for the country. The enthronement of the new King George, a year later, temporarily quelled the passions and brought relative normalcy. This was also helped by the concession to Greece of the Ionian Islands.
Regarding the army, however, the situation was still grim. The organization of 1833 , with its many amendments, was still in force and was not revised until 1876.
According to the organization, the Greek Army had to number 12,000 men. Instead it had fewer than 8,000. The annual draw did not exceed 2,500 men. The supply of the army with recruitment materials and with modern and adequate armaments was dire. Indicative was the fact that the artillery had only 20 battle-worthy field and mountain guns!
However, until 1866, when the Cretan revolution erupted, no one seriously engaged in the treatment of these problems. The need to reinforce the Cretan rebels with weapons and supplies and the fear of a Turkish attack against the metropolitan territory, forced the government of Alexandros Koumoundouros to purchase weapons and strengthen the army, which in 1867 reached 31,400 men.
Organizational experiments
Experimentation continued in the organizational field during this period as well. In the Infantry, the ten reserve battalions were abolished, all the companies of the other battalions were assimilated, and in December 1867, four euzone battalions of five companies (644 men per battalion) were formed.
The ten infantry battalions (the former line) had six companies each, with a total strength of 870 men per battalion. Until 1868 the infantry were still armed with front-loading rifled rifles. This year, however, the French Chassepot breech-loading rifles were given, on a trial basis, to some units.
1868 was also a year of reorganization of the cavalry. First of all, the lance disappeared from the armory of the cavalry and the Cavalry of the Acrobolists, as it was called, acquired a fifth ile. During this period the training of horsemen was intensified and emphasis was placed on acquiring the ability to fight on foot. The strength of the Engineer was also increased and in 1866 the first engineer battalion was formed, with the strength of four companies of pioneers.
Around then, the royal guard called Agima was formed. It consisted of two infantry companies and one cavalry company. At the same time, the Military Ministry was expanded, acquiring new departments while three headquarters were also established (both were abolished a few years later). In 1870, the Geodetic Detachment emerged from the Personnel Department of the Ministry, whose mission was to map the Greek area.
After all these changes the strength of the army stabilized at 16,500 men. Of these, 11,200 belonged to the Infantry, 517 to the Cavalry, 1,076 to the Artillery, 577 to the Engineers, 51 to the Music, 67 to the Sanitary, 79 to the Finance, 8 to the Religious and 2,200 to the Gendarmerie.
New weapons
In the field of hardware the developments were important after 1876. In that year 8,000 Mylona rifles and Arabids were purchased. This weapon, model 1872, of 11 mm. was the invention of the Greek Artillery Master Efstathios Mylonas. However, in 1877, with the outbreak of the new Russo-Turkish war, Gras rifles and arabesques and M.1874 revolvers were urgently purchased from France.
The Gras rifle was a long (1.3 m) breech-loading gun with a movable breech. It was fed one cartridge at a time, weighed 4.2 kg and had a caliber of 11 mm. For the time of "o gras", as the weapon was known in Greece, it was one of the best rifles in the world. It is no coincidence that he remained in service in the Greek Army until 1941!
A long bayonet about 45 centimeters long was fitted to the rifle. The cavalry and the Ewelpid School were provided with the corresponding arabida, 1,171 meters long and weighing 3,750 kilograms. The other units were equipped with the Gras artillery piece, 99 cm long and weighing 3.3 kg. The sabre-shaped bayonet of the Chassepot rifle, about 50 centimeters long, was adapted to this weapon. The M.1874 revolver had a weight of one kilogram, a caliber of 11.4 mm. and was fed with six cartridges.
The Artillery was supplied in 1866, with French 4- and 12-pounder muzzle-loading rifled guns. Shortly after, however, in 1877 it was equipped with the German breech-loading 75mm Krupp guns. The fortress artillery was equipped with 87 mm guns. Krupp guns had been tested with complete success in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71. They had almost double the range of the old front-loading guns and excellent shooting accuracy.
1877 was a pivotal year for the Greek Army. In addition to the renewal of armaments and equipment, an effort was made to improve the organizational framework of its operation. Of course, the whole effort was made after a holiday and under the pressure of events (outbreak of the Russo-Turkish War).
Large units - complexes - formations
In June 1877 it was decided to form brigade and division size formations for the first time. Two Infantry Divisions were formed, the Peloponnese Division and the Central Hellas Division. Each Division extended two infantry brigades.
The Sterea Division had the Athens and Messolonghi Brigades and the Peloponnese Division the Patras and Corfu Brigades. Each brigade had two infantry regiments (two battalions per regiment) and one infantry battalion. The number of companies per battalion was reduced to four. The large infantry units did not have organic detachments of the other arms and bodies.
