The English had prepared the stocks...

Soon, however, confidence returned and Saeki focused all his forces on the center and broke the English positions. The Leicesters and the 22nd Gurkhas held out, despite the gap between them, and Carpendale held out hope of repelling the Japanese. But General Kawamura, commanding the infantry of the 5th Division, had arrived to ram his troops and he ordered the 41st Regiment to move to the flank, east of the road, while the 11th Regiment prepared to attack. the west. Both units were fresh and eager to go into action.
On the other side, the 11th Indian Division looked increasingly tired and disorganized. Rumors swirled among the men, and at one point the transport column, believing that the enemy had broken through again, was seized with panic.
Murray-Lyon was now convinced that at unless he placed his division the next day behind an obstacle which protected it from the tanks, it would be destroyed. He therefore asked the 3rd Corps for permission to retreat. Percival refused, but eventually agreed. At 10 p.m., the order was given to the 11th Division to fall back from Jitra towards Alor Star, on the southern bank of the Kedah. This position was some 20 kilometers to the rear and the troops moved on in the pouring rain. Some units, wanting to avoid the road and the Japanese tanks, took across fields, abandoning vehicles and guns. After a severe clash with the rearguard, at 4:30 a.m., the Japanese ended up losing contact.
The events of Jitra, a real disaster, remain a painful memory for the British arms. According to the Japanese, Kawamura had engaged only 581 men in addition to the tank personnel, and he lost less than 50. English losses numbered in the thousands. The 15th Brigade left three-quarters of its forces there and the 28th more than 700 men. The losses in guns, equipment and supplies were disproportionate. As for morale, it had collapsed. On the Japanese side, on the contrary, it was getting higher and higher. The troops who, since the landing, lived
just biscuits, found tobacco, bread, tin cans. In addition to the vehicles, which Kawamura was delighted to seize, he also found the gasoline to run them and supplies of ammunition for the captured guns.
On November 10, Yamashita had written in his diary:"If Indian troops are added to the British forces in Malaya, we shouldn't have too much trouble. All the reports that reached him from his division commanders confirmed him in his opinion. “The Indians have no fighting spirit [...], they are happy to surrender [...], they are relieved to no longer be in the war. This was, among the Japanese, a real leitmotif.
The Japanese could not have known that the Indian units they had encountered up to that point were poorly trained, as disoriented as their officers and in nothing representative of the Indian Army. They would learn about it two years later.
Jitra, however, proved to be the turning point of the Malaysian campaign and its loss could only lead to disaster. From then on, there was no time to reinforce the positions, organize the defense of Johore and Singapore and to allow the new troops who landed to get used to the climate. The English and Indian troops no longer regained their balance. The further they retreated, the lower their morale. The soldiers were out of command and were beginning to notice. It is impossible to describe here the different episodes of the retreat. The same scenario repeated itself over and over again:when, for example, the Japanese threatened the flanks and rear of the 11th Division, the latter blew up the bridge it was holding and retreated. Japanese pontooners rushed to repair it and tanks and infantry resumed their advance. General Heath urged Murray-Lyon to regroup his units to avoid being nibbled by the enemy. Murray-Lyon for his part was in favor of a retreat before establishing a line of resistance. Neither really believed they could stop the enemy.