Thanks to the support of the Americans, Poland could revive bigger and stronger. But the pilgrimages of our prime ministers and ministers overseas were doomed to failure. Why?
Relations with the United States were of great importance for Poland from the beginning of World War II. Support from the world's greatest democracy and economic power would be a very desirable element for Warsaw, which was struggling with the Third Reich. Unfortunately, the USA did not feel very much supportive of distant and insignificant Poland.
On the third day of the war, on September 3, 1939, Poles could feel disappointed. President Franklin D. Roosevelt announced in one of his famous fireside talks that the United States would remain neutral. This meant that Warsaw could not count on political support and the supply of military equipment from overseas .
Benevolent neutrality
Washington only made small gestures. Soon after the conflict broke out, the president issued a statement condemning the barbaric way in which the Wehrmacht was conducting its warfare. He paid particular attention to the bombing of cities. He was prompted by the public opinion, keenly interested in the events in Poland.
However, after the defeat of the September campaign, Roosevelt invited President Ignacy Mościcki to the USA. He offered him - but only him - hospitality on American soil. As we know, Mościcki did not accept the invitation.
The President of the Republic of Poland, Ignacy Mościcki, was offered hospitality in the USA during the war.
Why did the US refuse its support? Roosevelt himself was an opponent of Hitlerism and wanted to actively fight it, but he was hampered by strong opposition. He had to take her into account. Jean Edward Smith, author of Roosevelt's biography entitled "FDR. Franklin Delano Roosevelt ” , argues that anti-war sentiments were very strong in American society. It was not wanted to join the conflict in Europe.
Although the Americans did not intend to become involved militarily, they supported occupied Poland in a different way - through charity. Former president Herbert Hoover undertook it energetically. In the third week of September 1939, he created an aid body called the Commission for Polish Relief (Comporel), and then prompted the Department of State to contribute as much as $ 50 million for his needs. Later that figure was added to an additional 30 million.
Suddenly, it turned out that American neutrality had some advantages. Comporel representatives went to the General Government. They acted there with the consent of the Germans and in agreement with the Polish Central Welfare Council. They started the action of donating food, medicines and clothes. American funds were used by thousands of Poles and Jews affected by the occupation.
According to Zbigniew L. Stańczyk from the American Hoover Institute, the commission delivered about 2.5 million tons of food in the first six months of the operation. This extremely valuable commission work in the General Government was unfortunately interrupted after the US entered the war.
Efforts of Polish diplomacy
The Prime Minister of the Polish government, General Władysław Sikorski, attempted to improve Poland's political position in Washington. In the spring of 1941, he went to the USA. During a meeting with President Roosevelt, he described to him the crimes committed by the Nazis in occupied Poland. He also presented his project of creating a confederation of Central and Eastern European countries led by Poland after the war.
Roosevelt was indeed moved by the reports of German crimes. However, he did not like the megalomaniac idea of a confederation at all. He considered it completely misplaced, and Sikorski decided to use it for his own political purposes. He encouraged him to… travel all over the States and make war talks. In this way the Polish prime minister was to fight on behalf of the US president for support for the war with Germany .
Both Foreign Minister Edward Raczyński (left) and Prime Minister Władysław Sikorski (right) did not achieve much during their meetings with the US President.
Polish politicians also tried to raise the issue of Poland's future borders with the American leader. Both General Sikorski and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Edward Raczyński, contacted him on this matter. During meetings with them, Roosevelt assured that he and the Prime Minister of Great Britain, Winston Churchill, were against any territorial changes during the war.
However, the president did not want to discuss the border issue in more detail. When General Sikorski presented his intentions to him in December 1942, he stubbornly insisted that it was not yet the time . He assured of great sympathy for Poland and attachment to the principles of the Atlantic Charter. Or maybe he did not like the ambitious plan to return Poland to the pre-war borders in the east and acquisitions at the expense of Germany in the west?
Russia is the most important
Neither Sikorski nor other Polish politicians realized that Poland, with several of its divisions, had to give way to another, more important for the United States, ally. It was, of course, the Soviet Union. After all, it was the Red Army who carried the main burden of the war and tied a large on the Eastern Front. German forces.
President Franklin Delano Roosevelt wanted the US to join the war against Hitler. Poland's interests, however, were of secondary importance to him.
Roosevelt saw in this a harbinger of a post-war order. He believed that it would be arranged by two powers:the USA and the USSR. Smaller countries, as the British historian Jonathan Fenby describes, could, in the president's opinion, only listen to and rely on the wise decisions of the superpowers. The assurances of support for Polish borders and independence were therefore just a blind eye. In fact, the American leader was helping Stalin by agreeing to surrender our country to his sphere of influence.
