Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto (April 4, 1884 – April 18, 1943) was a prominent figure in World War II, commanding Japanese naval forces during the first part of the Pacific campaign. He organized and led the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor.
He is generally regarded as a brilliant strategist with a sharp vision (tactician of Pearl Harbor, he had very quickly understood the potential of the aircraft carriers and the submarines; he had also predicted that the Japanese superiority would last only six months at a time). year in the Pacific; the Battle of Midway, six months after Pearl Harbor was the turning point). His loyalty to the Empire was unwavering despite his clear perception of the tragic outcome that would be that of Japanese ambitions in the Pacific.
He died on April 18, 1943, when the bomber carrying him and his escort were attacked by an American squadron, warned of the trip after having cracked the Japanese transmission code.
Youth
Isoroku Sadayoshi was born in Nagaoka in Niigata Prefecture. His father, Takano Sadayoshi was a low-ranking samurai of Nagaoka Han. "Isoroku" is an old Japanese term meaning "56", which is the age of his father when Isoroku was born.
In 1916, Isoroku was adopted by the Yamamoto family and took his name. It was common for families without sons to adopt young boys to keep the name alive. In 1918, Isoroku married Reiko Misashi with whom he had four children:two daughters and two sons.
Beginning of career in the navy
Yamamoto joined the naval academy in Etajima (Hiroshima) in 1901 and graduated in 1904. In 1905, during the Russo-Japanese war, he participated in the battle of Tsushima as an ensign aboard the cruiser Nishin. On May 27, 1905, following a battery explosion, Yamamoto lost two fingers and received 120 metallic shrapnel1. After the war, he served for several years on board other ships. Between 1907 and 1908, he took courses at the Torpedo School.
In 1911, he enrolled for course B at the Naval Academy in Tsukij and then course A in 1916 in order to move up in rank. He then went to the United States, to Harvard University between 1919 and 1921. He worked as a farmer in Dartmouth, Massachusetts. He then served as second in command on the light cruiser Kitakami, accompanied the staff in Europe and America as an orderly officer of an admiral (1923-1924) then was attached to the air units in 1924 with a position as second in command at a naval air base.
Between 1925 and 1928, Yamamoto served as Naval Attaché for the Japanese Embassy in Washington. He obtained the command of the Japanese aircraft carrier Akagien 1928, followed by the command of the Technical Office of the Department of Naval Aeronautics (1930-1933) and finally, the rank of vice-admiral aboard the Akagien 1933. After a job diplomatically during the London conference on naval disarmament, he obtained the strategic position of head of the central service of naval aeronautics. He became Deputy Minister of the Navy in 1936, a post he held until his appointment as Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet. At the same time, he was in command of the Department of Naval Aeronautics (1938-1939).
At the dawn of the Second World War
Despite his affinity with the United States through his studies, his work related to diplomacy and the embassy in Washington, Yamamoto was inevitably involved, either directly or indirectly, in the preparation of the war against the United States. His actions, however, did not go in the direction desired by the most warmongering soldiers. His participation in the first London conference on naval disarmament in 1930 was a failure for the military. Japan did not achieve parity with the American fleet. Yamamoto consistently opposed the invasion of Manchuria in 1931 and the resulting war with China in 1937. He also disapproved of the agreements and alliance with Nazi Germany.
On December 12, 1937, the Japanese army bombarded the USS Panay off the coast of China. This provocation, the beginnings of an imminent war with the Americans and a symptom of dissension within the Japanese government itself, produced a tense conflict with the United States. Yamamoto personally apologized to Ambassador Joseph C. Grew. The thesis of the accident was officially upheld although an American court based in Shanghai provided irrefutable evidence of Japan's intentions.
Yamamoto was thus strongly questioned by the military who wanted his downfall. He was cautiously assigned to a position at sea instead of his duties in the Ministry of the Navy. On August 30, 1939, he was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet to minimize the risk of attacks against him. On November 15, 1940, he was promoted to Admiral. Yamamoto issued a warning to then Prime Minister Fumimaro Konoe, making it clear to him that he feared the outcome and consequences of the conflict for Japan after six months. The facts gave him partly right since a major defeat took place in June 1942 at Midway (a battle often considered by historians as a key point of the Pacific war), about 6 months after the attack on Pearl Harbor.