The cavalry was reorganized into a regiment of the two divisions, but without increasing its strength. The artillery was reorganized into a regiment of three squadrons (one plain and two mountain) with four artillery companies per squadron. The Engineer Battalion also gained two other companies, one of telegraph operators and one of bridge-builders. Finally, two companies of nurses were formed. Based on the new organization, the Greek Army had 25,000 men.
However, the organizational changes did not stop. In 1878 the newly formed infantry divisions and brigades were disbanded and the battalions became independent again. However, the strength of the army, in view of the signing of the treaty of Agios Stefanos and the creation of the great Bulgaria, increased. In 1879 four more infantry battalions were formed.
In 1880, three infantry regiments were formed to which ten infantry battalions joined. Seven new infantry battalions and one Infantry Training Battalion were also formed. The following year the regiments were disbanded and the infantry organized into 31 infantry battalions, 9 euzon battalions, 13 field companies and 80 transport infantry ulamas. But after the integration of Thessaly, four infantry battalions and the field companies were disbanded.
In the same period, the cavalry was also strengthened, which now consisted of three cavalry divisions and one flat ilie. In 1882, a fourth equestrian order was established. In 1883, however, the cavalry divisions were dissolved and three cavalry regiments were established in their place, with four iles per regiment. In 1881 the Artillery Regiment was also disbanded and the Artillery Headquarters was reconstituted.
It included four independent artillery battalions, of four artillery pieces each, a fortress artillery battalion, four conjugals, two field artillery pieces, a company of firs, and the arsenal with the war materiel surveys. A short time later, an Artillery Inspection was also introduced.
The changes continued in the Engineers, which until 1887 had the 1st Engineer Regiment (three battalions), the Regimental School (the later Engineer School), seven local directorates, the Engineer Inspection, the independent Telegraph company and the Railway company.
Chaos
In this flurry of constant change and reorganization, it was doubtful whether there was time to train the staff and build a team spirit. Of course, the burden of responsibility falls on the then political leaders and their military advisors.
Without established discipline, without stable organization, in the midst of cosmogonic changes in the Balkans (creation of Serbian and Romanian states, violent occupation of eastern Romilia by the Bulgarians), the Greek Army, the main instrument for conducting dynamic foreign policy of the country, was not able to respond to his mission. As if this were not enough, thanks to the inadequacy of Greek diplomacy, the Greek Army reached the point of being ridiculed even more, when it undertook the "campaign" of Domokos (January 21, 1878).
Thessaly and Trikoupis
Under Major-General Skarlatos Soutsos, Greek divisions, with a strength of 25,400 men and 24 cannons, invaded Turkish-occupied Thessaly and advanced bloodlessly as far as Domokos. However, under the pressure of the Great Powers and the threat of war from the Turks, the Greek government ordered the army to withdraw from the Thessalian lands. Of course the rulers at the time did not take into account the blow to the morale of the army.
In 1880, after the signing of the Treaty of Berlin, which revised the scandalous, for Greek interests, the Treaty of Agios Stefanos, Greece won Thessaly and a small part of Epirus. However, the refusal of the Turks to cede these lands exacerbated the tension between the two areas. Greece declared conscription, mustering 83,000 men under arms.
The new government of Harilaos Trikoupis demanded from the Forces the implementation of the treaties, threatening, otherwise, to declare war on the Ottoman Empire. Throughout this time, a number of border incidents took place. Even entire Greek battalions crossed the border, without having a relevant order and were involved in real battles with the Turkish conquerors.
Turkey, which at that time was still reeling from its defeat in the Russo-Turkish War of 1878, finally yielded to the pressures of Greece and the Powers. The dynamic policy of Trikoupis had borne fruit.
Charilaos Trikoupis was the greatest political figure in Greece in the last quarter of the 19th century. From a very early age he understood what his predecessors, with the exception of Al. Koumunduro, they were not able to perceive, that is, the need to form a strong regular army, and its use as an instrument to satisfy national claims.
The revolutionary movements, without the support of regular army could not prevail. With this rationale, Trikoupis made every effort to strengthen the army and modernize its armament and tactics.
In 1882, a French military mission was called, under Major-General Vosser, which undertook to introduce the Greek officers to the rapid developments taking place in the art of war in Europe. At the same time, Civilian Shooting Schools were established in the capitals of the prefectures and the teaching of military exercises was established in the country's high schools. In this way, little Greece would elementary pre-train its reserves.
Unfortunately 120 years later the situation, in terms of retraining the reserve is much worse! Even reserve officers are now called every decade for refresher training... when they are called. Trikoupis also, with the ALP law of 1882, established compulsory military service for all Greeks. Unfortunately, this provision also tends to be abolished today. Another measure taken concerned the prohibition of serving officers from politics.
