In 1916, reconnaissance aircraft were very rare, and limited in their use. Both Jellicoe and Scheer relied on reconnaissance cruisers to locate their adversary. The two groups of reconnaissance cruisers under the command of Beatty and Hipper made contact at 02:00 and, after a brief exchange of fire, turned back to guide the bulk of their fleet.
Beatty, a popular and aggressive, sometimes impulsive leader of the Royal Navy, commanded the 52 ships of the First, Second and Fifth Cruiser Squadrons, the First, Second and Third Light Cruiser Squadrons and the First, Ninth, Tenth and Thirteenth Flotillas, all from the Scottish port of Rosyth.
At 03:45, Beatty made visual contact with Hipper and his forty ships, and their duel by interposed cruisers began. At this time, Hipper was heading south, attempting to lure Beatty into the trap of Scheer's fleet. Both sides opened fire from a distance of fifteen kilometers. After a few minutes, clouds of coal and explosives blocked all visibility. These conditions were a problem for both sides, but the sun in the west gave the Germans an advantage by drawing British ships on the horizon. At 0405 Jellicoe sent the third cruiser squadron forward under Hood to assist Beatty. Meanwhile, in the midst of the ongoing battle, Beatty's group was in trouble. After being hit five times by fire from the cruiser Von der Tann, the Indefatigable sank at 04:03 following an explosion of ammunition. More than a thousand men died in the explosion and disappeared under water in less than two minutes. Each side also lost two destroyers in the engagement.
Upon seeing the destruction of the Queen Mary, Beatty is said to have had these words:"There's something wrong with our damn ships today." But despite the rapid loss of two important buildings, Beatty changed course to attack the Germans more closely. With the arrival of the fifth squadron and the excellent British artillery, the victory changed sides, and Hipper found himself on the brink of disaster. It is important to note that Beatty's forces used 12, 13 and even 15 inch guns, while Hipper only had 11 and 12 inch guns at his disposal. This difference means that Hipper had to get closer than Beatty to open fire. The victory changed sides once again when Scheer arrived at 4:30. Beatty's position became harder to hold. Since Beatty believed that Scheer's fleet was still in port, the alert of Scheer's fleet approaching, reported by HMS Southampton, came as an unpleasant surprise. Hipper had managed to lure Beatty into Scheer's trap. Unfortunately for the Germans, the Southampton had gone too far south of the battle, allowing Beatty to escape the trap.
At 04:40, Beatty ordered his fleet to change course, hoping to lure the German fleet into the trap of the Grand Fleet. The British cruisers changed course without difficulty, but a confusion in the deck signals of the badly damaged HMS Lion left the ships of the fifth squadron on their own. When their commander, Evan-Thomas, realized that the rest of Beatty's fleet was heading in the opposite direction, he was almost out of range of Scheer's guns.
At 0457 Barham began to alter course, delayed by signal errors, and the rest of Fifth Squadron followed. For the next fifteen minutes Fifth Squadron fought the entire German fleet, Barham and Valiant firing at Hipper, Warspite and Malaya firing at Scheer. Konig, Grosser Kurfurst, Markgraf, Seydlitz, Lutzow and Derfflinger were hit during this exchange. Once out of Hipper's sight, Beatty steered north northeast and flanked Hipper with the Fifth Squadron. Lutzow, Seydlitz, and Derfflinger were hit again, and Hipper retreated. Scheer followed, hoping to bring his heavy artillery within range of Beatty. Jellicoe's cruiser squadrons were racing full steam towards Beatty's fleet, but were still hesitant to engage as they wanted to know the course of the approaching German fleet. This information was vital, because a mistake in the deployment could lead to disaster. It wasn't until 6:15 a.m. that Jellicoe was able to learn the position and course of Scheer's fleet, just as Jellicoe came within sight of Beatty's units, amid smoke and artillery flashes. /P>
For Scheer, the sight of the Grand Fleet emerging from the smoke must have been a nightmare. The Grand Fleet open fire as soon as they are within range. Recognizing his perilous position, Scher ordered all his ships to change course at once. Fortunately, if this maneuver was difficult, the German fleet managed it to perfection behind a smokescreen diffused by the German destroyers. While the trap for Scheer was set, the German artillery performed miracles, knocking out Warspite and Warrior, and blowing up Defense. The Warrior subsequently sank while attempting to return to port. The Invincible was victim of an explosion of ammunition, a German shell having hit one of its turrets at 6:33 a.m. Its explosion killed 700 men, including Admiral Hood.
But this triumph had a price. The English fire had immobilized the Lutzow, and severely damaged the other cruisers. Only their superior number of compartments saved them from a similar fate. Scheer now found himself on the defensive, still unaware that he was facing the full Grand Fleet. He changed course again in hopes of once again breaking through enemy lines to escape to his own minefields. Once again he found himself facing a line of dreadnoughts and had to retreat or else be annihilated. At this moment, a massive torpedo attack launched by the German destroyers saved the German fleet from disaster. While the effect of this torpedo salvo was in itself negligible, Jellicoe had his ships change course, believing that this was the only effective solution to a torpedo attack under the present circumstances. By the time the English fleet changed course again, Scheer was fifteen miles away. It was still possible to attack the Germans if Jellicoe ordered a quick interception.
But Jellicoe did not order this maneuver, fearing that Scheer was trying to lure the fleet into a U-boat trap or minefield. Jellicoe steered south with the aim of interposing himself between Scheer and the German ports. At 7:10 p.m., the two fleets came into contact again. Scheer ordered Hipper to charge the English fleet while ordering his own fleet out of combat. After about twenty minutes of fighting, Hipper also retreated.
Again, unwilling to follow the same course as the German fleet, Jellicoe steered southwest and managed to intercept Hipper at 8:15 p.m. During the ensuing engagement, Lutzow was sunk, and Seydlitz and Derfflinger suffered heavy damage before the British fleet again made the decision not to pursue the retreating Germans. While these decisions were later criticized, Jellicoe did not believe in the uncertainties of a nocturnal conflict. Scheer and Hipper finally managed to enter their minefields, around 3:00 a.m. on June 1. For Scheer, his arrival in German waters must have seemed like a miracle. If the English had him again in broad daylight, his chances of survival were very slim.
Then began the PR battle. Scheer and the Kaiserlische Marine claimed victory due to the number of ships sunk. The Royal Navy had lost six cruisers and eight destroyers, for a total of 6,100 dead, the German Navy had lost only one battleship, four light cruisers and three destroyers, for a total of 2,550 dead. In truth, the tally of results did not take into account the many badly damaged German buildings. Repairs would take a long time before these vessels could return to sea.
Faced with criticism of Jellicoe for not pursuing the German fleet more aggressively, Jellicoe declared that his priority was to protect the size of his fleet. His strategy was proven effective due to the virtual absence of a German fleet until the end of the war. If Jellicoe sent a telegram to the British government on June 2, 1916 to tell him that the fleet was ready and available within four hours, the German fleet was no longer fit for combat. She had also suffered such a defeat that her commanders would never again dare to confront the Navy, even once their ships were repaired.