Contributions to technological and strategic advances
Yamamoto opposed the construction of the battleships Yamato and Musashi, which he considered unnecessary and expensive in terms of resources. He was criticized for this position which went against the grain. Yamamoto preferred to opt for a fleet made up of aircraft carriers. The reality of the war would later show that Yamamoto had correctly assessed the role of super-battleships:the two ships of this type were of little use in clashes with American ships and were destroyed by massive air raids.
Yamamoto was responsible for a number of innovations in naval aeronautics. Often associated with aircraft carriers because of Pearl Harbor and Midway, the admiral contributed significantly to the development of aviation operating from land bases, notably with the design of the “G3M” bombers in 1935, and “G4M” in 1939. His requests to improve the distance covered by the devices and the possibility of carrying a torpedo, were made with a view to harassing and destroying the enemy on the high seas to limit his progress, a strategy implemented by the Imperial Japanese Navy. . Engineers succeeded in developing high-performance bombers to the detriment of fighters, which could no longer escort them properly because of their insufficient range. The overload of fuel in the fighters made them less maneuverable and more vulnerable, to the point that they received the pejorative nickname of "flying lighter". As a result, the “G3M” and “G4M” forced the air force to find a suitable fighter for the escort. A solution was provided in 1939 with the A6M “Zero” fighter, a handy device that could withstand long distances, but whose flammability had unfortunate consequences during combat. Isoroku Yamamoto was to die aboard a Mitsubishi bomber in 1943.
As Japan gradually moved towards an inevitable conflict in 1940, Yamamoto will promote a few strategic options with varying degrees of success. Following the request of young officers like Genda Minoru, Yamamoto approved the reorganization of the assignment of Japanese aircraft carriers. The six largest were grouped into a single unit, the First Air Fleet. This restructuring increased the strike force of the Japanese with in return, an increased vulnerability since the ships constituted a concentrated target. Yamamoto did the same with the 11th Air Fleet, this time from land bases. The Fleet composed of “G3M” and “G4M” would neutralize the American air forces in the Philippines and a few days later the British “Z Force”.
In January 1941, Yamamoto continued his efforts and proposed a radical revision of Japanese naval strategy. For two decades, the naval staff had prepared a strategy based on successive attacks by light ships, submarines and units operating from land until the number of American ships was equal to the Japanese fleet. These operations were to be carried out during the advance of the American fleet in the Pacific before engaging in a final battle intended to annihilate the enemy diminished, in an area between the Ryukyu Islands in the west and the Mariana Islands in the west. is.
Inspired by techniques used in Europe, notably the attack on the Italian port of Taranto by the British in November 1940 and aware of the military and logistical advances of the United States, Yamamoto decided to upset this concept. He offered to strike hard early on with a major attack, followed by the climactic battle fought offensively rather than defensively. Yamamoto hoped, without absolute guarantees, that the Americans would be deeply demotivated by massive casualties early in the conflict and attempt to negotiate. Events were to contradict this vision. Yamamoto realized this, when diplomatic ties were severed by the Americans after Pearl Harbor, and the United States was clearly moving towards a conflict intended to avenge this surprise attack. This observation was summed up in a scene from the film Tora! Torah! Torah! where Yamamoto (played by Sô Yamamura) says, "I'm afraid we've awakened a sleeping giant." However, nothing has yet proven that he would have actually said this sentence. On the other hand, he did declare to members of the Japanese cabinet, in connection with a possible attack against the United States:“I can prance for six months… after that, I have no hope of success”.
The Navy General Staff reluctantly approved, and Yamamoto pressed on, threatening to quit if he didn't get what he wanted. Admiral Osami Nagano was convinced by Yamamoto's arguments. The 1st Air Fleet began preparations for the raid on Pearl Harbor, finding solutions to various technical problems such as launching torpedoes in shallow water.
Attack on Pearl Harbor
As Yamamoto had planned, the first air fleet, consisting of six aircraft carriers for a total of 400 aircraft, launched its attack on December 7, 1941. Two successive waves of 353 aircraft fell on Pearl Harbor in Hawaii. The attack was a complete success for the general staff since the objectives were to sink at least four battleships and prevent the American navy from countering the Japanese advance in the Pacific. American aircraft carriers were favored targets but were not given more prominence than battleships in the list of targets, contrary to what has been claimed by some observers.