How much Washington's support for Poland was really worth, it turned out during the next Big Three conferences. As Jean Edward Smith writes in the book "FDR. Franklin Delano Roosevelt ” , in Tehran, Roosevelt had a private meeting with Stalin to discuss the Polish question. He then agreed to move Poland's western border as far as the Oder. He only refused his public support. He did not want to lose the votes of Americans of Polish origin in the upcoming elections if he decided to run for them.
A government friendly to Moscow
This is not the only example of US support for the Soviet position. According to Dr. Ewa Cytowska-Siegrist, a researcher of Polish-American relations during the Second World War, Roosevelt repeatedly blocked Polish efforts to explain the Katyn massacre. He also prevented information from being reported in the US about its true perpetrators.
During the Tehran conference, Roosevelt met privately with Stalin, inter alia, to discuss the issues of Polish borders.
Moreover, FDR supported Stalin's demand for a "Moscow-friendly government" to be established in Poland. He supported the idea of reconstructing the London government by introducing left-wing politicians into it. He persuaded Prime Minister Stanisław Mikołajczyk, who visited the USA in June 1944, seeking political support to do so. The American president strongly encouraged the Polish politician to come to an understanding with Stalin. After his departure, he extensively reported on the course of the talks to the USSR leaders.
With such American support for the plans of the USSR, it is not surprising that during the meeting of the Big Three in Yalta in February 1945, Stalin easily forced his plans towards Poland. It was all the easier for him because at this stage the Red Army had already occupied the whole country and was installing a pro-Soviet government in Warsaw.
The Western Allies knew they had little say in the matter. "A fundamental change of the situation would require much better bargaining cards than Roosevelt and Churchill actually had," commented Averell Harriman, US ambassador to Moscow. This is how the balance of power is described by Jean Edward Smith in the book "FDR. Franklin Delano Roosevelt ” :
Stalin wanted communist Poland for security reasons. "It was a matter of life or death." Roosevelt needed some assurances that would allow him to save face among Americans of Polish descent. The result was a declaration on a liberated Europe. It obliges to carry out the will elections in liberated countries and the formation of governments "broadly representing all democratic elements."
Nobody had any illusions that these were only superficial guarantees for Poland. Their illusory nature was pointed out by William D. Leahy, his chief of staff, in a conversation with Roosevelt:
Leahy complained to FDR that this formula was so flexible that "the Russians can stretch it from Yalta to Washington itself, technically without violating it." "I know, Bill - I know that," replied Roosevelt. "But it's the best thing I could do for Poland this time."
Truman changes front
Roosevelt's successor, Harry Truman, initially showed a more resolute stance towards Moscow on the Polish issue. He demanded, for example, the broad participation of London politicians in the new Polish government. He tried to obtain the release of at least a few people during the trial of sixteen. He also emphasized that he wanted a strong, democratic and independent Polish state .
During the Potsdam Conference, the US leader wanted to additionally weaken post-war Poland. All this to prevent the expansion of the Soviet sphere of influence in Europe.
He, too, finally gave in. American interests prevailed. The president sought the participation of the USSR in the war with Japan. Finally, on July 5, 1945, it recognized the Provisional Government of National Unity, withdrawing support from the London Government.
It was only during the Potsdam conference that Truman finally realized that Poland was in the Soviet sphere of influence. But he started not so much to defend it as to… further weaken . He questioned Poland's new western frontiers, claiming that an excessively truncated Germany would have trouble paying off post-war repairs. He was ready to leave the Regained Territories to Germany. He even denied the earlier arrangements made in Tehran and Yalta, under which our country was to receive compensation in the west and north for the Borderlands.
History would have been different
Could the Americans have done more for Poland during World War II? The answer to that question is yes. However, they would have to show greater political imagination and assertiveness in their relations with Moscow.
The post-war borders of Poland changed significantly. If Poland had more support from the US, could Poland keep the Borderlands?
The uncritical and blind support of the Soviet Union, which Roosevelt saw as the only real partner for the United States, made Poland and its interests unimportant. It is true that the USSR carried the main burden of the war on itself for years. However, as many historians emphasize, supporting Stalin at all costs was a political mistake that soon took revenge on the United States.
Enriched by the concessions of Roosevelt and Truman with half of Europe, Moscow became a very formidable enemy during the Cold War that was just beginning. If the Americans had decided to support Poland more strongly in 1939-1945, the war and post-war history of our country would have been completely different ...