After the capture of the Nasrid capital on January 2, 1492, Boabdil, the deposed sultan, came to hand over the keys of Granada to the Catholic Kings, Ferdinand of Aragon and Isabella of Castile. The episode, which marks the end of the Reconquista, is represented here by Francisco Pradilla. 1882. Palace of the Senate, Madrid • WIKIMEDIA COMMONS In March 1246, Ferdinand III of León and Castile signed a vassalage agreement with Muhammad I st ibn al-Ahmar, first sultan of the Nasrid dynasty. Two and a half centuries later, in January 1492, the Catholic Monarchs entered Granada. If the military imbalance between Castile and the Sultanate of Granada had long been flagrant, it was not until 1482 that Ferdinand II of Aragon and Isabella I re of Castile are ready to launch the military operations intended to eliminate the last Andalusian state; this conflict, which has been going on for ten years, has taken the name of war of Granada. During this war, the constitutive aspects of military action differed little from those which saw Christians and Muslims clash in previous centuries. Granada, the last bastion Granada was a steep, fortified and well-defended city, the annexation of which involved occupying strongholds. However, as in medieval warfare, defenders sheltering behind stone walls often enjoyed superior advantages over the forces deployed by the attackers. And even if the introduction of artillery modifies this pattern, the Catholic Monarchs still resort to the classic strategy in force for centuries:the war of attrition. They therefore undertook a systematic policy of incursions into Nasrid territory, cutting down trees and burning fields, destroying hamlets, capturing or killing populations, and seizing fortifications if possible. These incursions, called talas , consisted of cutting down trees to erect a rampart and could last one or two weeks. They concerned entire regions, and the booty was not the only objective, since it was a question of destroying the economic resources of the Grenadians, eroding their defense capacities, undermining the morale of the population and intensify internal discontent and dissent. These incursions were not insignificant:the great tala of Ferdinand the Catholic against the Vega de Granada, in 1483, lasts a week, mobilizes 60,000 men including knights, "workers" and woodcutters (recruited to cut down trees and destroy crops), and focuses on the territory between Íllora and Montefrío. These practices weakened the Nasrids, but did not lead to territorial annexations. Annexation of the Kingdom of Granada was only possible by conquering its fortresses and walled cities, which meant laying siege to it. Of course, a surprise attack could be successful and save time and resources, as at Alhama in 1482 and Zahara in 1483. But this type of attack, led by experts, was only possible against fortresses or fortified towns of reduced size, and not against the large Granada towns. Besiege or assault In this case, the Castilians exercised a siege according to the rules of the art, erecting the reales (“royal camps”) in order to isolate the besieged and defend their own troops from attacks by the latter or from attacks by armies coming to the aid of the besieged. The descriptions of the sieges of Málaga, in 1487, and Baza, in 1489, give a fairly precise idea of the sophistication of these encirclement techniques. Traditionally, the tactics and devices used during sieges – ingenious stone-throwing devices, wooden towers, ladders, or sapping and mining the ramparts – were ineffective, and assaults by live forces demanded a human cost that was difficult to accept. . It is for these reasons that the conquests of cities, fortified villages, even fortresses, were regulated by a blockade which lasted several months and where famine and the absence of outside aid played a decisive role. But, in the 15th th century, the introduction of a new kind of weapon, artillery associated with gunpowder, called into question the advantage of the defenders over their attackers. Previously, there had been battles on open ground between numerous armies:Salado (1340), Río Palmones (1344), Boca del Asna (1410) or Higueruela (1431). But during the Granada war, the Nasrids, aware of their military inferiority, did not take the risk of a confrontation of this kind, as had been the case in Baza in 1489 between the army of Ferdinand the Catholic, who besieged the city, and the troops come to help the Grenadines. Faced with the ruthless offensive of the Castilian armies, the Nasrids had no choice but to take refuge behind their ramparts and watch helplessly as their fields were destroyed, while resisting the siege with more or less fortune. . The elements that had previously worked in favor of the besieged strongholds – the powerful protection of stone walls, a steep relief, the help of an outside force, etc. – are annihilated by the artillery and the effective