In reality, five battleships were sunk, three others were damaged and 10 other ships (cruisers, destroyers among others) were sunk or seriously damaged. Yamamoto later complained about the lack of responsiveness of Vice-Admiral Nagumo, at the head of the 1st Air Fleet. According to Yamamoto, he should have sought out and destroyed the American ships that were absent from port, or at least bombarded the various depots and strategic centers on Oahu more intensely. Nagumo was content with the massive casualties that had already been inflicted. The Japanese lost 29 aircraft and expected the loss of two ships. Yamamoto did not sanction Nagumo because he had all in all acted according to plans and had had to face various problems (insufficient armament to attack certain objectives, lack of knowledge of the position of other ships at sea, insufficient visibility to launch a third wave, etc).
Politically, the attack was a disaster for Japan. The country attracted the immediate hatred of the United States because of the deceitful character of the operation and the numerous losses recorded. Public opinion awoke and galvanized the war as predicted by Yamamoto. ̣̼Having received the results of the attack he declared to his officers these words “Gentlemen we have awakened a sleeping giant who will have reason to fight”.[ref. necessary] Strategically, the raid was a success:it cut the momentum of American forces in the Pacific, but Yamamoto was unaware that American strategists had abandoned the idea of a naval operation across the Pacific to the Philippines. This vision had already been discussed in 1935 and then refined in 1937, the year in which the U.S Navy determined that it would take at least six months to raise a sufficient war fleet and that other logistical problems could lengthen this period (up to two years after the declaration of war). In 1940, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Harold Stark had set up the "Plan Dog" which was essentially defensive and focused on Nazi Germany. Yamamoto did not know that the orders given to Admiral Husband Kimmel were to keep the Japanese out of the eastern Pacific and Australia.
Period between December 1941 and May 1942
After neutralizing the Americans, the combined fleet led by Yamamoto carried out a series of operations in the Pacific and the Indian Ocean in order to annihilate the American, Australian, Dutch and British installations which were in the area bounded by Wake, the Australia and Ceylon. A few hours after the events of Pearl Harbor, the 11th Air Fleet attacked the 7th Fleet of the American Air Force based in the Philippines and the British "Force Z", in particular the battleship HMS Prince of Wales and the battlecruiser HMS Repulse.
Yamamoto's subordinates (Vice-Admirals Ozawa, Kondō and Takahashi) dealt with reducing the enemy forces through naval and submarine strikes, a phase which culminated on February 27, 1942 during the Battle of the Java Sea where Japanese ships defeated the Allies. With the occupation of the Dutch East Indies and the destruction of American resistance, Japan now had significant resources for its industry (oil and rubber).
After this success, Japan halted its advance to secure its positions. Yamamoto was involved in the preparation of the new military plans and showed more or less enthusiasm for the strategies envisaged. He tried to negotiate in order to find a compromise between wisdom and a possible expansion of the empire through the invasion of India, Australia and the capture of Hawaii. Japan did not have the necessary troops for these large-scale operations and preferred to concentrate on Burma and New Guinea. Yamamoto supported the idea of a "decisive battle" against the Americans in the central Pacific area, but the more cautious officers of the Imperial General Staff were reluctant. During these discussions, the raid on Tokyo changed the game by demonstrating the ability of the Americans to attack the archipelago with their air forces. This operation served the argument of Yamamoto who wanted to launch a surprise attack on Midway.
Japanese operations in the Coral Sea came up against a powerful American naval air force at the beginning of May. The respective losses of the light aircraft carrier Shoho and the large aircraft carrier USS Lexington can bring out a rather favorable tactical result for the Japanese. But the Americans seriously damaged the aircraft carrier Shokaku, and the Zuikaku suffered serious losses in pilots and aircraft. Failure to engage these ships during the Battle of Midway would be sorely felt.
