Historical story

The truth about the Kiszczak group:they were one step away from taking control of "Solidarity"

The team that Czesław Kiszczak has built at the Ministry of Internal Affairs are the most effective Polish Chekists. They introduced martial law, persecuted the opposition and invigilated the Church. Their names flow from all the high-profile communist crime cases. It's high time to recall their biggest - though would-be - project.

The death of Stanisław Pyjas, the murder of Father Jerzy Popiełuszko, spying on John Paul II, and in the Third Republic of Poland, the murder of General Marek Papała. In each of these cases, there is information about Kiszczak's associates. Most of them have never been punished, while others have made careers in free Poland. Hardly anyone knows, however, that they almost took over "Solidarity" for the communists!

Jaruzelski's man takes over the SB

Czesław Kiszczak entered the building of the Ministry of the Interior as the man of General Jaruzelski. Previously, he was in charge of the Military Internal Service and had little in common with "civilians" (that is, officers subordinate to the ministry).

Popiełuszko, Pyjas, Papała ... Materials about each of these crimes contain information about Kiszczak's associates.

His predecessor, Mirosław Milewski, was promoted to the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party, where he was to supervise the security services - he spent his entire adult life as an officer of the UB and the SB. His contacts and knowledge could weaken Kiszczak's position. The latter, however, quickly selected associates who brought order to the SB in line with the generals' line.

The old folks support the new "broom"

Kiszczak adopted a strategy of tame the Esbek establishment. He did not bring in new people, but he reorganized the leadership of the office and cast old talents in new roles.

Bogusław Stachura became his deputy. Władysław Pożoga took up intelligence and counterintelligence. Władysław Ciastoń was assigned Department V - the fight against Solidarity and the Church. The management also included Józef Chomętowski, Zdzisław Sarewicz, Henryk Walczyński, Józef Sasin and Zenon Płatek. They all worked in the UB / SB for decades. Often from the lowest positions.

Why did they support Kiszczak? Did they want to avoid the purges that took place in almost all communist offices in the early 1980s? Probably they were aware of the defeat they suffered in the fight against Solidarity. They saw the army as the only savior that can overcome the rising "anti-socialist forces".

Security Retreat

Andrzej Friszke in his book "The Revolution of Solidarity" describes the presentation by Col. Walczyński, an alarmist report from October 1981.

According to the document , membership in "Solidarity" in the institutions of key importance to the dictatorship of the proletariat was as follows:education and upbringing up to 80%, universities up to 90%, culture and art over 70%.

The Polish Ministry of the Interior faced enormous challenges. And each of them had something to do with Solidarity ...

Actions threatening the system:personnel changes in the management of facilities, defamation of party activists, demands for changes in teaching history, withdrawing Russian studies, establishing illegal student organizations, breaking up state scouting, anti-socialist anniversary events, etc., were recorded in 23 provinces.

In practice, Walczyński admitted to a complete loss of influence on the education system controlled by "Solidarity". The communists were not disturbed by strikes or production cessation at the end of 1981. They were terrified of losing media influence . They also could not come to terms with the growing popularity of Kuroń's social democratic clubs, with the influence of the Confederation of Independent Poland and the growing sympathy for "Solidarity" among farmers.

Counterattack. What were the SSBBs planning?

In addition to the plan for the internment of opposition activists, which was then implemented, it was also planned to initiate censorship of domestic mailings and correspondence, control of telephone calls, blocking access to some diplomatic posts, and even seizing radio receivers . Andrzej Friszke writes:"the goal was clearly defined - total paralysis of society and suppression of all opposition organizations and institutions, restoring the total power of the PZPR."

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Approximately 46,000 reservists were also commissioned to serve. Scenarios of the development of accidents were prepared. The variant of the development of the situation, formulated at the turn of September and October 1981, said directly:"The assistance of the Warsaw Pact troops is not excluded". This sentence was underlined in the document contained in the Institute of National Remembrance.

Martial law and revenge

Of all the plans, the most spectacular was the one disclosed in the IPN Bulletin by Grzegorz Majchrzak. On December 13, as you know, NSZZ "Solidarność" was not dissolved. His activities were only suspended. The question arose:what's next with its structures? The answer has been in preparation for months.

Czesław Kiszczak in his prime. Without any sick leave on hand.

On the first Monday of the second week of martial law, the highest officials of the Ministry of the Interior could read in a secret report: "There is an absolute necessity to preserve the Solidarity trade union and, of course, to take steps to transform Solidarity into a trade union."

This meant nothing less than putting Solidarity under communist control. The authors of the report also warned:"You must never commit [...] those mistakes that were committed in the past in relation to various mass organizations and social movements" (Quotations after:Grzegorz Majchrzak, An attempt to create Neo-Solidarity ... ).

Jump on "Solidarity"

On December 23, Bogusław Stachura ordered the plan to be implemented. These activities were to be led by Józef Sasin. The preparations started in full swing at the end of 1982.

As Grzegorz Majchrzak writes, it was reported that 1147 "active members" were selected for the management positions of the "reborn" Solidarity, 182 of them were to take up positions in the management of the region and founding committees, and 965 in plant committees.

Martial law was just the beginning. Kiszczak's team planned to take over "Solidarity" for their own needs.

The initiative was continued this summer. But then the action stops. Why? Perhaps the communist decision-makers feared that the new "Solidarity" would get out of the control of the secret police. Or perhaps the successes in breaking up and surveillance of the opposition were so great that the plan seemed unnecessary anymore. It is also possible that the esbecomion did not manage to recruit someone from the top management of "Solidarity" who would "legitimize" the entire operation.

The truth will probably never see the light of day. People from Kiszczak's team will not tell everything about these events. It remains to be hoped that it will be discovered by historians analyzing the vast archives of the Institute of National Remembrance.

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