At the end of 1967 it seemed that the US was winning the war in Vietnam. The Tet Offensive in early 1968, however, began the steady decline of US assignments in Vietnam, despite an undeniable military victory.
Tet Offensive data
Who: The regular forces of the North Vietnamese Army supported by the Viet Cong (some 80,000 troops). They clashed with US forces in Vietnam, plus the South Vietnamese Army, a force of more than 1.5 million men.
How: The communists launch a major offensive throughout South Vietnam, targeting urban areas and military bases.
Where: The Tet Offensive was launched all across South Vietnam, from military bases along the demilitarized zone (DMZ) in the north to the Mekong Delta in the south.
When: From January 29 to April 8, 1968.
Why: The North Vietnamese hoped to occupy the urban centers of South Vietnam and provoke a popular uprising.
Result: A total military defeat for the North Vietnamese Army and the Viet Cong.
Background
From 1965 to late 1967, the main US strategy in Vietnam was "search and destroy" (S&D), a form of attrition warfare created by General William Westmoreland (1914-2005), head of the commando Military Assistance, Vietnam (MACV), and other top US officials. S&D tactics focused on racking up high casualty counts among North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and Viet Cong (VC) personnel, utilizing the huge US advantage in firepower and formations maneuver. The goal was to reach the "tipping point" where North Vietnam would be unable to continue the war, due to troop losses.
By the end of 1967, there was cause for optimism:NVA/VC casualties were appalling and, in the long run, seemed unsustainable. North of the demilitarized zone (DMZ), Ho Chi Minh (1890-1969) and his military commander, General Vo Nguyen Giap (b. 1911), also recognized this fact and decided on a radical change in strategy. Instead of continuing the slow and violent routine of revolutionary war, they would wager on an all-out offensive in the South.
What would become the Tet Offensive was not intended to defeat US forces or the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) in direct open battle, but to provoke an uncontrollable popular uprising within the South that would destroy ARVN capacity, force US capitulation, and lead to a regime change.
To maximize the North's chances of success, Giap decided to launch the offensive during the Vietnamese national Tet lunar new year holiday . This important cultural event, for which the Viet Cong had already announced a ceasefire between January 27 and February 3, would allow large numbers of ARVN soldiers to receive permits to visit their relatives, and there would be a general reduction of the state of alert of the defenses of the South. The Tet Offensive
it was aimed primarily at the large urban centers of South Vietnam, so preliminary NVA/VC operations were trying to lure US/ARVN forces into the countryside. On January 21, 1968, siege operations began against the northern US Marine Corps base at Khe Sanb and other actions around Dak To drove troops away from the cities. Although there was a general American suspicion that an offensive was in the making, the NVA/VC managed to infiltrate 84,000 men and thousands of tons of supplies throughout South Vietnam, ready by the time of the attack.
broadoffensive
When the Tet Offensive was launched on January 29/30, 1968 , consisted of dozens of simultaneous actions rather than a single campaign. Thirty-six of the 44 provincial capitals, five autonomous cities, 72 district capitals and 23 military bases were attacked with rocket, mortar and artillery fire, with follow-up assaults by regular NVA units at battalion or division level, or VC assault teams. Most psychologically worrying for the US government were the attacks on Saigon, carried out by a total of 35 enemy battalions. VC sappers blasted their way into the US embassy compound and engaged in a six-hour light-arms combat in the courtyard against US military police guards. The shootout was captured on camera, and although the VC attackers were ultimately killed (along with five US soldiers ), the resulting TV images profoundly upset the American public's faith in the invulnerability of their government.
Other high-value targets were hit elsewhere in Saigon. The MACV and ARVN headquarters buildings were attacked, as well as the presidential palace. Other targets included the US/South Vietnamese naval headquarters, the Korean and Philippine embassies, and the national radio station. During this latest operation, 15 VC managed to occupy the station, intending to broadcast revolutionary proclamations throughout South Vietnam while awaiting the arrival of a relief force. However, government engineers managed to cut the connection between the station and its transmitter, and the VC squad was eventually killed or killed when the relief force failed to reach them.
Saigon was just a center of attention for the NVA/VC during Tet. From the Mekong Delta to the northern military bases of Quang Tri and Lang Vei, US and ARVN forces fought desperate battles to prevent a North Vietnamese occupation. However, the advantage tilted inexorably in the opposite direction. ARVN and US forces managed to extinguish the vast majority of local attacks within three to four days. From its inept performances through the mid-1960s, the ARVN was emerging as a force with a new professionalism, its American training backed by a fervent desire to protect homes and districts. (Increasing evidence of NVA/VC atrocities in captured regions also inspired ARVN troops to fight to the death rather than be captured.) Furthermore, there was no sign of a popular revolt in support of the communists, which it brought down Tet props and was a bitter ideological shock to the communists.