Battle of Midway in June 1942
Yamamoto's plans for Midway were later considered by some to be overambitious and demonstrated the admiral's arrogance. Critics claimed that Yamamoto reacted too hastily to the Doolittle raid. But some historians rehabilitate Yamamoto's vision which was part of an intense fight against the American fleet in the Pacific. Yamamoto sought to move the US Navy away from the archipelago and annexed territories in order to strengthen the defenses. The Admiral knew that victory or negotiation could only be achieved with a fatal blow to the American forces.
Yamamoto's plan was to lure the Americans into a trap, and if possible the aircraft carriers, away from Pearl Harbor. The 5th Fleet (2 small aircraft carriers, 5 cruisers, 13 destroyers and 4 freighters) was to head for the Aleutian Islands, attack Dutch Harbor, Unalaska and invade the islands of Kiska and Attu.
The next day, the first mobile force (4 carriers, 2 battleships, 3 cruisers and 12 destroyers) was to attack Midway and annihilate the air forces. When the American air domination had been neutralized, the second fleet (an aircraft carrier, 2 battleships, 10 cruisers, 21 destroyers and 11 transport ships) was to land 5000 soldiers to seize the atoll and eliminate the Marines. The capture of Midway was to push the American carriers into a trap where the First Mobile Force would engage in combat to destroy it. Afterwards, the First Fleet (an aircraft carrier, 7 battleships, 3 cruisers and 13 destroyers), in conjunction with units of the Second Fleet, was tasked with eliminating resistance at sea and completing the destruction of the American fleet. in the Pacific.
Yamamoto had planned two security measures:an aerial reconnaissance beforehand (operation K) on Pearl Harbor and a group of submarines which were to monitor and detect the movements of American aircraft carriers in the direction of Midway. The plan was meticulously prepared and established with an obvious domination of the Japanese with 79 ships against 26 for the Americans. Only the forces in terms of submarines and aircraft were equivalent.
But Yamamoto had not planned a major secret event. The Americans were made aware of the Japanese plans through the hard work of their cryptanalysts. These had broken through the Japanese Navy's encryption methods so well that Admiral Chester Nimitz, the commander of the Pacific Fleet, was able to set up a devastating ambush and thwart Yamamoto's strategies. Nimitz sent a destroyer to block supply for Operation K. Yamamoto was forced to cancel this mission and could not find out if the Pacific Fleet was still at Pearl Harbor. Nimitzen also sent his carriers towards Midway, overtaking Yamamoto's submarine fleet which arrived too late. The American ships then lay in ambush, awaiting the first mobile force of the Japanese. The Aleutian feint was simply ignored, and several days before the planned attack, the Americans launched the assault on the four Japanese carriers, destroying them on June 4, 1942 while they were vulnerable.
With his air power reduced and his forces scattered, Yamamoto was unable to meet the American attack. Nimitz repositioned his forces, withdrawing them to the east rather than risk a night battle. Realizing he had lost, Yamamoto abandoned the invasion of Midway and ordered his ships to withdraw. This event marked the turning point of the Pacific War, a little more than 6 months after Pearl Harbor, a delay that had been mentioned earlier by Yamamoto. Subsequently, Yamamoto's plans were criticized, but outside the context at the time of the events:lack of concentration of forces, overly complex operation, underestimated ability to gather information and decipher the allies. However, without the input of cryptography experts from the US Army, the Midway operation could have had a considerable impact on what happened next.
After Midway
The General Staff was not immediately discouraged and considered launching similar attacks on Samoa and Fiji to cut the link between Australia and the United States. The purpose was to block General Douglas MacArthur in his quest for New Guinea. Admiral Ernest King wanted to end Guadalcanal Air Base and Japanese rule in the area. The fierce battle began in August 1942 and continued until February 1943.
Yamamoto remained in command, partly restrained by the idea that he should not demotivate the men of the Combined Fleet. However, he had lost face at Midway and the staff was not inclined to suffer further setbacks. Yamamoto thus lost some of the leeway he had requested to complete his operations.
Overwhelmed at Guadalcanal, scattered throughout Asia and the Pacific, the Japanese were forced to abandon strike plans similar to Midway. They concentrated on New Guinea and Guadalcanal, but a lack of coordination and logistics between naval and ground troops prevented the Japanese general staff from gaining the upper hand over the Americans.