Populism – East Romilia crisis
However, Trikoupis' work was overturned by the outbreak of the Eastern Romilia crisis and his electoral defeat. The new government of Theodoros Diligiannis declared conscription. For eight months the army remained mobilized, without the government taking any action.
There wasn't even a business plan and the heads of the departments of Thessaly and Epirus were drawing up separate action plans! The pointless conscription destroyed the, anyway, not flourishing Greek national economy and had a serious impact on the morale of the army and the people.
In this climate, various parapolitical and paramilitary organizations, such as the "National Defense" and later the "National Company", were allowed to grow. The members of these organizations, military, political and intellectual, certainly had good intentions. However, their "romantic" perception of war became the cause of suffering for the Nation.
In the meantime, the continuous Cretan revolutions (1885, 1888-89) constantly fueled the tension in the relations between Greece and the Ottoman Empire. The crisis finally erupted with the explosion of the new Cretan revolution, in 1896.
The "black" 1897
In February 1897, the Greek government sent to Crete a mixed detachment of two infantry battalions, one engineer battalion, one artillery and one euzone company, under the command of colonel Timoleon Vassos. The small regular Greek forces, in cooperation with the Cretan rebels, managed to inflict serious blows on the enemy.
Despite Greece's substantial involvement, the Ottoman Empire did not immediately declare war on Greece. At the end of March 1897, however, the invasion of Macedonia by a body of 2,500 volunteers of the National Society, gave the Turks the occasion to declare, with the blessings of the Powers, war on Greece.
The Greek Army had been mobilized since February 15. In view of the war, the divisional formations were reconstituted. Three divisions were formed, two in Thessaly and one in Epirus. The divisions in Thessaly formed the Army of Thessaly, 40,000 strong and 96 cannon, under the command of the heir to the throne Constantine.
The 1st Infantry Division had five infantry regiments, four infantry battalions, two cavalry regiments, two artillery regiments, two engineer companies and services. The 2nd Infantry Division had four infantry regiments, three infantry battalions, two cavalry companies, only four artillery companies, one engineer company and the necessary support units. The 3rd Infantry Division, or the Continental Army, as it was called, was roughly the same composition as the 2nd. But it also had one cavalry company, four artillery companies and four engineer companies.
The reorganization of the army only a few days before the start of hostilities (divisions were formed on March 14) did not contribute much to the favorable development of operations. There was no plan of action and the high command seemed unable to impose its authority and to stop even the heads of formations, who refused to comply with its instructions-orders.
The plans that were finally drawn up provided for a defensive posture in Thessaly and an offensive posture in Epirus. But both the lack of coordination and discipline, at all levels, as well as the defective arrangement of the Greek Army on the border, combined with the non-existence of strategic reserves, led to the shameful defeat.
The Turkish Army of Macedonia, with seven infantry divisions, one cavalry division and 186 artillery pieces, under Etem Pasha, took advantage of the Greek weaknesses and forced the Greek forces to retreat. On the Epirus front, the 22,000 men of colonel Thrasyvoulos Manos, despite the initial successes, were finally defeated.
The army in any case fought bravely. The victory of the 3rd Infantry Brigade of colonel Constantinos Smolenskis in Velestino proved that the war of 1897, the "black '97", as it became known, could, if not be won, at least not lost. But it was lost, not by the men, but by the leadership, political and military. About 25 years later, in a similar way but with more tragic consequences, Hellenism would mourn the annihilation of the Ionian homeland.
In general, during the first 33 years of George I's reign, some important steps were taken to strengthen the army. There were good intentions from many. But few had the special responsibility to put them into practice.
The Greek Army, throughout this period, suffered, as it does today, from the same diseases that plagued the Greek society, of which, after all, it was a part. And then "incompetent", mostly incompetent, officers occupied the highest positions of the hierarchy. Until 1882, the highest and most senior officers, active, were executives of political formations and depended their military development on the predominance of their political friends, for which they sometimes fought even with weapons.
Η ενασχόληση των στελεχών και του στρατού γενικότερα με καθήκοντα έξω από τη δικαιοδοσία τους, που ήταν -και είναι – η προς πόλεμο προπαρασκευή και η εκτέλεση στρατιωτικών επιχειρήσεων, υπήρχε και τότε ως φαινόμενο, χωρίς τουλάχιστον να βαπτίζεται “κοινωνική προσφορά”.
Λίγοι πολιτικοί της εποχής κατανόησαν ότι ο στρατός υπήρχε για να προετοιμάζετε για επιχειρήσεις, σε καιρό ειρήνης και για να επιχειρεί σε καιρό πολέμου, όταν του το επιτρέπουν. Λίγοι κατανόησαν ότι ο στρατός δεν ήταν παρά ένα όργανο άσκησης εξωτερικής πολιτικής, εξαιρετικά πολύτιμο για να φθείρεται άσκοπα.