mobilization of the Castilians, who deploy thousands of men, including the sappers who open roads and set up camps, and by the impossibility of benefiting from aid from South Africa. North or the capital of the kingdom. In the 15th th century, the introduction of artillery associated with gunpowder called into question the advantage of the defenders over their attackers:the conquest of fortresses and fortified towns no longer required endless sieges. The Grenadines had little choice. They could defend themselves, sometimes to the end – as in Málaga, where the population was enslaved – and, on many occasions, negotiate an honorable surrender. They could also set ambushes for their attackers or, in the best of cases, attempt a rarely successful incursion across the border. The deployment of resources by the Catholic Monarchs during the war was unprecedented in the Iberian Peninsula, as evidenced by the number of troops recruited for a single campaign. In 1212, the army formed by the coalition of several Christian states had gathered 12,000 combatants at the Battle of Las Navas de Tolosa, and Ferdinand I st d'Aragon had tried to recruit some 28,000 men (knights, horsemen and "workers") at the beginning of the 15th th century against the sultanate. But the tala led by Ferdinand the Catholic in 1483 against the Vega de Granada brought together 10,000 men on horseback, 20,000 "workers" and 30,000 woodcutters. Behind this increase in numbers is a kingdom that has grown in size, population and wealth, and which has also seen an increase in its financial resources and administration. Resolve logistical issues Strengthened by this momentum, the Catholic Monarchs are therefore not forced to restructure in depth the troops in their service. In fact, the army that conquered the kingdom of Granada still had medieval characteristics. It is a temporary contingent, raised for a specific campaign and dissolved once it is completed. It is heterogeneous, because formed by militias provided by the nobles, the military orders, the episcopate and the cities, which at the time of federating united with troops directly dependent on the monarchs, such as the royal guard or the vassals of the king who received a salary in exchange for their military assistance. This contingent therefore lacked professional cadres and permanent management units, each militia having its own. It was also devoid of permanent logistical arrangements, allowing it to evolve or obtain supplies in the field for long periods. Thus, on the sidelines of the increase in the volume of the army, the great novelty is probably the creation in 1476 of the Santa Hermandad , the Holy Brotherhood. It is a permanent army of a territorial nature, located in the cities of Castile and León, paid for by a specific tax contribution, and which has up to 10,000 “workers” in certain campaigns. While the army assembled by the Catholic Monarchs is impressive in terms of its numbers, it nevertheless has two weaknesses:it is not permanent and has no professional management staff. The army also included a large number of heavily equipped knights, armed with long spears, swords, shields, helmets, chain mail, metal plates or armour, riding in bridle with long stirrup leathers and a high saddle tree, which gave them good stability on the mounts during confrontations with the enemy. But the war on the border was not based so much on a frontal clash between cavalry as on operations requiring more mobility:incursions, talas , ambushes... This is how light cavalry develops:the rider's equipment is lightened (javelin, leather protections), the latter rides the genet, that is to say with short stirrups, which gives him greater speed and flexibility adapted to the terrain and combat techniques of the Grenadines. It is also necessary to underline the non-negligible role of the peasants in charge of essential functions:loggers during the talas , fighters during sieges, sappers opening the way for armies and large pieces of artillery and setting up camps for the attackers. In addition to the tools essential to their tasks, they carried traditional weapons (spears and crossbows), then gradually portable firearms such as espingardes. A new body of experts in the handling of firearms, the gunners, was thus born. Imbalance of forces The resources of the sultanate were very inferior, and it is estimated that the cavalry of the whole kingdom (a light cavalry rising to the genet) was hardly to exceed the 7,000 combatants scattered over the whole territory, so that the sovereign could never count on all the horsemen for a precise offensive. The number of crossbowmen was higher, but they too were scattered throughout the cities, towns, and strongholds of the kingdom. And it seems that their firearms never had the power and efficiency of those used by the Castilians. The army led by the sultan included his personal guard (the "renegades", Christian