Yamomoto decided to launch lightning operations with his combined fleet. But he suffered significant losses which he had great difficulty in compensating for. However, he launched three major attacks on the Solomon Islands and Santa Cruz between September and November. The losses inflicted were much more significant but never sufficient to destabilize the Americans. The victories of the allies began to seriously weaken the Japanese forces. The successive loss of several important ships and entire squadrons of bombers and torpedo boats hit hard the hopes of the Japanese general staff. In February 1943, the loss of Guadalcanal meant the impossibility of waging a victorious battle over the Solomon Islands. Yamamoto continued to engage in a few skirmishes but eventually decided to move air units from carriers to land bases. Some of these units were stationed at forward bases in the Solomon Islands.
Death of Yamamoto
To re-motivate his troops after the Guadalcanal debacle, Yamamoto decided to visit several bases in the South Pacific. On April 14, 1943, as part of the Magic program, American intelligence services intercepted and deciphered a message containing detailed information on the route that Yamamoto would take, the timetables and the device planned to transport and escort him. It was planned to fly Admiral de Rabaul to Ballale Airfield on an island near Bougainville in the Solomon Islands. The trip was to take place on the morning of April 18.
Admiral Nimitz consulted with William F. Halsey, Jr., commander in the South Pacific, and authorized, after approval by President Roosevelt on April 15, a special mission called Vengeance on April 17 to intercept Yamamoto's plane and to shoot it down in midair.
The 339th squadron of the 347th fighter group (13th Air Force) was assigned to this mission:only Lockheed P-38 Lightning were able to intercept an aircraft at such a long distance. The pilots were informed of the objectives, but certain details were omitted:they were to destroy the plane of a "high-ranking officer", but Yamamoto's name was not mentioned.
On the morning of April 18, despite warnings from his advisers who feared an ambush, Yamamoto took off as planned from Rabaul with an escort of 6 Zeros for a journey of about 500 kilometers. Shortly afterwards, of the 18 P-38s specially prepared for this mission with additional drop tanks, 16 took off from Guadalcanal (one punctured a tire on takeoff and crashed and a second had to turn back following problems with fuel supply) and flew about 700 kilometers in complete radio silence. At 09:34 (Tokyo time), the two groups of aircraft met and the fight began between the 16 P-38s and the six Japanese Zeros.
First Lieutenant Rex T. Barber chased the first of the two Japanese bombers, the T1-323 aircraft carrying Yamamoto. Barber fired until smoke billowed from the left engine. Barber moved aside to attack other devices. Yamamoto's plane crashed in the jungle.
The crash site and the Admiral's body were discovered the following day by a Japanese rescue party in the jungle north of Buin. Lieutenant Hamasuna was commanding the operation and reported the scene:Yamamoto had been ejected from the wreckage, his hand covered in a white glove clutching his samurai sword, upright in his seat under a tree. Hamasuna added that he immediately recognized Yamamoto, his head tilted down. An autopsy was carried out and showed that Yamamoto had received two bullets:one in the shoulder, the other having crossed his cheek and having emerged above his right eye. Despite the severity of the injuries, controversy erupted in Japan. It was unclear whether he survived his injuries or died instantly in midair.
A name was specially assigned to this incident which raised the morale of the American troops and which plunged Japan into disarray on May 21, 1943. The news was not given earlier in order to preserve the morale of the imperial army. To cover up cryptographic advances in Japanese encryption, American strategists invented a story that was aired in the media:civilian coast guards in the Solomon Islands had spotted Yamamoto boarding a bomber.
Admiral Yamamoto's ashes return to Japan at Kisarazu aboard the battleship Musashi on May 23, 1943
Captain Watanabe and the rest of Yamamoto's team cremated the Admiral's remains at Buin. His ashes were sent to Tokyo aboard the Musashi. The state funeral took place on June 3, 1943 and the title of Admiral of the Fleet was awarded to him posthumously, along with the Order of the Chrysanthemum. Yamamoto was also the only foreigner to receive Nazi Germany's highest honor (Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross with Oak Leaves and Swords). Part of his ashes were buried in the public cemetery of Tama in Tokyo, the rest is with his ancestors at the Chuko-Hi temple in Nagaoka.
In the film The Battle of Midway (1976), his role is played by Toshirō Mifune.