"...Even at the risk of being annihilated"

The Japanese therefore decided to add an entire engineer regiment to each of the divisions of the XXVth Army, plus a fourth under the direct orders of Yamashita. A decision was made on a new type of bridge and the amount of equipment needed to build them. Engineers then began training frantically in the jungles of Formosa.
While these military preparations were taking place, the political and strategic situation was changing very quickly. In July, Japanese forces invaded southern Indochina and thus provided Saigon with a forward naval and air base for an assault on Malaya. On September 23, the imperial army invaded northern Indochina. Four days later, Tokyo signed the Tripartite Pact with Berlin and Rome:the two Western powers recognized Japan's right to proceed with a reorganization of the entire Far East, of which it would take the lead, and the three nations promised each other assistance mutual.
But the crucial date, as far as Malaysia is concerned, was September 6th. That day, a council was held in the presence of the emperor and a compromise, already worked out between the cabinet and the high command, was accepted. Under the terms of this compromise, a deadline would be set for diplomatic negotiations with America and preparations for war would be carried out as quickly as possible to be completed by the end of October. An attack on Russia, proposed by a group of generals, was definitively rejected; the attack in the South — Thailand and Malaya —, on the other hand, was adopted. On the other hand, Admiral Yamamoto, commander-in-chief of the combined naval and air forces, who had fought against the idea of ​​a war against America and England (because, according to him, Japan could win
a lightning victory in six months, while America would have overwhelming power in two years), was called a defeatist; the naval staff then allied itself with that of the army. The navy wanted
the landings to be preceded by an intensive bombardment of coastal defenses and airfields. Without this action, the
warships would be vulnerable to attack by the R.A.F. The military, on the other hand, invoked the element of surprise. All of its leaders were
convinced that the British would not move a finger until war was declared, which meant that they would not initiate any major air action until dawn on the 8th At that time, the Japanese 3rd Air Group would intervene and, by the superiority in numbers and quality of its aircraft, would gain mastery of the air in a few hours.
Others factors were taken into consideration. The Formosa Meteorological Officer, Dr. Nishimura, estimated that on December 6 and 7 the winds would be moderate but that on the 8th the northeast monsoon would begin and the seas would become increasingly rough along the ribs. The 8th was therefore a deadline for the landing; if time were to be wasted in a preliminary bombardment, the whole operation might fail. We would then have to wait until April to start again.
But the naval staff stuck to its idea:the risks run by the Japanese warships were unacceptable and a compromise had to be found; we were at an impasse. It was then that Vice Admiral Jisaburo Ozawa, appointed Supreme Commander of the Combined Forces, stood up and spoke. He understood the army's desire to land as soon as possible and without prior bombardment; his reasons were good and Admiral Yamamoto had to accept them. Then, to the amazement of all and the indignation of the naval staff, he declared:“I say that the navy must accept the proposals of the army, even at the risk of being annihilated. The discussion was over.
The XXVth Army still had no operational commander; it was not until November 5 that General Yamashita was appointed. Although he enjoyed a great reputation—many officers considered him the best soldier Japan had ever had—he also had many enemies, chief among them General Tojo, who had recently become prime minister after the fall of the Konoye cabinet.
Yamashita was a member of the Koda-ha or "Emperor's Clan", an extremist organization that attempted a coup in 1932. Although he did not If he hadn't been directly involved, Yamashita had seen his name scratched from the promotion lists and his chances of reaching a high command seemed very slim. However, his abilities were so remarkable that he eventually rose to the rank of general, although his past was not forgotten in many circles. Upon his return from a mission in Germany and Italy in 1941, he was given command of the army of Manchuria, because Tojo demanded that he be kept away from Tokyo and the seat of power. So even now that he was recalled and put in command of the XXVth Army, at this critical moment in Japanese history, he was under no illusions; he knew that any mistake would result in his dismissal and immediate disgrace. To make matters worse, his superior, General Terauchi, commander of the Southern Army, was also an old enemy, from whom he could expect the minimum of help and the maximum of ill will. Yamashita was therefore isolated and in a difficult situation; only a quick victory could save him.