captives converted to Islam), contingents recruited by the state (the regular army), volunteers fighting to carry out jihad, and manpower from various places who could be mobilized for certain campaigns. According to the Grenadian author Ibn Hudhayl, the army was well structured, at least in theory, with units of 5,000 men commanded by a general, divided into five corps of 1,000 men each, themselves subdivided into five groups of 200 men. These groups were divided into five sections of 40 men, each section being divided into five squadrons of eight combatants each. Grenada could also count on the significant support of tribes of North African Berbers, the guzat (or "volunteers of the faith"), who played a major military role, for example defending Málaga during the siege of 1487. The Grenadines were aware that the catastrophe was inevitable due to the imbalance of forces. During the six-month siege of Baza in 1489, troops from Granada led by Al-Zaghal (the penultimate king of Granada, dethroned by Boabdil) camped nearby at Guadix. But the Nasrid leader had not launched any major offensive against the Castilian royal camp. The defenders of the city, decimated by famine and fighting, convinced that only the assistance of this Nasrid army could save them from capitulation, asked Al-Zaghal for help. He answered them in terms of clear fatalism and resignation:his will to rescue them was as great as his power to do so was weak. The die was cast. Find out more History of Granada, by Sophie Makariou and Gabriel Martinez-Gros, Fayard, 2018.History of the Reconquista, by Philippe Conrad, Puf (Que sais-je?), 1998. Timeline 1481 On December 27, the attack on the population of Zahara by Nasrid troops marked the beginning of the war. The Christian armies retaliated by taking Alhama on February 28, 1482.1483 Sultan Boabdil – who disputes power with his father Muley Hacen and his uncle Al-Zaghal – is taken prisoner in Lucena, but Ferdinand II releases him after he becomes a vassal of the Catholic Monarchs.1487-1489 The Nasrids lost their two major ports:Málaga (1487), then Almería (1489). Guadix capitulates after the fall of Baza. Az-Zaghal, uncle and rival of Boabdil, controlled these last three cities.1492 The Catholic Monarchs demanded that their vassal Boabdil deliver the capital to them. But the people and religious circles of Granada oppose it, and the struggle continues until the surrender on January 2. A decisive novelty The use of artillery was a novelty of undeniable effectiveness during the Granada war. During the conflicts between Castile and Granada, the oldest mention relating to the use of "thunders" dates from the siege of Algeciras (1342-1344), but it seems that artillery was not used by besiegers before the Ferdinand's campaigns I er of Aragon (1407-1410). The effectiveness of artillery was then limited. But, 70 years later, during the Granada war, the use of more efficient firearms was decisive in campaigns such as that of 1486 against the Vega de Granada, leading to the conquest of fortified villages as important as Loja, Íllora , Moclín, Montefrio and Colomera. According to the chronicler Andrés Bernáldez, these villages are taken in barely a month "whereas in other times the smallest [of these villages] could last a year and could only fall by famine". Faith helps in war To justify the war, the Catholic Monarchs and the Nasrid sultans tried to mobilize their respective communities by resorting to religious and legal arguments. The former call on a set of recurring values since the IX e century, linked to the concepts of "just war" and "holy war". According to this discourse of reconquest, Christians have the right to recover the lands that Muslims have unjustly appropriated to the detriment of their ancestors:war is therefore as just as it is holy, since it is a question not only of reconstituting the lost homeland, but also to restore Christianity submitted by the Muslims. For their part, the leaders of Granada resort to the Koranic notion of jihad, "to make an effort in the way of God", which encourages the believer to fight to defend his faith and which, in the event of death, represents a way of personal salvation. and access to paradise. The Siege of Baza In June 1489, the siege of Baza began, the hardest and longest of the war. The city was protected on one side by the valley, and on the other by gardens cultivated on steep terraces. King Ferdinand sets up two royal camps on the two less well-defended flanks. Then he cut down the orchards to install the artillery and connected the two camps by a ditch filled with water and protected by a palisade with 15 towers. In the valley, he then connects the two camps by two parallel walls and spaced four steps apart to be able to resist the attacks of the besieged or of troops coming in reinforcement from outside. Baza is isolated and has no choice but to surrender at the end of the year.