In and around Saigon, US and ARVN forces massed 10 divisions of combat troops on February 4 and launched a general counteroffensive, Operation Tran Hung Do, to retake the city. Using close air support, artillery, and recoilless rifles, Allied troops blasted their way through the NVA/VC defenders with controversial excess firepower.
The Battle of Hue
As the flames of the Tet Offensive were doused in many parts of South Vietnam, in one city the battle would continue until February 25. North of Da Nang, the coastal city of Hue was one of the most exquisite cities in Vietnam. It was divided into two parts by the Perfume River, which separated the New Town to the south from the old walled Citadel to the north. The outer wall of the Citadel, 9 m high and 6 m thick, and reinforced with an inner brick wall, became irrelevant when 8,000 communist soldiers
they occupied the town (with the exception of the ARVN 1st Division headquarters) on 31 January, following heavy artillery bombardment. Hue's iconic beauty had kept the city from the effects of war until Tet, with the result that it was barely defended.
Consequently, it became the only city that was fully occupied by the communists during Tet.
At first, US forces around Hue responded unintelligently, sending only a handful of Marine platoons into the city. Most of them were repulsed by the NVA defense, which reached division level. Once the truth was known, US and ARVN forces began planning a powerful counteroffensive to retake the city. The allied forces divided the attack into two zones. US Marine units would retake the New Town, while ARVN forces would storm the Citadel . Once the Marines had cleared their tactical zone, they would cross the Perfume River to support the ARVN. In addition, the 3rd Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Division (airmobile), was airlifted 10 km west of the city on February 2 to intercept NVA logistics and reinforcements flowing between Laos and Hue.
Soldiers of the 1st Air Cavalry, later supported by troops from the 1st Airborne Division and by local ARVN units, managed to prevent three NVA regiments from reinforcing the communist troops.
As the fighting in Hue itself intensified, US and ARVN forces experienced a harrowing introduction to urban warfare, something that had been neglected in many post-WWII training programs. In Ciudad Nueva, the 1st Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment, 2nd Battalion, and 5th Marine Regiment managed to advance just four blocks in six days of heavy fighting. At first, the historical and architectural situation of the city spared it from heavy American bombardment. However, the high cost of house-to-house fighting soon changed this policy, and the destruction of Hue began. During the fighting in Hue, 52,000 US artillery rounds were dropped on the city, along with 7,670 heavy naval artillery rounds and 600 tons of airborne munitions. The consequences for the civilian population were dire, but on February 10 the New Town was fully occupied .
The Marines then crossed the Perfume River to the Citadel, where ARVN units had also been pushing the Communists back. Gradually the ARVN troops pushed the NVA/VC out of the northern parts of the Citadel. Finally, they recaptured the airfield and, on February 24, the imperial palace on the north bank of the Perfume River. Resistance to the Allied counter-offensive continued on the western fringes of the city and in the Gia Hoi district (where the communists had massacred hundreds of civilians in acts of "social engineering") throughout February, although on March 2 the entire the city
it was back in Allied hands. In terms of casualties, the cost of Hue had been 119 US soldiers, 363 ARVN troops, some 8,000 NVA regulars or VC insurgents, and some 6,000 civilians.
Aftermath
With Hue, the Tet offensive was practically closed. When the siege of Khe Sanh ended in early April, it was time to assess the damage. For the North, the Tet Offensive was a catastrophic failure. Not only had it lost some 54,000 soldiers (compared to 11,000 South Vietnamese and 2,000 American troops), but the Viet Cong was all but destroyed as a political and military entity. Furthermore, the absence of a popular uprising destabilized the North's faith that the South was waiting for the possibility of embracing communism.
The Tet Offensive was undoubtedly a military victory for the US; however, it was not reflected in this way in the Western media. The impression was given that the conflict was escalating dramatically, although politicians and commanders offered assurances that the North was on the verge of collapse. Subsequent military calls for increased troop numbers sounded alarm bells even among US politicians, and in 1969 policies of "Vietnamization" (transferring the conduct of the war to mainly South Vietnamese hands) and progressive US troop withdrawals became predominant.